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ABSTRACT
(
A VHDL implementation of 128-bit AES on a Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGA (lowest 
speed grade) and ML403 development board is developed from a Verilog design that 
adheres to the FIPS-197 standard, adding innovative features: automatic start of 
transform, CBC mode, key permutation value readout and store, and output of each 
intermediate state value. Core processing rate achieves 640 Mbps; 27 Mbps is achieved in 
practice, via peripheral register access. A non-linear, cryptographically secure LFSR- 
CASR pseudo-random number generator with a cycle length of 280-243-237+l is 
translated into C and C++ from Verilog and evaluated. A C design and implementation of 
IPsec, based on the Five-layer security framework, using these primitives, is presented. 
The rate of IPsec packet processing achieved is 2 Mbps, determined by direct pulse 
measurement. A PC-based GUI drives the IPsec implementation and serves it policies, 
with a framework for flexibly choosing services, mechanisms and primitives using the 
SMIB.
Index Terms: IPsec, Virtex-4, FPGA, AES, pseudo-random number generator, 
Software Design, Cryptography
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TTL -  Time To Live -  field of an Internet Protocol (IP) datagram 
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VHSIC -  Very High-Speed Integrated Circuit -  see VHDL
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Motivation
To begin with the virtually self-evident, companies need communications. In any 
economy beyond that of the 1700s (in the USA), electronic communications are needed. 
Indeed, these are valuable to individuals for personal use, as well. Telegraph, telephone, 
telex and facsimile systems performed all the services of electronic communication 
systems in their day, for decades, since the 1800s, and it was not until the 1990s that the 
Internet began to rise to predominance, replacing and supplementing those systems with 
the mass ability to transmit documents. The facsimile machine has been largely rendered 
redundant by email and the WWW (World Wide Web), and telephony is in the process of 
becoming an Internet application at the time of this writing, although it is not now 
known, of course, if the entire legacy PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network) will 
be replaced by the Internet and if so, how long that will require.
Partly due to its public nature, and partly due to economies of scale, the Internet is 
extremely economical to use, which gives a reason for companies and individuals to 
make great use of it. However, since it is public, it is necessary to secure its use for 
general privacy purposes. Today, generally only companies have the resources to perform 
mass securing of Internet services, although personal software packages such as PGP 
(Pretty Good Privacy) are available for individual use -  PGP performs security services 
at the user, or application layer [PGPI]. For mass use, companies use encryption to 
implement VPNs (Virtual Private Networks), using the Internet as their own private 
communication network. VPNs are technically available to individuals, since Microsoft 
Windows XP, for one, is equipped to perform IPsec (Internet Protocol security), but its 
setup still requires technical expertise and cooperation that are mostly beyond the abilities 
of unorganized individuals. Notably, the “Free S/WAN” movement and software package 
has attempted to provide IPsec to individuals; so far without success [FSWAN].
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Use of a public network gives some of the strongest possible reasons to adopt 
security measures against attacks that threaten, although managers of private networks 
are well advised to adopt additional security measures beyond the physical. Some attacks 
and their countermeasures are as follows:
• Masquerade, unauthorized access, repudiation: need an 
authentication/access control service
• Message modification, replay: need an integrity service
• Spying: need a confidentiality service
• Denial of service (DoS)/unauthorized access: need an availability/access 
control service
These imply the existence of five basic services: authentication, integrity, 
confidentiality, access control and availability. Two others are anti-replay (a form of 
integrity, given that the time a message is sent should be counted as part of its makeup), 
and non-repudiation (which consists of authentication plus audit logging or message 
retention).
The combination of “IP” (Internet Protocol) and “Security” creates the 
abbreviation “IPsec”. Although it was originally intended to secure all IP transactions, it 
found its most natural application in VPNs [FER1999]. IPsec can be thought of as an 
adaptation of the general concept of VPNs to the Internet [PER2000].
1.2. Overview of IPsec
The idea of IPsec dates back to 1994, and the most important four RFCs 
(Requests For Comment) were issued in 1998 [STA2003]. They are: RFC 2401,
“Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol”, RFC 2402, “IP Authentication Header”, 
RFC 2406, “IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)”, and RFC 2408, “Internet Security 
Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)” -  see the “RFCs” subsection in 
the References section -  a full list of IPsec RFCs is available [IPS2005].
A brief overview of IPsec is presented here. A comprehensive and detailed 
description of IPsec has already been done in the working group to which this author
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belongs, in the ECE department at the University of Windsor, by a previous Master’s 
candidate; please see [FAH2005].
It is desirable to make the security system transparent to the user, for if the user 
has to perform any operation to accomplish the security transform in addition to sending 
the message, the additional burden will likely be refused, done carelessly, or, with the 
best will in the world, absent-mindedly forgotten in the press of competing primary 
duties. The IPsec layer or sublayer is located below the IP layer, just above the link layer 
(see Figure 1 for the OSI model adapted to five layers for the Internet -  OSI stands for 
“Open Systems Interconnection”), and thus is transparent to the user, who generally deals 
directly with only the Application layer.
(Internet Protocol)
Security - a security system
Figure 1. The OSI model adapted to five layers for the Internet -  also showing IPsec
IPsec provides confidentiality, integrity, authentication, anti-replay services, and 
can be used for non-repudiation and access control, although common implementations 
of those two are typically weak (see the final paragraph in section 2.2.1. “Key 
Exchange”). It does not provide a formal availability service, and suffers from weakness 
in this area (see section 2.2.1., “Key Exchange”).
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1.2.1. Key Exchange
There are three different modes of key exchange in IPsec: Main Mode, Aggressive 
Mode, and Quick Mode. There are also some utility modes, such as NGM (New Group 
Mode), used to negotiate a new group for Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, carried out 
under protection of IS AKMP (Internet Security Association and Key Management 
Protocol) phase 1. Main Mode and Aggressive Mode are alternate modes that can be used 
to establish the “Phase 1” SAs (Security Associations), whereas Quick Mode is an 
exchange that uses the protection of the Phase 1 SAs to establish the Phase 2 SAs that are 
the actual IPsec working SAs that protect the data packets ([ZH02000] pg. 1606).
1.2.1.1. Main Mode
The initiator sends a cookie and a proposed phase 1 SA. The responder replies 
with a cookie and the accepted phase 1 SA. The initiator sends its Diffie-Hellman public 
key and a nonce, and the responder replies with its Diffie-Hellman public key and nonce. 
Both sides compute the Diffie-Hellman shared secret, or key. The initiator sends its 
signed certificate to establish its identity and the responder replies with its signed 
certificate ([AIE2002] Figure 3, pg. 55). Signing in this case means to encrypt a hash of 
the message using the shared secret -  in general, signing means encryption, using a 
shared secret, or a private key in a public key cryptosystem, of the message itself or of a 
hash of the message. A total of six messages are sent.
1.2.1.2. Aggressive Mode
In Aggressive Mode, only three messages are exchanged. The initiator cookie, 
proposed Phase 1 S A, Diffie-Hellman public key and initiator ID (identity) are sent at 
once, and the the responder replies with its own cookie, the accepted Phase 1 SA, its 
Diffie-Hellman public k ey , its ID, as well as its signed certificate. The initiator then 
sends its signed certificate ([AIE2002] Figure 4, pg. 56).
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1.2.1.3. Quick Mode
See Figure 2. The initator sends its proposed Phase 2 SA, nonce, hash, optional 
DH public key, and optionally, client IDs. The responder replies with the accepted Phase 
2 S A, nonce, hash, optional DH public key, and optionally, client IDs. As a handshake, 
the initiator sends a hash of the nonces ([ZH02000] pg. 1608).
It can be seen that these protocols are susceptible to a DoS (Denial of Service) 
attack. Since there is no burden of identification or computation placed upon the initiator, 
attackers can make the server perform computationally-expensive modular 
exponentiations in order to calculate the Diffie-Hellman shared secret. See section 2.2.1., 
“Key Exchange”, for a full discussion.
1.2.2. Security Policy Database and SMIB
An IPsec implementation requires an SPD (Security Policy Database) for the 
purpose of negotiating security associations. The SPD contains, in part, selectors to 
determine whether or not to process a packet, for a given policy of how to process the
in it ia to r responder
gash of the
Figure 2. Quick mode
1.2.1.4. Key Exchange -  Conclusions
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packet selected. The selectors can be set to “all”, as “wildcards”, and the sense of the 
selectors can be set as meaning either to select or not select the packets with the selected 
characteristics. Using an SPI (Security Policy Index) to uniquely identify a Security 
Association (SA), an SPD entry can refer to more than one SA, and a single SA can be 
derived from more than one SPD entry, in which case more than one SPD entry would 
have the same SPI -  see Table 1 for an illustration.
From To Protocol Port Policy SPI(s)
1.1.1.1 2 2 2 .2 TCP 1000 ESP w. 3DES ! ’3
1.1.1.1 22 .2 2 * * ESP w.AES 2
Table 1. Key elements of a Security Policy Database (SPD)
In addition, it can be useful to define a Security Management Information 
Database (SMIB), containing the SPD and other information useful to running a security 
and communication system, such as the local address, clients served by the IPsec 
operating entity, or node, the functional modules available to the system to do key 
management and perform the other services noted before, and the parameters needed to 
control them. See [KEN1994] for a list of ideas.
1.2.3. Security Associations
A security association (SA) defines the agreement under which two entities will 
use IPsec to communicate, in a particular direction; i.e., two SAs are needed for 
bidirectional communication. The S A contains, at a minimum, the addresses of the 
communicating entities, the protocol and mode to be used, the SPI, and the algorithms to 
be used -  see Table 2 for an illustration of a Security Association Database (SADB), 
which contains the information specifying the node’s SAs.
From To Protocol Mode SPI Policy
2.2.2.2 1.1.1.1 ESP Tunnel 10 64-bit DES
1.1.1.1 2.2.22 ESP Transport 11 168-bit DES
Table 2. Key elements of a Security Association Database
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1.2.4. Services
1.2.4.1. Authentication Header Protocol
The Authentication Header (AH) Protocol adds a header to IP packets, that 
contains a signed hash of the message, to transform the packet into an IPsec packet. This 
provides authentication and integrity services. The header also contains the SPI so that 
the S A can be identified, a sequence number for anti-replay purposes, and some other 
data, such as the type of header immediately following, and the “payload” length of the 
Authentication Header.
1.2.4.2. Encapsulating Security Payload Protocol
In the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Protocol, each IP packet’s contents 
are encrypted, providing confidentiality and encryption. The contents are first padded to 
make them a natural number multiple of the encryption block size, and to provide space 
for the padding length field itself, meaning that if the contents are already a multiple of 
the block size, padding must still be added. A header is added that contains the SPI and 
sequence number, and a variable-length authentication field is specified, following the 
payload data. If an Initial Vector (IV) is included with the ciphertext, it is usually not 
encrypted ([STA2003] pg. 183); in this work it was realized that if Cipher-Block 
Chaining (CBC) were to be used, and the IV is first encrypted without chaining, 
following which the IV is used, an attacker would be able to tell if the first block of data 
happened to be all zeroes, because then the encrypted IV and the first encrypted block of 
data would be identical (note that for the strongest possible security, security algorithms 
are generally made thoroughly public in order to receive the most possible scrutiny). If 
chaining were to be done from the encrypted IV, the encrypted IV would itself be the IV, 
meaning that time would have been wasted in a needless transform done to the IV.
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1.2.4.3. Anti-Replay Service
Each IPsec packet contains a 32-bit sequence number to prevent replay attacks. If 
a packet with an identical sequence number is received, it is discarded. Also, if a packet 
with a sequence number that is too old is received, it is discarded. Of course, if  the packet 
authentication fails, the packet is discarded. The foregoing are events that should be 
logged for audit [STA2003]. A settable “window size” determines the lowest sequence 
number that will be accepted, from the highest sequence number so far received. When 
the sequence number overflows, the SA should be renegotiated, although whether that 
will be done is generally also negotiated.
1.2.5. Modes of Operation
Two modes of operation are defined for each of the AH and ESP protocol, 
Transport Mode and Tunnel Mode. In Transport Mode, the IP packet’s header is modified 
as needed for retransmission and the IPsec header is inserted following. Any transform, 
such as ESP, is done only to the packet payload. In Tunnel Mode, a new IP header is 
appended to the beginning of the IP packet, following which the IPsec header is added, 
following which the entire IP packet is included, unchanged in AH protocol and 
transformed only, in ESP. This allows the original IP packet to continue on unchanged 
after its transmission as an IPsec packet, which is very useful when a gateway is 
employed, and for VPNs.
1.3. Previous Work
As noted after, (see section 2.3.2., “The Erfani Patent”), in previous work in the 
author’s group in the ECE department at the University of Windsor ([FAH2005] section
4.2, pp. 84-94, and Chapter V), a five-layer framework for the design of a security system 
was introduced. The five layers are: the Policy, Management, Services, Mechanisms and 
Primitives layers (see section 2.3.2., after). These five layers were “fleshed out” into 
modules and several operating scenarios were described. These are: an IPsec session 
scenario, in which the security system is used to establish an S A and send a packet via 
ESP Transport mode ([FAH2005] section 5.1.1, pp. 100-105), a comparison between
8
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policies used for secure vs. very secure applications ([FAH2005] section 5.1.2, pg. 105), 
and a description of a combination of SAs in which IPsec AH protocol packets are 
tunnelled through an ESP SA between two routers ([FAH2005] section 5.1.3, pg. 106).
1.4. Problem Statement
Generally, the software approach to implementation is versatile, but resulting 
implementations are relatively slow. Use of “hardware”, or dedicated integrated circuits 
(ICs) -  or even LSI and MSI (Low Scale and Medium Scale Integration) ICs to perform 
a task results in implementations that work much faster, but versatility suffers.
Cryptographic operations, such as encryption, decryption, hashing and random 
number generation are generally extremely computationally intensive, making hardware 
accelerators extremely desirable.
This leads to the question: How can the five-layer security architecture be used to 
implement IPSec in hardware, given that the overhead of using cryptography mandates 
hardware acceleration?
1.5. Motivation for General Layering
In implementation, breaking the task into implementation layers, from hardware, 
to software drivers, middleware and user-interface layers is useful to make it manageable 
and doable by a group of individuals or working groups, each of which does his own 
component. Modules can also be upgraded and replaced separately. Each layer uses the 
services of the layer below (except for the lowest layer -  in perhaps a system-limited 
sense) to provide services to the layer above (except for the highest layer -  again, in 
perhaps a narrow sense). This was done in the seven-layer OSI model which specifies the 
following layers, from top to bottom: Application, Presentation, Session, Transport, 
Network, Link and Physical. The seven were reduced to five for the Internet: Application, 
Transport, Network, Link and Physical. Note that in this modified OSI model, IPsec, if
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implemented via BITS (Bump-In-The-Stack), would fit at the bottom of the Network 
(Packet), or IP layer, since IPsec is applied after packetization just before sending to the 
Link layer -  note that the diagrams in [FUM1998] (Figure 2, pg. 191), and in [HUN1998] 
(Figure 11, pg. 1118), depicting IPsec between the IP and TCP (Transmission Control 
Protocol) layers, are not right.
It is also useful to break the task down into conceptual, functional, or managerial 
levels, as in [ERF2003], which proposes five layers: Policy, Management, Services, 
Mechanisms and Primitives (Figure 3).
Policies yanaaement Services f^sch&ftisms PiffnH m i
User Interface;
Midcilwsre
(Sublayers)
Databases
Data control
Tasks -  H
Sub-tasks
Math functions,
cryptography * 1 /■' sVSfi?? y-*
'Drivers' . i f  !> M
Hardware
Figure 3. Functional vs. technical layers
As indicated in Figure 3, in a relation proposed in this work, a given functional 
layer requires presence at its and all lower implementation layers; the lower 
implementation levels have to contain “sub” functions to support the higher functionality. 
Policies require entering from the user interface, presence in databases, and control of the 
data. Management may require some entry from the user interface as well, but it at least 
is specified by the data entered into the databases. Services and Mechanisms are tasks „ 
and subtasks, and primitives require the low-level math functions and cryptography. 
Finally, in order for the electronic communications to proceed, the software must operate 
the hardware via drivers.
It might theoretically be possible to be more efficient with an “ad hoc” unlayered 
design, but a sufficiently complex system would not then be understandable and
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improvements or bug fixes would eventually become impossible, at some level of 
complexity. Disadvantages of layering include the necessity of passing data down 
through the multiple layers, which can slow down processing. Strict separation of layers 
can prevent a successful system design if passing needed data is disallowed on the 
grounds that it appears to “belong” only to one certain layer. A layer may duplicate 
functionality present in another layer, perhaps due to insufficient communication and 
planning between the respective working groups. An example of this latter inefficiency is 
error checking and recovery, which is often done at the link layer as well as on “an end- 
to-end basis” ([KUR2000], 3rd ed., pg. 47).
1.6. Motivation to use FPGAs
FPGAs (Field-Programmable Gate Arrays) contain thousands of blocks of 
identical generic logic which can be configured via programming like a static RAM 
(Random Access Memory) to operate in an extremely wide range of different behaviours. 
They are cost-effective in production and testing since this can be done in-house with 
affordable equipment, and devices are provided by manufacturers that make available 
many resources (block RAM, clock dividers, etc.) in a structured way,
FPGAs offer some of the performance levels of hardware and also some of the 
versatility of software, since they can be reconfigured for different functionality, even 
during runtime. Configuration files, or “bit files”, for programming the FPGA, can be 
stored in memory, such as Flash EEPROM (Electrically-Erasable Programmable Read- 
Only Memory), or “Flash”, and recalled at will. Stored configurations, such as encryption 
schemes, can be compressed for storage [DAN2000]. Field upgrades for such things as 
bug fixes and new standards are possible, even using pin-compatible devices [CHE2002].
FPGAs offer lower non-recurring engineering (NRE) costs compared to custom or 
semi-custom ICs, such as ASICs (Application-Specific ICs), since they come ready­
made, and need only be configured. On the other hand, they incur higher per-unit (PU)
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costs, such that if  sales of more than 100,000 units occur, it would be more economical to 
spend the NRE costs to produce an ASIC ([KHA2006] pg. 8, [OGA2004]).
Software running on a general-purpose processor can typically produce AES 
(Advanced Encryption Standard -  Rijndael is the name of the specific algorithm adopted) 
throughputs of low tens of Mbps (i.e., 30) [DAN2000], whereas FPGAs can achieve up to 
176 Mbps implementing DES (the Data Encryption Standard) and up to Gbps rates 
implementing AES; for example, speeds of 964 Mbps ([WOL2004] pp. 550, 554) and 
1.197 Gbps [LUJ2005] have been reported (see section 2.4., “Implementations of IPsec,” 
after). An ASIC processor achieved 2.29 Gbits/s of AES throughput in a 0.18pm CMOS 
(Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor) standard-cell technology in 2002 
[SCH2002],
1.7. Embedded Systems
An embedded system is a computerized module or component containing built-in 
software, usually on an IC chip, which is not changed in its normal course of operation. 
As part of its computerization, it also contains a computer processor, but that is not a 
defining characteristic, since non-embedded systems such as PCs (Personal Computers) 
also contain processors. For example, in this work, the normal operation of the system 
does not include loading and running the firmware, i.e., once the bit file, which contains 
both the FPGA configuration (the “soft hardware”) and the (“firm”) software, has been 
loaded to the board. Although this work involved loading the ML403 board on a regular 
basis, every single time it was used, this can be seen as engineering development work, 
not regular user operation, for which the bit file could be stored in the Flash EEPROM 
(Electrically-Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory) and automatically loaded at 
bootup. The ML403 board can also be loaded by a user via a “flash card”, in which case 
its status as an embedded system would be greatly mitigated. For another example, a PC 
is not an embedded system, because the user operates it by loading programs to its RAM 
IC chip or chips from its hard disk, such as by clicking with a “mouse”, in its normal 
course of operation. Internally, however, a PC contains an embedded system, the BIOS
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(the Basic Input-Output System), which historically could not be very easily changed by 
the user at all (PCs first appeared in the early 1980s, and somewhat earlier, too, in a 
general sense, before the IBM PC appeared on the market). Today, the BIOS chip can be 
a Flash EEPROM, which can be changed by the user via a special procedure, not in its 
normal course of operation. Another example of an embedded system might be a PDA 
(Personal Digital Assistant), able to perform many applications. Another might be the 
anti-lock braking module in a car. Yet another might be a coffee maker, in which the 
software would most likely be present in a PROM, soldered directly to the PCB (Printed- 
Circuit Board), to keep manufacturing costs low. Another might be a washing machine, 
in which the PROM might conceivably be placed in a socket, for possible warranty 
repairs. Another might be a “set-top box”, capable of having its software in its Flash 
EEPROM updated “over the air” by the service provider. Clearly, the more easily the 
software can be changed, and the more frequently it actually is, the less “embedded” the 
system is.
1.8. Objectives
This work has the following objectives: (1) to produce a block-level design of an 
IPSec processor, (2) implementing each layer of the Five-Layer paradigm, and (3) 
implement at least a key portion of it, using FPGA hardware accelerators; (4) to avoid 
pitfalls -  note that the implementation of a security system can detract from its maximum 
theoretical strength as planned in corresponding standards -  standards do not specify 
implementation details; and (5) to compare the performance results achieved to those of 
others.
1.9. Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature 
pertaining to IPsec and its implementations. A brief history of and background to IPsec 
are presented and its applicability is discussed. IPsec key exchange, as a noteable point of 
weakness in IPsec, is treated. An overview of high-level management schemes for IPsec
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is presented, including the patent by S. Erfani, which is the background for this work. 
Software and hardware implementations of IPsec and its primitives are surveyed, the 
latter in FPGAs and ASICs, and an example application is presented. High Level 
Synthesis is discussed, as well as random number generators. Chapter 3 presents the 
design of an AES hardware accelerator in VHDL (Very High-Speed Integrated Circuits 
Hardware Design Language), as ported, or translated, from Verilog and implemented on 
a Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGA using the Xilinx ML403 development board, the design of test 
software for it, the design of a CSPRNG (Cryptographically-Secure Pseudo-Random 
Number Generator) in C (the programming language), as ported from Verilog, the design 
of an implementation of a portion of an IPsec implementation in C using the novel 
security design framework proposed by S. Erfani (see [ERF2003] and [FAH2005]), the 
design of two demonstration GUIs (Graphical User Interfaces) using MSVC++V6 
(MicroSoft Visual C++ ver. 6), and the design of a CLI (Command-Line Interface) 
suitable for performance-testing of the IPsec implementation. The test methodologies are 
also presented. In Chapter 4, the results acquired from testing the AES implementation, 
the CSPRNG, and the IPsec implementation are presented and analyzed. Lastly, Chapter 
5 presents conclusions and discusses areas for future work. In each of Chapters 3-5, 
section 1 contains the AES implementation discussion, section 2 contains the CSPRNG 
discussion and section 3 contains the IPsec implementation discussion.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
2.1. Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of IPsec implementation and management in a 
variety of different areas: industry white papers, FPGA papers, papers on ASICs, papers 
on implementation of primitives such as AES and Random Number Generators (RNGs), 
papers on High-Level Synthesis (HLS), papers on IKE (Internet Key Exchange), and 
system-wide, or "high-level" papers. The Erfani patent [ERF2003], which is the paradigm 
for the present research, is presented. It is shown that the state of the art in the literature 
contemplates system-wide approaches to IPsec, but there is still room for improvement in 
terms of explicit recognition of all layers of an IPsec system for the purpose of managing 
its design and implementation (see the author’s overview paper [WIE2006]).
2.1.1. History of IPsec
IPsec refers to the “Secure IP” set of proposals published by the IETF (the 
Internet Engineering Task Force) as RFCs [IETF]. The formal standards process in the 
IETF began in 1992 (compare 1994 as stated in [STA2003] before, in section 1.2.) with 
the publication of the first draft charter for the IPSEC working group [DUN2001], and as 
of April 29,2005, there were 31 RFCs listed in the IPsec Charter [ITEF-IPSEC].
IPsec has now been in existence for so long that the pace of technological change 
has obsoleted part of it -  the original, or “single” DES (Data Encryption Standard) 
specified only a 56-bit key and can now be broken by an exhaustive search attack in a 
few days using publicly-published techniques. The FreeS/WAN [FSWAN] organization 
has disallowed “56-bit” DES on the grounds that it is now too weak (even though that 
level of security would prevent real-time monitoring of transmissions and could allow the 
continuing accumulation of ciphertext faster than it could be cracked), which technically 
places them in violation of the standard. In Oct 2, 2000,The US National Bureau of 
Standards officially adopted one of the proposals, Rijndael, which was submitted in the
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competition to provide the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), replacing DES 
[JAR2003], [REJ2003], but the movement to replace DES as the minimal encryption 
standard with 3DES did not succeed. However, DES expired as a standard in 1998 
[ELB2000].
Another debate was over simplex vs. duplex data flows. Since data might need to 
be transmitted in only one direction, it was decided to base IPsec on simplex connections; 
hence Security Associations (SAs) are one-way [DUN2001].
2.1.2. Government Politics
The US government’s reaction to new encryption technologies was one of the 
strongest: it classified cryptographic hardware and software as “munitions” and forbade 
its export. Furthermore, US nationals were forbidden from even providing any technical 
assistance whatsoever to the development or maintenance of cryptographic products that 
would be available in other countries. This caused severe problems for the development 
of IPsec in that most of the IPsec working group members were US citizens and could 
only work on the standard, not provide any technical examples or do any testing. 
Implementations of IPsec had to be developed with the input of US citizens entirely 
forbidden in order to keep US government regulations from preventing their distribution. 
This resulted in the slowing of design and deployment of IPsec-compliant systems 
[DUN2001].
2.1.3. The Standards Process -  Outcome
Input to the standards process came from hardware vendors, who wanted “bump- 
in-the-wire” (BITW -  compare BITS) devices to tunnel IP packets through hardware 
encryption systems. Adding this capability to the standards increased their extent 
[DUN2001].
The standards produced are very complex. This is an inescapable consequence of 
a committee process; a much more streamlined standard would be developed by having a 
competition and awarding a large monetary prize to the winner, which would save
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everyone money overall due to the never-ending costs of dealing with the permanent 
excessive complexity that resulted from the committee process. The competition 
approach was seemingly successfully used to select Rijndael as the AES. Excessive 
complexity invites misunderstanding, resulting in implementation and user mistakes that 
leave security holes. Industry, government and academia were each involved in IPsec, 
and the results show in the multiple options specified. One harsh but useful critique of 
IPsec stated that although IPsec is the best security option in this area, it is not possible 
for the authors to determine whether or not IPsec is secure [FERI 999].
2.1.4. Applicability of IPsec
IPsec is really only useful for implementing VPNs (Virtual Private Networks). 
The following are some areas in which IPsec was tried and either found unworkable or 
workable with difficulties ([ARK2005] pp. 242-246).
2.1.4.1. Neighbour Discovery Protocol (NDP)
There is a basic logical flaw in attempting to use IPsec for NDP: a “chicken-and- 
egg” problem. In order to exchange keys with the neighbours, they have to be discovered. 
In order to discover them securely, keys would have to be exchanged with them. Solving 
this and other problems that were involved, caused additional thorny problems, inducing 
the IETF to abandon IPsec for use in NDP.
2.1.4.2. IP Mobility
There are some basic concerns with using IPsec and Mobile IP. IP addresses can 
change rapidly, and new IPsec tunnels have to be set up, which could cause so much 
overhead that any actual user communication would not have any time to run. The 
implementation approach to IPsec -  relying on IP addresses, which is not a correct 
approach (see the final paragraph in section 2.2.1., “Key Exchange”) -  has to be changed 
to mitigate this. Another problem is how the mobile node could continue to set up Mobile 
IP tunnels to the host node if the host node is behind a firewall or gateway and the mobile
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node travels away from the LAN. These problems are not insurmountable and IPsec is 
still used, running it over the Mobile IP tunnels.
Aside from these, there is the question of using IPsec to secure the binding 
updates in which the mobile node informs the host of its new IP address. A global 
authentication infrastructure would be required for this, which does not exist. Also, such 
an infrastructure would have to track all IP addresses assigned to users and provide this 
information in a secure way, which would be impractical, to say the least. Instead of 
using IPsec, a different set of mechanisms was adopted which use the routing 
infrastructure to assist in authorization of the mobile node.
2.1.4.3. Network Management Protocols
Although IPsec could provide security for all management traffic in a network, it 
itself does not provide means with which to differentiate nodes in order to provide them 
with different privileges, since it was not designed for that, but rather to identify different 
SAs between different users. These protocols would have to add their own user 
authentication mechanisms at the application layer.
2.1.4.4. Streaming Multimedia
Streaming Multimedia uses RTP (Real-time Transport Protocol), which changes 
port numbers dynamically. This would prevent use of IPsec implementations that rely on 
stable IP addresses, upper layer protocol identifiers, and port numbers to locate the 
policies and SAs to use.
2.2. Operational Aspects of IPsec
2.2.1. Key Exchange (
The Key Exchange protocol has a number of weaknesses which were the subject 
of several investigations.
18
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
The Key Exchange protocol is rather susceptible to a Denial of Service attack due 
to the acceptance of Diffie-Hellman (DH) values; the initiator (or client) can have the 
responder (or server) doing modular exponentiation for nothing. Even though cookies are 
used, a Distributed Denial of Service attack can always be mounted. Also, since ISAKMP 
uses a date and time stamp as a responder cookie, these must be left behind in the 
responder in order to track initiators, meaning that the responder can be clogged with 
these, giving rise to a so-called “cookie crumb” attack. Instead, as in the Photuris 
protocol [RFC2522], the responder cookie should be regenerable from sender 
information and one local secret ([SIM1999] pg. 3, [RFC2522] pg. 18). There is no 
resource-limitation feature in ISAKMP, as in Photuris -  an initiator can collect ISAKMP 
responses in a “cookie jar” and then send them all rapidly as key exchange messages 
([SIM1999] pg. 4). A saboteur, or “Monkey In The Middle” (MITM) can simulate the 
initiator to the responder and vice-versa, sending each of them different DH keys so that 
they waste resources computing a non-matching “shared secret” and fail to discover the 
attack until later verification fails ([SIM1999] pg. 4) (Note that this is not to be confused 
with the “Man In The Middle” attack, in which the attacker maintains the illusion, to both 
parties, that they are each secretly communicating with the other, in order to breach the 
confidentiality of the communication). Aggressive Mode eliminates the initial cookie 
exchange, thereby reducing its utility as a counter against DoS attacks. It does not 
provide identity protection, but it is intended for mobile users, who most need it, due to 
the ease of eavesdropping on wireless links ([SIM1999] pg. 5). Quick Mode opens the 
door to a DoS-Replay attack in which an attacker simply replays the Quick Mode packets 
and the responder uses all of its resources decrypting the packets only to find that the 
nonces used are the same ([SIM1999] pg. 6). Additional flaws noted in [SIM1999], (pp. 
6-8) include the overly general IKE/ISAKMP framework that relies on a Domain Of 
Interpretation (DOI), requiring further negotiations to agree on specifications, the 
addition of modes and options which defeats scalability and simplicity, inadequate and 
inconsistent error messaging, unpadded ID field sizes that indicate the types of contents 
such as IP addresses, and unauthenticated fields that could be used as Trojan-Horse 
channels.
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However, there seems to be a mistaken diagnosis of a possible “Man In The 
Middle” attack in [ZH02000], pg. 1609. Its analysis is that a MITM attack is made 
possible because the final hash sent by the responder in Main Mode is done using the 
initiator’s suggested SA. An attacker can pose as the initiator in the SA exchange and 
choose one of several SA offers for the responder and a different one for the initiator. A 
check of the final hash that is received by the initiator, done by the initator, using the SA 
supplied to it, will verify the final hash sent. However, the final hash sent from the 
initiator to the responder should fail its check due to different SAs in use without the 
MITM any longer, and so should the final hash sent from responder to initiator. This 
problem seems to be the same, then, as the “Monkey In The Middle” vulnerability noted 
before.
Also noted in [ZH02000], pg. 1610, is the possibility of an active attack in which 
the identity of a correspondent can be learned. Since no authentication is done until initial 
SAs are set up, an attacker could pose as a responder and learn the identities of any 
initiator when the SA is set up and the initiator sends its identity.
Several papers provided suggestions to improve key exchange by suggesting new 
and different protocols, as discussed in the following section.
[AIE2002] suggested a pair of protocols, called JFKi and JFKr, for “Just Fast 
Keying”, “initiator” and “responder”, respectively; the former was designed to provide 
identity protection for the initiator in the key exchange and the latter to provide it for the 
responder. Applications would be an anonymous client contacting a public server, vs. 
peer-to-peer. These protocols combat DoS attacks against the responder by not requiring 
the responder to perform modular computation until the initiator has first done so, and • 
established round-trip communication. This basic idea is also the idea of [CH02003] (pp. 
332-333).
Identity protection is provided to the initiator in JFKi because after doing the key 
calculation, the initiator sends its identity encrypted. In JFKr, the responder sends its
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identity encrypted after receiving the initiator’s identity. Active identity protection is not 
possible for both initiator and responder, as noted ([AIE2002] pg. 52), due to the DoS 
protection for the responder -  the initiator has to send its ID first, because the responder 
can’t be allowed to go ahead with modular computation until the initiator has taken on 
that burden first. Thus the initiator will be subject to an active ID attack in using the JFKr 
protocol, but not in the JFKi protocol.
It seems that the possibility of a “Man In The Middle Attack” was forgotten; to 
combat that, public keys exchanged should be signed by a CA (Certificate Authority) at 
the time that one side sends its identity.
Another proposal ([CH02003] pg. 329), involves “client puzzles” in which the 
server requires a client to solve a computationally-intensive puzzle before the responder 
will create state or do its own computations. The server sends a hash containing its nonce, 
to the client, along with a partial solution to the hash. The client has to do a certain 
amount of computation to find the nonce and it has to return the correct nonce before the 
server will authenticate it, while the server only has to store the nonce for each client. The 
client's workload increases rapidly and linearly with the number of requests it makes, 
whereas the line representing linear increase of storage and work at the server has a very 
low slope when shown on a graph ([LEI2000] pg. 7). The server could vary the difficulty 
of its puzzles in direct relation (or more) to its load.
It is to be hoped that the debate process within the IETF will adopt these and/or 
other suggestions for improving the present easily-attackable state of IKE/ISAKMP.
Finally, related to key exchange, an example of the way that implementation can 
cause security holes is in the practice of treating an IP address as being authenticated by 
the IPsec AH protocol, since that is what gateways or firewalls can examine for filtering 
purposes. Actually, the AH authenticates the packets as coming from a user who knows 
the key. ([FER1999] pg. 5) This means that a different user could use the trusted IP 
address, set up SAs, and be trusted as a different party. This kind of masquerade is
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precisely what authentication is supposed to prevent. Since IP addresses are so easily 
forged, identification must depend upon the possession of secret knowledge, not upon IP 
addresses ([SIM1999] pg. 6). A general statement of this problem is that somehow 
binding has to be achieved between entities that are outside of the protocol and their 
purported identities within the protocol. A related problem is that of different protocols 
using different names for the same entity [ROE2001].
2.3. Management and Architecture
2.3.1. Other Management Proposals
[GUT2004] has proposed and developed an approach to dealing with the 
complexity involved in configuring real-world security systems, in order to prevent 
oversights that cause security holes. The method takes four steps: (1) modeling, (2) 
expressing security goals, (3) deriving algorithms and (4) implementing. Modeling 
expresses the security system in mathematical terms which allows it to be processed by 
algorithms to check for missed areas whose validity in turn can be verified. Thus a 
security system can be checked for correctness in the design phase before the expense of 
implementation is incurred.
[TRC2003] has pointed out the paradigm of low-level to high-level interactions 
and that at each level, the needs of technology, the organization and government
■ -J
mandates must be taken into account (Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Aspects of E-business security technical layers
“Approaches related to security of IS (Information Systems) are to be linked 
within appropriate methodology to achieve optimal and balanced solutions for an 
enterprise.” ([TRC2003] pg. 359). The security of E-business should be designed along 
with the E-business and not added in as an afterthought. Unfortunately IPsec is an 
afterthought to IPv4.
[DUF2002] has proposed a three-level architecture for security management for 
distributed multimedia services, arranged in three layers: service, middleware and 
network ([DUF2002] Figure 1, pg. 364) -  note that the unlabeled ellipses represent 
additional services and managers according to their layer (The ACM -  Association for 
Computing Machinery -  did not grant permission to reproduce this figure).
Note that functional concepts at a certain high level require implementation at its 
level and at all lower levels; for example the policy rules need handling here at the 
Middleware level as well as the Network level.
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[PAR2002] has proposed a “C-ISCAP” (Controlled Internet Secure Connectivity 
Assurance Platform), “which is an internet information security system based on IPsec.” 
(Figure 5).
CA
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Figure 5. Another implementation-oriented layered architecture for IPsec management. Reproduced 
with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.
Here, ISE stands for “Internet Security Evaluation System”, which evaluates 
system safety and attempts to proactively identify threats. SEPS is the security policy 
database, SEMS is the Security Management System, “AUTOKEM” is the automatic key 
exchange mechanism, using a CA (Certificate Authority) to prevent “Man In The 
Middle” attacks, UKEM is the “Universal Key Management System”, SPDB is the 
Security Policy Database, SADB is the Security Association Database and “UGINE” is 
the “Universal IPsec Engine”.
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In a follow-up paper, [KIM2002], it is proposed to use multiple secure IKE 
sessions in parallel when one C-ISCAP system needs to communicate with more than one 
other, by using different Diffie-Hellman random numbers in each signature to keep track 
of the different sessions. A “chicken and egg” dilemma, somewhat similar to the one 
mentioned before, would result if the policies for creating IPsec associations were to be 
distributed using IPsec. To improve communication between the UGINE and the SEPS, 
two separate stacks, one for each communication direction, are proposed.
A design at the Mechanisms and Primitives level was provided by [FER2005] in 
proposing a multi-accelerator. Each accelerator was provided with its own work queue 
and a scheduler distributed the work among the accelerators and the CPU (Central 
Processing Unit). A scheduling algorithm was developed that controlled this distribution 
of IPsec packet processing. Soft QoS (Quality of Service) could be supported in that 
higher-priority bit streams would be provided with a higher-priority access to the 
scheduler.
[LIM2003] proposed a system of policy distribution using a four-layer 
architecture of management, processing, consumer and target, with the policy data base 
serving the upper three layers. A policy server defines, stores, and configures policies for 
the ultimate target systems and the policies are distributed to the targets using IETF 
standard protocols: COPS-PR (Common Object Policy Service for PRovisioning) or 
SNMP; the Policy Information Base (PIB) standard is proposed in RFC 3159. The 
usefulness of this can be appreciated if a large company has tens or hundreds or more 
IPsec installations to be configured throughout a country or large region, in similar or 
different ways; automating the configurations helps to prevent human error.
[GAB2004] proposed an “Active Networks” architecture that contains policy, 
service, management as well as lower modules. This architecture is active in the same 
sense as the other architectures in this section in that it contains a policy layer and 
controlling and reactive elements. A “commodity” PC was used, containing an Intel P4 
2.2 GHz CPU with 512 Mbit RAM running Red Hat Linux 8.0; 396 packets per second
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could be processed when the user credential (such as an X.509 certificate) is only 
contained in the packet(s) and 1190 packets per second (three times the rate) could be 
processed when the user credential was already contained in the node. However, the size 
of packets used was not given.
[DON2004] proposes a Secure Name Service (SNS) to enhance availability 
between cooperating extranets. SNS only answers queries from trusted network domains, 
and returns a “secure handle” to a service, rather than an IP address as does DNS. “This 
SH (Secure Handle) is mapped to the real IP address of the host in the SNS framework by 
SGs (Security Gateways), and the IP address is only known to the SNS server and 
associated SGs.” ([DON2004] pg. 549).
As can be seen from the foregoing, the state of the art in the literature 
contemplates some systematic approaches to IPsec. What seems to be needed here is a 
unifying paradigm.
2.3.2. The Erfani Patent
[ERF2003] [USPTO] “outlined a comprehensive system and method for 
managing security in an electronic network,” composed of five functional layers: policy, 
management, service, mechanisms and primitives (see Figure 6 and the top row of Figure 
3). Just as the layered OSI model is a model optimized for the design of communication 
systems, this five-layer model is optimized for the design of security systems.
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Figure 6. The five-layer security framework, applied to IPsec
In previous work in the author’s group in the ECE department at the University of 
Windsor ([FAH2005], Section 4.2, pp. 84-94, and Chapter V), as noted before, these five 
layers have been “fleshed out” into modules and several operating scenarios have been 
described. Modules in the policy layer include: Prevention and detection of IPsec security 
violations, Network-wide IPsec implementation policy, and Disaster recovery. Modules 
in the management layer include: Policy control and management of security services, 
Event logging, IPsec services monitoring, User interface, Interoperability and Recovery 
and backup. Modules in the services layer include: Access Control, Integrity, 
Authentication, Confidentiality, Privacy and Rejection of replayed packets. Modules at 
the mechanisms layer are further subdivided into the following groups: Encryption, 
Message authentication, Key management, Certificates and Digital signatures. Finally, 
modules at the primitives layer are further subdivided into the following groups: Prime 
number generation, Modular arithmetic, Encryption, Hashing and Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC), although the latter is not yet used in IPsec. Additional modules at 
the policy level are SLA (Service Level Agreement) and User Information. Additional
27
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
modules at the service level include Availability, although this service is not formally 
specified by the IPsec RFCs and is weak in IPsec (see Section 2.2.1., “Key Exchange”).
2.4. Implementations of IPsec
2.4.1. Software Implementations
It was found in [NAY2005] that the Free S/WAN implementation incurred greater 
performance degradation than 802. IX due to its end-to-end security with double 
authentication, a stronger encryption method as well as better key management and 
tunneling. One of their results was that in using DES for FTP (File Transfer Protocol), 
degradation of performance was worse than the degradation for HTTP (HyperText 
Transfer Protocol) in going from 802.IX to Free S/WAN.
In [KER1997], a software implementation of IPsec was done on Linux and 
several different versions of BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution). It was found that 
encryption of packets “was a major bottleneck”, resulting in a factor of ten decrease in 
throughput in a ping performance test. Authenticating packets caused no significant 
decrease in throughput in this test. Unfortunately their results for UDP (User Datagram 
Protocol) throughput and TCP transfer throughput were not reported in meaningful units 
-  for example it was not possible to discern the meaning of 5000 units of throughput in 
terms of “cpu time”. However, the factor of ten decrease in throughput using ESP was 
evident, and in these tests, the use of AH did make significant differences in throughput, 
reducing throughput by 30% and 50% in UDP transfer and 50% and 60% in TCP for 
MD5 and SHA-1, respectively.
In [KAN2004], an IPsec stack was developed for the Linux kernel 2.4 and 2.6 
series. HMAC-SHA-1 and HMAC-MD5 (HMAC: Hashed Message Authentication 
Code) were implemented for authentication, NULL, DES-CBC, and 3DES-CBC were 
included for encryption. This work was submitted to the Linux kernel maintainers; it had 
the advantage of simplicity, but it differed in the Security Association and Policy 
Database (SADB and SPDB) cache lookup system used in IPv4 and IPv6, leading to it
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being declined for use with Linux. Throughput and other numerical results were not 
reported in this work.
2.4.2. Hardware Implementations
2.4.2.1. FPGA Implementations
[DAN2000], “An Adaptive Cryptographic Engine for IPSec Architectures”, was 
the first to take advantage of compressibility of dynamic configurations. The AES 
finalists at the time, which were MARS, RC6, Rijndael, Serpent and Twofish, were 
implemented. Compared with software implementations, throughput speedup of 4 to 20 
times was achieved while the key setup time was reduced 20 to 700 times.
[BEL2002], “GRIP: A Reconfigurable Architecture for Host-Based Gigabit-Rate 
Packet Processing”, offloaded processor cycles onto a dedicated network interface, which 
allowed more bandwidth for the cryptography. Throughput of 50 Mbps were measured, 
possibly due to decryption failures of packets over 1500 bytes in size, and flow-control 
issues caused by the design of the header-processing logic.
In [CHE2002], “Implementation of an FPGA Based Accelerator for Virtual 
Private Networks,^ a 3DES core achieved 120Mbits/s in CBC (Cipher-Block Chaining) 
mode, three times as fast as a software implementation.
In [MCL2002], “A Single-chip IPSEC Cryptographic Processor,” a single-chip 
IPsec cryptographic processor was implemented on a single XCV1000E Xilinx Virtex 
FPGA. Throughput results were 310 Mbps for AES and 78 Mbps for SHA-1.
In [KIM2004], “Design and Implementation of a Private and Public Key Crypto 
Processor and its Application to a Security System,” AES: 390, 3DES: 267, SEED: 358 
and KASUMI: 568 Mbps were achieved using an FPGA. Parts of the processor were later 
implemented in 0.5pm CMOS. To test and demonstrate the chip, a custom board
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providing real-time data security for a data storage device was developed. It encrypted all 
data going to the hard disk and decrypted all data leaving it.
In [LUJ2005], “IPSec Implementation on Xilinx Virtex-II Pro FPGA and Its 
Application,” IKE was done in the Power PC portion of the FPGA; the hardware invoked 
the software only when necessary. Throughput result were AES: 1197, SHA-1: 304 and 
MD5: 277 Mbps.
These all reach to the Services Layer -  no higher.
2.4.2.2. FPGA Implementations of Primitives
2.4.2.2.I. AES
As noted before, Rijndael was chosen as AES in October 2000 [REJ2003].
In [JAR2003], a Finnish reference, a fully-unrolled implementation of Rijndael 
was done using a Xilinx Virtex-II FPGA, implementing the S-Boxes (Substitution Boxes) 
combinatorially. It was designed fully pipelined so that a new data-key pair can be input 
at every clock cycle. The design consists of eleven separate blocks. Throughput results 
were 17.8 Gbps for an individual block, but overall throughput in a cipher feedback mode 
such as CBC, was not reported.
In [STN2003], a reference from Belgium, another fully-unrolled implementation 
of Rijndael was done. Using the Xilinx Virtex E FPGA LUTs (Look-Up Tables), 
throughput of 1,563 Mbps was achieved, and using the RAM to implement the S-Boxes, 
throughput of 11,776 Mbps was achieved.
A final-round contender for AES, Serpent, was implemented on a Xilinx Virtex 
XCV1000 FPGA in [ELB2000]. Four different architectures were implemented: Iterative 
Looping, Iterative Looping with Partial Loop Unrolling, Full Loop Unrolling and Full 
(32-stage) pipelining. Throughputs achieved were 61.92 Mbps, 444.16 Mbps, 312.32
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Mbps and 4.86 Gbps, respectively, although the final one was in ECB (Electronic Code 
Book) mode only. Software could process Serpent at a rate of 26.90 Mbps of throughput.
2.4.2.2.2. Hashes
In [KAN2002], SHA-1, HAS-160, and MD-5 were implemented on one chip, an 
Altera EP20K FPGA. Combining SHA-1 with HAS-160 reduced the required logic 
elements by 27%. Throughput results depend on the speed grade of the device; grade 3 
was used. Results were 114,160 and 142 Mbps, respectively.
In [ZIB2003], a Chinese reference, the SHA-1 algorithm was implemented on an 
Altera EP1K FPGA and a maximum throughput of 268.99 Mbps was achieved.
In [KHA2005], a reference from the University of Victoria, BC, Canada, the 
similarities between MD5, SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160 (since they are based on an earlier 
hash function, MD4) were used to design one chip to perform all three; a LUT (Look-Up 
Table) design on a Xilinx Virtex II FPGA. Simulation only was reported; in that, 
projected throughput was 145.72,116.94, and 116.94 Mbps, respectively.
In [DEE2001], a reference from the Memorial University of Newfoundland, 
Canada, two implementations of MD5 using iteration and full-loop unrolling were done 
on a Xilinx Virtex V I000 FPGA with a clock rate of up to 200 MHz. Throughput was 
165 and 354 Mbps, respectively.
2.4.2.3. ASIC (Application-Specific Integrated Circuit) Implementations
In [WUL2001], “CryptoManiac: A Fast Flexible Architecture for Secure 
Communication,” 0.25 pm standard-cell technology was used to implement the 
“CryptoManiac” processor, a 32-bit VLIW (Very Long Instruction Word) dedicated 
cryptographic processor which contains four functional units each with an adder, a lkB 
S-Box cache, two logical units for instruction combining, a rotator, and two multipliers.
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A specialized instruction set optimized for running cryptographic algorithms was 
provided. One key innovation was combining arithmetic and logical operations within a 
single cycle, since the latter type of operation often follows the former in cryptographic 
processing, allowing the processor clock cycle to be better used. The best results for 
Rijndael (AES) that were achieved was about a 64 Mbps encryption rate, superior for a 
software implementation.
2.4.2.4. ASIC Implementations of Primitives
In [WAN2004], an ASIC implementation of SHA-1 and MD5 was done using 
0.25 pm CMOS technology; their innovations were reduced hardware complexity in 
reducing the number of multiplexers and hardware sharing by using common hardware 
for both algorithms. Throughput results were 417 and 520 Mbps for SHA-1 and MD5, 
and about 94 and 117 Mbps when digital signing of these hashes was required.
In [REJ2003], two ASIC implementations of Rijndael were done using 0.13 pm 
CMOS technology; in one, only one lookup table was used to implement the S-Box used 
for all rounds and access to it is pipelined between rounds. In the other, separate S-Boxes 
were implemented in order to use them concurrently. Both implementations achieved 
2.56 Gbps of throughput in feedback modes.
2.4.3. Conclusion of the “Implementations” Section
In conclusion and summary, the heavy overhead incurred by encryption mandates 
hardware acceleration. Software running on a general-purpose processor can typically 
produce AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), i.e., Rijndael, throughputs of low tens of 
Mbps (i.e., 30) [DAN2000]. 70.5 Mbps using Visual C++ was achieved, as reported in 
[MR02000]. FPGAs (Field-Programmable Gate Arrays) can achieve up to 176 Mbits/s 
implementing DES (Data Encryption Standard) and up to 964 Mbits/s implementing AES 
[WOL2004]. An ASIC processor achieved 2.29 Gbits/s of AES throughput in a 0.18pm 
CMOS standard-cell technology in 2002 [SCH2002], [VER2003],
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None of these implementations used a comprehensive functional architecture such 
a the present, proposed, five-layer framework.
2.5. An IPsec Application
[GOD2002] used IPsec to secure a wireless gateway. The Microsoft Windows 
2000 implementation -  i.e., a software implementation -  of IPsec was used; but the WEP 
(so-called “Wired Equivalent Privacy”) implementation was not specified. A Buffalo 
WLIPCM-11 wireless network interface PC card was used. Throughput was 604 kBps 
unencrypted, 458 kBps using 40-bit WEP, 355 kBps using IPsec with DES and MD5 and 
209 kBps using IPsec with 3DES and SHA. Multiply by 10 to get speeds in bits per 
second (bps), which are believable in terms of the roughly 30 Mbps maximum throughput 
possible using software implementations of IPsec.
2.6. High-Level Synthesis for Hardware Implementations
UML (the Unified Modeling Language) [JAC1998] was considered as the design 
language for the FPGA portion of this project, but was rejected as not suitable because it 
was object-oriented, too high-level and tools to program FPGAs were not available.
Simulink, a software package by Mathworks Inc., was considered. In a user 
report, “The engineers at SELEX generated a specification for what they wanted the 
FPGA to do using Simulink and used Xilinx System Generator for DSP to program the 
FPGA to match the Simulink model,” [MAT2006].This was found to be aimed at DSP 
(Digital Signal Processing) and required the basically manual step of replacing the 
Simulink standard blocks with Xilinx standard blocks.
According to a tutorial on HLS (High-Level Synthesis), there are many 
unanswered questions when it comes to using this technique in a complete context.
“Much work needs to be done before synthesis becomes really practical,” ([MCF1988] 
pg. 335). According to [COM2002], HLS tends to produce larger and slower designs than
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structural description can produce. Its descriptions can leave many aspects of the circuit 
unspecified. Also, optimizing for the bit width of operands cannot be done.
In [LIH2005], the rather heroic measure of inserting a timing and netlist control 
guidance stage between the place and route steps of physical synthesis for ASICs had to 
be done. It is reported that there are very few algorithms that have been proposed to make 
the HLS tool aware of the layout information, so that the resulting physical design can be 
improved.
Investigating SystemC, a HLS language, “The performance of this simulation 
kernel is not to be compared with that of commercial VHDL/Verilog simulators at the 
present,” ([WIKIP], SystemC). Also, the size and complexity of SystemC models 
becomes too large to be practical in modern design projects, and new tools are being 
researched to deal with the complexity [GEN2006].
HLS is an open area of research (Dr. M. Khalid, in personal conversation, May
2006).
As a result of these investigations, the Xilinx ISE (Integrated Software 
Environment) and EDK (Embedded Development Kit) software packages were chosen, 
due to availability, as well as availability of compatible hardware development boards 
such as the Xilinx “Microblaze” (or “Multimedia”) boards, which are equipped with 
Xilinx Virtex II FPGAs. HDL (Hardware Description Language) programming in VHDL 
or Verilog was chosen, rather than attempting to use HLS.
2.7. Random Number Generators
Since an RNG (Random Number Generator) was incorporated in this work, some 
background on PRNGs (Pseudo-RNGs) and CSPRNGs (Cryptographically Secure 
PRNGs) was investigated.
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It is desirable to have an RNG to generate keys and IVs (Initial Vectors), for if the 
users were entrusted with this task, they would skip it as a time-consuming burden, 
leaving them set to all zeroes, or provide short and simple values, or naturally provide 
predictable values. IVs are often sent in the clear and only need to be different, since their 
purpose is only to vary the ciphertext. However, it should not be possible to predict the 
future values or determine the previous values used for keys, in case some become 
known to an attacker. An RNG which has the property of difficulty of determining past or 
future values from current values is known as cryptographically secure. For testing, it is 
useful to use a PRNG for its repeatable output. For actual use, the PRNG is seeded with 
an initial value taken from randomly-occurring values, such as the time of day, the value 
of a free-running counter or the time delays determined between user activity. Many such 
values are often combined together, often using the XOR (Exclusive-OR) operation, for 
the greatest possible unpredictability.
To make an exhaustive search -  involving trying all possible values (somewhat 
inaccurately known as “brute force”) -  attack impractical, a long sequence, known as the 
“period” or “cycle length”, before the PRNG repeats, is important. A well-designed 
PRNG has a cycle length of 2e, where e is the number of bits in the state; the “state” is the 
core “word” on which the PRNG operates and which provides the source of the bits of 
the output number) [LEC1998]. The number of bits in the state is also known as the 
“linear complexity”, of a linear PRNG, of course [WAL2007]. A good PRNG has a cycle 
length of over 2200 [LEC1998]. The “Mersenne Twister" algorithm has a period of 
(219,937)-1 ([WIKIP], “Pseudorandom_number_generator”).
Linear PRNGs, such as LFSR (Linear Feedback Shift Register) types suffer from 
predictability [HP12006]. For example, an LFSR was developed that operated at high 
speed, low power and high precision and was useful in general communication systems, 
RADAR (RAdio Detection And Ranging) signal simulation and processing environments 
where random numbers exhibiting more than one type of statistical distribution were 
needed [WEI2004], but would not be completely useful for cryptography. In order to be 
cryptographically secure, the RNG should perform well in strict statistical tests. One such
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is the “DIEHARD” series of tests, developed by George Marsaglia at the Florida State 
University Department of Statistics ([SOT1999], pg. 2), [MAR1995], which consists of 
fifteen different tests (see also [WIKIP], “Diehard_tests”, for an intuitive description of 
each). "The higher the entropy in a series of numbers is, the more difficult it is to predict 
a given number on the basis of the preceding numbers in the series," [HAA1999]. "True 
random numbers are independent from each other and therefore unpredictable but they 
are rarely employed," [KAR2000]. For more comments on randomness required for 
cryptography, see [RFC 1750].
AES itself makes a fine CSPRNG with an enormous period [HP12006]. It could 
be used to encrypt the value of a counter beginning at some seed, using CBC or some 
other mode, which would give a period of 2b, where b is the cipher block length (128 to 
256, for AES) ([HEL2003] pg. 324); it could also be used to repeatedly encrypt its own 
output (as in CBC encrypting blocks of all zeroes), but the period cannot be guaranteed 
using this method ([HEL2003] pg. 324). The foregoing could be done, of course, starting 
with some seed IV. AES also has tremendous non-linearity included in its design 
[FIPS197].
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CHAPTER III
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1. Design of an FPGA AES Hardware Accelerator
3.1.1. Introduction
The AES cipher was chosen in October 2000 [REJ2003], to replace DES (Data 
Encryption Standard) which is now too computationally intensive to use in obtaining 
good security, given that it has to be run three times to obtain an effective key length that 
is sufficiently secure.
3.1.1.1. Overview of AES
AES is a ten-round substitution-permutation cipher [FIPS197]; it carries the 128 
(or 192 or 256)-bit plaintext value through “rounds”, i.e., repetitions of the four 
processing steps, which are: XOR with the “key permutation” or “key expand” value for 
that round (i.e., the round key), substitute (sub) bytes using an “S-box”, shift rows and 
mix columns, to convert it into the ciphertext. The value being carried is known as the 
state. The inverse cipher does each round in reverse order, meaning that an inverse S- 
box, and an inverse mix columns function are required. The same key expand values are 
applied, in reverse order. A former name of the algorithm chosen as the AES, Rijndael, 
was “Square”, as can be seen after. Rather than attempting a repetition of the complete 
details of AES, an idea, or the “flavour” is presented here and the reader is referred to the 
standard for the complete details [FIPS197].
The difference between Rijndael and AES is that Rijndael is defined for block and 
key sizes of every increment of 32 bits from 128 to 256 bits, inclusive, whereas AES has 
a fixed block size of 128 bits and key sizes of only 128,192 and 256 bits ([WIKIP], 
“Advanced_Encryption_Standard”). The 128-bit key size definition was chosen to 
implement for this project, for simplicity.
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The following listing shows the pseudo-code for the AES encryption cipher 
[FIPS197]:
Cipher (byte in[4*Nb], byte out[4*Nb], word key[4*Nb])
byte state[4*Nb], w[4*Nb, Nr+1], state[4*Nb], integer round 
state = in
ComputeRoundKey(key, w[kx, 1])
AddRoundKey(state, w[kx, 1]) 
for round = 1 step 1 to Nr-1
ComputeRoundKey(key, w[kx, round+1])
SubBytes(state)
ShiftRows(state)
MixColumns(state)
. AddRoundKey(state, w[kx, round+1) 
end for
ComputeRoundKey(key, w[kx, Nr+1])
SubBytes(state)
ShiftRows(state)
AddRoundKey(state, w[kx, Nr+1) 
out = state
Note: Nb: number of blocks, Nr: number of rounds, w: key expand array, kx: key 
permutation, 4: 4 bytes, i.e., each block is 4 bytes, or 32 bits.
and the inverse, or decryption cipher:
InvCipher(byte in[4*Nb], byte out[4*Nb], word key[4*Nb] ) 
byte state [4*Nb], w[4*Nb, Nr+1] 
state = in
ComputeRoundKey(w[kx, 1])
AddRoundKey(state, w[kx, 1]) 
for round = Nr-1 step -1 downto 1 
InvShiftRows(state)
InvSubBytes(state)
ComputeRoundKey(w[kx, round+1])
AddRoundKey(state, w[kx, round+1) 
InvMixColumns(state) 
end f o r .
InvShiftRows(state)
InvSubBytes(state)
ComputeRoundKey(w[kx, Nr+1])
AddRoundKey(state, w[kx, Nr+1) 
out = state
Note that, in spite of the pseudo-code provided by the FIPS (Federal Information 
Processing Standard), in decryption the entire set of round keys must be computed before 
decryption can begin, since the last must be used first. For AES-128, Nb=4 and Nr=T0. w 
is chosen to represent the array of key expand values in [FIPS 197].
38
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3.1.1.1.1. Round Keys
The round keys, or “key expand values”, are permutations of the key. The first 
“permutation” is the key itself. In each round, this is XORed with the “sub-bytes” 
(substituted bytes) of the current key permutation value rotated left by 8 bits, using the 
same S-box as do the rounds, i.e., “key XOR (sub(rot(key)))”. Also, the high-order byte 
of each 32-bit portion of the 128-bit block is XORed with the output of a function of the 
round step in which the HOB (High-Order Byte) is determined from Table 3. This 
function is called “Rcon” (Round Constant), where Rcon(step) = [2(step'1){00} {00} {00}] 
in GF(28) [FIPS 197]. (GF: Galois Field).
Round 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A
Rcon
(HOB)
01 02 04 08 10 20 40 80 IB 36
Table 3. The AES round constant (hex)
Figure 7 [FIPS 197] illustrates how the round key is added in each round. Each 32- 
bit block of the round key is XORed column-wise to a matrix formed from the bytes of 
the state.
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Figure 7. AES add round key
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3.1.1.1.2. Substitute (“Sub”) Bytes
Figure 8 [FIPS 197] illustrates the substitution process. Each byte is replaced, on 
an individual basis. This operation introduces non-linearity.
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Figure 8. AES "sub"-bytes
3.1.1.1.3. ShiftRows
Figure 9 [FIPS 197] illustrates how each row is shifted, each by one successive 
byte extra.
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Figure 9. AES shift rows
3.1.1.1.4. Mix Columns
Figure 10 illustrates how the “Mix columns” operation is applied. The operation 
itself is a complex and staggered combinatoric operation done to each byte of each 32-bit 
block (column) in the matrix.
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3.1.2. Technology
As noted before, Xilinx was chosen for tool availability on the desktop PC 
(Personal Computer) used for this research, which had a 2.39 GHz motherboard 
containing a “Celeron” CPU and 256 MB of RAM. The Xilinx software packages used 
were version 8.2i of: the ISE (Integrated Software Environment -  8.2.03i, specifically) 
and the EDK (Embedded Development Kit, version 8.2.01i, specifically).
In the ISE individual modules are built -  including even an entire project instance 
from the EDK - ,  simulated, and loaded as a “bit file” or “bitstream” to a target board, 
whereas in the EDK individual modules are put together, such as the Power PC (PPC), 
RS232/UART (Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter) module and any user IP 
(Intellectual Property) that was developed, and entire systems are built [XILQST], 
[XILIDT].
The Xilinx ML403 board, shown in Figure 11, an embedded system, was chosen 
for this research; the board includes a Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGA which in turn contains a 
hard-core PPC 405 -  the XC4VFX12-FF668 [XILUG80] (a “hard-core” device is actual 
device with its design doped into the semiconductor, as opposed to a “soft-core” device, 
which is implemented by means of the FPGA fabric). The Virtex-4 was the next to most
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recent version in the Xilinx Virtex series; it is a general principle never to buy version 
one of anything (even the first of a new sub-version of an existing series). Moreover, the 
board had a reasonable price, of $495 US, as of June 2006.
r !-•vwrmsx-**■■■■■I
Figure 11. A photograph of the Xilinx ML403 board
3.1.2.1. Specific Virtex-4 FX12 FPGA Features
The Virtex-4 FPGA contains four embedded Digital Clock Managers (DCMs) 
that can divide the clock and provide an additional three clock phases at each multiple of 
ninety degrees [XILV4DS].
It also contains on-chip BRAM (Block RAM) useful for small software programs 
up to 128kB [XILML403T] and which is available for use instead of the FPGA fabric 
when appropriate, Such as for ROMs (Read-Only Memories) and RAMs. The Xilinx 
“primitive” name for individual portions of BRAM is RAMB16 -  individual elements 
incorporated in Xilinx FPGAs are known as “primitives” within the Xilinx company (not
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to be confused with the use of the term “primitive” in this work to mean the lowest-level 
functionality of a security system). The XC4VFX12 has thirty-six 18kB blocks of BRAM 
[XILV4DS].
The XC4VFX12 FPGA also contains 5,472 cells, or “slices”, of FPGA fabric 
containing 10,944 LUTs (Look-Up Tables) at two LUTs per slice, which is relatively 
small compared to the 10,752 slices (21,504 LUTs) of the Virtex-II FPGA in the Xilinx 
“Microblaze” boards [XILV4DS] [XILV2DS], however, those FPGAs (XC2V2000- 
FF896) do not contain the hard-core PPC. Note that the suffix of the part number, such as 
FF668 or FF896, refers to the package type and number of pins [XILPKG].
3.1.2.2. ML403 Board Features
The ML403 board has a 100 MHz clock -  which means a 10 ns clock period, and 
it has an expansion header of many pins, connected to FPGA pins on the circuit board, 
which is very useful for oscilloscope measurements. It has an RS232 serial port, 1MB of 
SRAM (Static RAM), and a JTAG (Joint Test Action Group) port for downloading the 
firmware and debugging. A special cable, the “PCIV”, or “Parallel Cable IV” 
(pronounced “PC-four”) cable is required to connect from the PC parallel port to the 
JTAG port.
In addition to the XC4VFX12 FPGA, the board also has an ACE (Advanced 
Configuration Engine -  XCCACE), Flash EEPROM, (XCF32P, 8 MB), a CPLD 
(Complex Programmable Logic Device -  XC95144XL), a Flash Configuration controller, 
an EEPROM (4kb IIC -  Inter-IC bus -  interface), an LCD (Liquid Crystal Display) 
screen, push buttons, LEDs (Light Emitting Diodes), and other features. For the purposes 
of this work, only the PPC and FPGA (integrated together in one) chip was used, of the 
major ICs available on the ML403 board.
3.1.3. Selection of the Base Design
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The various designs examined for use as a starting point were as follows. The 
design by Rudolf Usselmann of ASICs, ws [USS2002], done in Verilog, was clearly 
documented, with detailed synthesis results for a Xilinx Spartan He XS2V200-6 FPGA, 
so it was chosen. Others looked at were a low-area implementation done in SystemC 
requiring 500 clock cycles to encrypt or decrypt a block for the 128-bit AES algorithm 
[VILL22005], a 128-bit implementation done in VHDL [SAT2004], a work in progress 
only tested at the gate level with placement and routing still to be done [HUR2002], and 
an advertised “Ultra High Speed AES (Rijndael) Crypto Processor,” not in the public 
domain [DEV2003],
3.1.3.1. Some Aspects of the Usselmann Design
The Usselmann design [USS2002] included a text in vector to input the plaintext 
(or ciphertext, in the case of the inverse transform, or decryptor), a key vector to input the 
key, a text_out vector to output the ciphertext (or plaintext), a keyload signal to initialize 
the key expand values from the key, and a “load” signal to initiate the transform. In the 
encryptor, keyload was connected to load because the key expand values are generated as 
the rounds require them, but in the decryptor, keyload was a separate input. There was a 
done pulse output in both, and a keydone output for the decryptor, indicating that the key 
expand values were generated and stored internally. Keyload only had to be repeated in 
the decryptor if the key was changed, but it had to be done before the inverse transform 
using that key could be done, which is always the case, since the inverse transform 
requires the last key expand value first.
This design features the S-box instantiated sixteen times, to process each of the 
bytes of the state simultaneously each round. This increases speed at the expense of 
FPGA slices and/or FPGA resources such as BRAM, since the S-boxes are realized as 
ROMs.
3.1.4. Architecture Provided by Xilinx
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For the user peripheral, Xilinx provides the outer wrapper VHDL, named after the 
user peripheral, and a core, named user_logic.vhd [XILUT2003], [XILML403T] for 
VHDL, if VHDL is chosen, or “.v”, if a Verilog implementation is selected. The outer 
wrapper is an IPIC (IP -  Intellectual Property -  Interconnect) which instantiates the IPIF 
(IP InterFace) for the OPB (On-Chip Peripheral Bus) -  the IPIF is a subset of the OPB -  
and user_logic.vhd, and interconnects them. Note that here IP stands for “Intellectual 
Property”. In this work, the AES encryptor and decryptor were implemented as two 
separate user peripherals, called “aes_enc” and “aes_dec”, respectively.
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Figure 12. Xilinx system architecture
Referring to Figure 12 ([XILUT2003] pg. 21), the OPB also serves such 
peripherals as the UART and GPIO (General-Purpose 10), that may be instantiated as 
modules using the Xilinx EDK, and is connected via the “PLB20PB” bridge to the PLB 
(Processor Local Bus) which is connected to the PPC CPU. The PLB also connects to the 
BRAM via a controller module. The DCM modules connect to the PPC and to the busses. 
The JTAG port connects to the PPC. The modules required are added in the EDK using
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the BSB (Base System Builder) wizard or from the available peripheral window pane on 
the left in the EDK [XILML403T].
Xilinx provides the standard IP cores used, such as the UART. In this work, a 
communication speed of 57,600 kbps was chosen using the BSB.
Xilinx provides an interface in the user_logic file itself for the user to interface 
with the outer wrapper -  the user programs the slv_regs (“slave registers”) from software 
and can access them in the user logic core using the VHDL shown after (or Verilog, if 
selected). Xilinx also provides the software libraries in C source code to access the slave 
registers via software,
The C code to read and write the slvregs, provided by Xilinx is shown here (the 
first line is just an associated variable declaration).
Xuint32 Reg32Value = 0;
Reg32Value = AES_ENC_mReadSlaveRegO(XPAR_AES_ENC_0_BASEADDR);
AES_ENC_mWriteSlaveRegO(XPAR_AES_ENC_0_BASEADDR, Reg32Value);
For a decryptor instruction, “ENC” is replaced with “DEC” in both places in each 
instruction. For a different slv_reg, the “0” in “SlaveRegO” is changed to the desired 
number, from 0-12 (decimal notation).
The user fills in the rest of user_logic with his HDL -  in this work, the Usselmann 
core’s top level-file. The outer wrapper is fully provided by the Xilinx tools 
[XILML403T] and does not need to be modified by the user unless the user desires to add 
something extra, such as an external connection of a signal to an FPGA pin, as was done 
in this work. The outer wrapper is always in VHDL and interface is accomplished using 
the default binding rules if userjogic is in Verilog ([XILIPTS3] pg. 28). The default 
binding rules state, in part:
If the entity name is the same as the component name, then this entity is
bound to the component.
If there are multiple architectures for the same entity, the last compiled
architecture for the entity is chosen [MAR2003].
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The following is a portion of user_logic.vhd -  showing the “slave register” 
interface provided by Xilinx:
SLAVE_REG_WRITE_PROC : process(Bus2IP_Clk) is 
begin
if (Bus2IP_Clk'event and (Bus2IP_Clk = '1')) then 
if (Bus2IP_Reset = '1') then 
slv_regO <= (others => '0');
else
case slv_reg_write_select is 
when "1000000000000" =>
for byte_index in 0 to (C_DWIDTH/8)-1 loop 
if ( Bus2IP_BE(byte_index) = '1' ) then
slv_reg0(byte_index*8 to byte_index*8+7) <= 
Bus2IP_Data(byte_index*8 to byte_index*8+7);
. end if; 
end loop;
[ .  . . ]
when others => null; 
end case; 
end if; 
end if;
end process SLAVE_REG_WRITE_PROC;
SLAVE_REG_READ_PROC : process( slv_reg_read_select, slv_reg0, 
slv_regl, slv_reg2, slv_reg3, slv_reg4, slv_reg5, slv_reg6, slv_reg7, 
slv_reg8, slv_reg9, slv_regl0, slv_regll, slv_regl2 ) is 
begin
case slv_reg_read_select is
when "1000000000000" => slv_ip2bus_data <= slv_reg0;
[. • •]
when others => slv_ip2bus_data <= (others => '0'); 
end case; 
end process SLAVE_REG_READ_PROC;
3.1.5. VHDL in Xilinx
Variables are called “signals” in VHDL (in Verilog, “wire”, or “reg”), and arrays 
of signals are called “vectors”, typically declared as “std jogic” -  “standard logic” in 
which the values allowed are shown in Table 4. Typically only “0” and “1” are used, and 
“U” and “X” appear in practice, as found in this work.
U Uninitialized
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X Forcing Unknown
0 Forcing 0
1 Forcing 1
z High Impedance
w Weak Unknown
L WeakO
H Weak 1
- Don’t care
Table 4. IEEE VHDL std_logic values
Signal processing is typically done within “processes”, each of which are 
associated with a clock edge. Most conditional logic blocks can only be implemented 
within processes. However, boolean logic and assignments can be done 
“asynchronously”, but that should be kept to an absolute minimum in Xilinx VHDL for 
FPGAs. The format of a process block is shown:
MY_PROC: process (myclk, myrst) 
begin
if (myrst = '0') then 
myvar <= 'O'; 
elsif (rising_edge(myclk)) then
[insert your logic involving myvar, etc., here] 
end if; 
end process MY_PROC;
Note the standard reset signal, myrst and its syntax. This block and its elsif can be 
omitted, keeping only the contents of the “elsif’. The part in parentheses after the key­
word “process” is called the sensitivity list. The process will activate only when a signal 
in the sensitivity list changes.
Note that (myclk’event and (myclk = '1')) is equivalent to (rising_edge(myclk)) 
and that (myclk'event and (myclk = ‘0')) is equivalent to (falling_edge(myclk)) 
[XILXST].
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Typically, “non-blocking” assignments are used in signal processing, which 
means that all assignments in the process are done simultaneously from the input data 
when the clock edge occurs. The syntax for a “non-blocking” assignment is “<=”. In a 
“blocking” assignment, one assignment is performed first before the next is done; the 
syntax for this is Blocking assignments are often used in logic “functions,” which 
implement combinatorial logic.
The value of a signal can be determined in complex ways and set in its own 
process, but write conflicts will occur if a signal is controlled from more than one 
process. However, signals can be used for “read” purposes in different processes. If it is 
attempted to reset signals using a non-reset signal in the standard reset syntax, the signal 
will be interpreted as a reset signal and will be connected to the design reset, causing 
write conflicts. Using the syntax in the Xilinx manuals is mandatory if  one wishes to 
accomplish one’s intention with Xilinx VHDL [XILXST]. As an example, the “case 
statement” cryptographic S-box had to be put in a process to be properly recognized as a 
ROM, or else the Xilinx synthesis tool would interpret the block as an asynchronous 
RAM and remove all but one of the required instances.
For another example, the VHLD for a dual-port RAM is shown:
process (elk) 
begin
if (elk1event and elk = '1') then 
if (we = 11 1) then
RAM(conv_integer(a)) <= di; 
end if; 
read_a <= a; 
end if; 
end process;
do <= RAM(conv_integer(read_a));
Note: we: write enable, a: address, do: data out [XILXST].
This is the only type of syntax that will be recognized by the Xilinx synthesizer as a dual 
port RAM.
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Fortunately, assignments between vectored signals declared as big-endian and 
little-endian (see section 3.1.7.1., “Core Design and other Modifications” for 
explanation) are straightforward; e.g.:
signal -key : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (127 downto 0);
signal slv_regl : std_logic_vector(0 to C_DWIDTH-1);
key(127 downto 96) <= slv_regl;
bit 0 of slv_regl will be assigned to bit 127 of the variable key, and so on to bit 31 
(i.e., C_DWIDTH-1) of slv regl assigned to bit 96 of key.
Note that range assignment is flexible; e.g.:
signal wO, wl, w2, w3: STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(31 downto 0);
Type kbarray is array (10 downto 0) of STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(127
downto 0);
signal kb: kbarray;
w3 <= kb(conv_integer(read_kb))(127 downto 096);
and can be applied to the output of arrays, as shown.
3.1.6. Working with the Xilinx Tools
When building a module or an entire project in the Xilinx ISE, the simulation 
stages available are behavioral, post-translate, post-map and post-PAR (place and route), 
reflecting the build stages: design entry (behavioral simulation), synthesize and translate 
(post-translate), map (post-map) and PAR (post-PAR simulation) (Note that Xilinx uses 
the US spelling of “behavioural”). In synthesis, the HDL is recognized and represented as 
logic components such as AND gates, counters, ROMs, and so on. “Translate” is a 
technical stage in which the “netlisf ’ (the list of circuit connections) format is converted. 
In map, the logic components are expressed using the type of logic cells available in the 
FPGA, which contain two LUTs per cell, or “slice”, a multiplexer and two flip-flops. In 
“place”, specific logic cells in the FPGA are chosen for the mapped content, and in 
“route”, the FPGA switching fabric, which makes up three-quarters of the FPGA, is set 
with the necessary electrical connections.
BRAM resources are automatically used for ROMs by XST (the Xilinx Synthesis 
Tool). When necessary, separate vectors can be used to contain data instead of using
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ROM syntax, and also distributed LUT (Look-Up Table) ROMs, available from the 
Templates in the ISE, are available.
When using the EDK and making changes to the design [XILML403T], “Project 
—> Clean All Generated Files” must be done, or the changes will not be recognized.
Simulation has some differences from implementation -  the Unisim library is 
required for post-PAR simulation, but only required for implementation in modules 
containing the LUT ROMs -the Unisim library declaration is shown:
library UNISIM;
use UNISIM.VCOMPONENTS.ALL;
The following IEEE libraries were required:
library ieee;
use ieee.std_logic_1164.all;
use ieee.std_logic_unsigned.all;
However, the following two have to be commented-out in order to support 
convjnteger for array index addressing (conv_integer is used to converting std_logic to 
an array index) when that is used:
Use ieee.numeric_std.all;
use ieee.std_logic_arith.all;
The file containing input stimulus to feed to the design for simulation is called the 
“testbench”. Input setup times and output valid delay settings in the testbench must equal 
or exceed the “minimum arrival time before clock” and “maximum output required time 
after clock” specified in the synthesis report or simulations will not succeed.
Mentor Graphics ModelSim XE III 6.1e starter edition was used for simulation, 
which was quite reliable, and allowed examination of interior design signals, which was 
not possible with the simulator provided with the Xilinx ISE. Moreover, simulation of 
advanced build stages, such as post-PAR, in the Xilinx software was very much “broken”
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and unusable. The ISE allows selection of different simulators when the Xilinx project is 
created, and when working with the project. A VHDL vector is normally represented as a 
single line in simulation output and can be set for display or input in various radices 
(bases), such as hexadecimal, decimal, octal and binary.
3.1.6.1. Simulation Test Methodology
Simulation results, of the encryptor and decryptor core designs, were initially 
verified using an available Javascript implementation that showed the results and 
intermediate values of the transform and its inverse [STY2006]. Due to problems 
encountered in higher orders of simulation, such as post-translate and post-map, in which 
portions of the key expand values were being apparently duplicated, due to not making 
the S-box synchronous, and using insufficient “input setup time” and “output valid delay” 
timing specifications in the testbench, respectively, the arbitrarily-chosen and somewhat , 
redundant key of 466E6172 676C6572 20426C61 67686572 (hex.), which was the ASCII 
(ANSI Standard Code for Information Interchange -  ANSI: American National Standards 
Institute) for "Fnargler Blagher", was changed to 01020304 15161718 292A2B2C 
3D3E3F42 (hex.), which has no planned ASCII meaning, for simulation, so that each 
byte would be unambiguously unique.
3.1.6.2. Software Loading, Running and Debugging
Xilinx includes the GDB (GNU DeBug -  GNU: “GNU is Not Unix”) software. 
Before invoking that, XMD (Xilinx Microprocessor Debug) must be started and 
connected to the Power PC target (see [XILEST], chapters 10-12). The icon to launch 
XMD is visually identifiable as a bug in a box. Connection is automatic. Experience 
showed however, that it was necessary to disconnect and reconnect in order for GDB, ; 
especially, to successfully operate: enter the command “disconnect 0”, and then “connect 
ppc hw” in the XMD window (the quotes are delimiters here and not included in the 
command). XMD appears similar to a DOS (Disk Operating System) window and DOS 
commands will work. The user can change directories, for example. To test the compiled
53
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
and linked software without using GDB, the command “dow executable.elf ’ can be used 
-  but it is necessary to change to the directory containing “executable.elffirst, “run” 
launches execution; “stop” stops it. This is useful since the debugger slows execution so 
much that RS232 communication is prevented. If debugging is desired, GDB can be 
launched by clicking the icon next to the XMD icon, which is of a bug (not in a box). 
This method is also useful for loading larger amounts of code to SRAM, when the code 
size exceeds that available in BRAM.
3.1.7. AES Design Done in this Work
3.1.7.1. Core Design and other Modifications
Figure 13 shows the modules and their hierarchy in the encryptor and decryptor 
design, modified from that found in [USS2002]: the top-levels were renamed 
“user_logic” as required by Xilinx, and the higher-level wrappers needed for bus 
interfacing were added.
Xilinx me Wrapper
aes anc.vhd
I
Xilinx IPIC Wrapper
a es  dec.vhd
user logic vhd I
la&JL&M
userjogic.vhd
assJ»y„*xpar»dL i2S.vhd aes_.st30x.vhd
Inverse SBm  
CB8_jnv_sb<»c.vhd
S M : SBox
aes_.fcoti.vhd o*$jsbox,vhd
AES Cipher AES Inverse Cipher
IPIC: IP Interconnect 
IP: Intellectual Property
Figure 13. AES encryptor and decryptor modules and hierarchy
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Note that the key expand module was not included with the inverse cipher, or 
decryptor, in order to allow both modules to fit in the XC4YFX12 FPGA. As detailed 
after, key expand readout from the encryptor and input to the decryptor, for its storage, 
was implemented.
Thirteen 32-bit slv regs were specified for each core -  slvregO  for control 
signals, 1-4 for the key input, 5-8 for the plain/cipher text and IV input and 9-12 for 
cipher/plain text output and other output.
Big-endian data orientation was maintained in the design, as shown in Figure 14. 
In this orientation, high-order data is located in the low-order ends of the registers, since 
the general standard for numeric notation is to read the high order data first, left to right 
and top to bottom, and memory maps are generally presented low-order to high-order, 
left to right and top to bottom. In little-endian data orientation, the low-order data is 
located in the low-order register bits.
Key In Text In Text Out
slvjegl
slv_reg2
sbjreg3
s k j t tg A
shr_reg5
slv_reg6
slvjreg7
slvjregS
dv_reg£
slv_reglO
shnregll
slv_reg!2
128-bit word 
High
Data order
IE #
Low
Low
0 31
0 31
0 31
0 31 Split into 4 32-bit
.words
-*► Low:. 
_
Figure 14. Big-endian data orientation and core IO register usage
Extensive modifications to the original code were required in order to make it 
work on a Xilinx FPGA and to interface it to the OPB. First, however, the original 
Verilog code was verified in behavioural simulation. The decision was made to translate 
the Verilog into VHDL, to avoid having to rely on mixed-language support. Then the
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done bit behaviour was revised so that it would remain set for the software to read. This 
was accomplished by removing a clearing condition; instead of the former:
done <= (not (dcnt(l) or dent(2) or dent(3)) ) and dcnt(O); 
done <= not (dent(3) or dent(2) or dcnt(l)); 
the latter was used, where dent is a four-bit counter, counting down. This VHDL syntax 
selects individual bits of a vector. When the “and” of the zero-order bit was included, 
done would be cleared on the clock rising edge after dent reached zero, making done a 
pulse with a length of only one clock cycle. ld_r was used in order to clear done for 
another transform, where ld_r stands for “real load” and is timed always to occur on the 
same clock phase (see the section on “autoload”). A signal called dcntbits was defined 
and set to “1” for as long as dent is not “0”, and used to enable updating of text out while 
the rounds progress. When done is changed to “1”, dcntbits is changed to “0” and 
text out stops changing so that it can be read.
All major blocks of the design had to be placed within VHDL processes of the 
type shown before, and assigned a clock signal so that they would be synchronous. This 
was a major step in success of simulation beyond behavioral. Asynchronous latches are 
difficult to simulate, because their timing has to be followed and correctly predicted using 
wire and component delays, whereas a clocked flip-flop’s state can be processed by the 
simulator at the clock transition times.
Amalgamating the shift rows step was possible because the signals being 
transferred to the next step only needed to be rearranged. This freed a clock cycle in the 
timing plan. Saving a step in each round allowed the use of two clock phases for the more 
computationally-intensive mix columns and inverse mix columns functions. The DCM 
was used since it could produce three additional clock pulses of the same frequency as 
the system clock, at each multiple of a 90-degree phase delay. Since the system clock was 
100 MHz, its period was 10 ns, making each phase 2.5 ns apart. The XC4VFX12 FPGA 
on the ML403 board was speed grade 10, the slowest of grades 10,11 and 12 [XILRIV], 
and the design could not achieve the timing of 2.5 ns between round steps. Therefore a 
second DCM was used to produce the additional three phases and the first was used to
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divide the clock by two. Four phases of a 50 MHz, 20 ns clock are 5 ns apart, and the 
design was able to meet timing. The timing plans were carefully worked out so that 
required data was available by the time of occurrence of the clock edge used by the 
process requiring the data.
Figures 15 and 16 show the timing plans developed for the encryptor and 
decryptor. In the encryptor timing diagram, notice the sequentially-placed sa (add-round- 
key step), followed by “sub bytes”, then “mix columns”, after two phases of time so that 
the mix columns logic would have 10 ns to propagate before being required at its 180- 
degree clock phase. The key expand value, w, is made ready one phase prior to being 
needed for the add-round-key step. Within the key expand module, rconout is made ready 
well in advance of the time that it is needed for inclusion. The done signal is timed to go 
high one phase after text out is ready.
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10 ns clock
20 m  dock 
•^phases 
90 degree phase 
180 degree phase 
270 degree phase
ld_r (real load)
text in (stable)
key (stable) 
Iitciypt
dent (round count)
dcntbits 
sa (text in/mc xor w) 
sub bytes 
mix columns
done
text out 
Key Expand
Key perm (w) 
subword 
Rcoit 
rent
rcntjnext
rconout
90 180 270 0 90 180
" J :  :
I i
L _ , 20 ns clock and phases produced' I
I
t
(sub bytes xorw's)
Figure 15. AES encryptor timing plan
ld_r is positioned to begin always on the same clock phase (see the section on 
autoload). When Id r is high, tex tjn  is used to XOR with the key expand value, whereas 
after that the key expand value is XORed with the final step (mix columns) of the 
previous round.
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-phases 0 90 180 270 0 90 180
90 degree phase -----1 t f
180 degree phase
270'degree phase 20 ns clock and phases produced;
i by DCM
ld_r (real load) __ 
text in (stable)
key (stable)
Decrypt
dent (round count) 1 1 (set to 1 during ld_r)
idcatgo 1 1 (set to 1 during ldjr)
sa (text k  xor w's or kv mc's) -use as sr's for sub bytes
sub bytes I
ark (sub bytes xor w's)
kv mix columns (me)
done text out= ark
Key Expand retrieve I
-w's
Figure 16. AES decryptor timing plan
In the decryptor, the shift rows operation occurs before the “sub-bytes”, but this 
operation is made implicit from the sa data by simple arrangement in the VHDL 
assignment statements (as in the encryptor). The key expand value has to be retrieved for 
use; it cannot be generated concurrently as in the encryptor, since the final key expand 
value is needed first, in the decryptor. The key expand values are loaded into the 
decryptor before any decryption transform is initiated. By initializing the step counter 
dent to 1 during Id r, and also initializing it to zero prior and by default, the number of 
clock cycles required for decryption was reduced from eleven to ten -  note that dent 
actually is counted upwards in the decryptor. It should be possible to adjust the encryptor 
timing plan and logic in a similar manner in order to reduce the time required by a clock 
cycle.
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The encryptor (aes enc), along with the other supporting modules, used all 
assigned BRAM resources. Therefore, in the decryptor (aes_dec), separate vectors to 
store the key expand values were used, instead of the dual-port RAM structure that was 
otherwise available, and Xilinx distributed LUT (Look-Up Table) ROMs, available from 
the Templates in the ISE, were used for the S-boxes. Modifying the libraries to be 
included in the project for the decryptor array declaration when the dual-port RAM was 
being used, seemed to cause the slv_reg contents to be displayed backwards in post- 
translate and later simulations. Declaring them as big-endian in the decryptor was the 
work-around.
The slave register interface described before was modified in its write process so 
that selected bits could be written to the slave registers by the core while the slave 
registers were not already being written to by the bus. It is not possible to write, from the 
core, a bit in a slv_reg that is regularly being driven from the bus, originating from 
software, since the bit will be overwritten and its value will not change. However, it is 
possible to write to bits individually, thus choosing the role of each bit. The only bit 
required in slv_regO as an output from the core is the done bit; the rest of the control bits 
defined in this work for slvregO  are inputs. Therefore the “case” statement in the 
slvregs  write process was separated using “i f ’ statements into groups of slv_regO on its 
own, slvjegs9-12, which are also used as outputs, and slv_regsl-8, which are only used 
as inputs. The condition used in the “i f ’ statements is the write select to the registers from 
the bus; in the “else”, writes from the core were placed. Bit 0 of slv_regO was assigned as 
the bit to which done from the core is written, and is set when done is “1” and cleared 
when ld_r is “1”. The clock to the slv_reg write process is the bus clock undivided; the 
pulses from the core, being twice as long, would therefore always occur for enough time 
to allow a bus clock rising edge to occur. The bits which are defined as control inputs 
from slv regO are assigned asynchronously in the core from their slv regO bit positions. 
In the block involving slv_regs9-12, those registers are assigned from text_out when done 
is “1”.
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3.1.7.2. Additional AES Implementation Features
. ,3.1.7.2.1. Autoload
Originally in the development of the encryptor and decryptor, a bit from slv_regO 
was defined as the “load” bit and I d r  would be set to “1” on its clock, if “load” was 
high. This caused an avoidable delay in setting the bit in software and then clearing it -  it 
would have to be cleared or ld_r would repeat -  in fact, ld_r always repeated when this 
method was used until the “load” bit was cleared, because the speed of the transform, of 
eleven clock cycles, was more than twice as fast as the software could set and clear the 
“load” bit. Instead, a signal called start Jo a d  was defined which is set to “1” when 
slv_reg8 is written, and cleared when ld_r is detected to be set to “1”. Therefore 
start Jo a d  turns on at some arbitrary time and waits for the ld_r process to detect it on the 
chosen clock for ld_r, and then turns itself off. In the ld_r process, ld_r is turned off on 
its own chosen clock rising edge if it is set, thus ensuring that it stays high for only one of 
its clock cycles. Thus the write to the final te x tjn  register neatly triggers one ld_r pulse 
and one transform. This could also be useful if DMA (Direct Memory Access) ability is 
added to this core at some future date. DMA ability is available [XILOPBIP2H], and was 
investigated as part of this work, but adding it is a considerable undertaking.
3.1.7.2.2. Key Expand Readout, Storage and Readback
A method to induce the encryptor to produce and hold the key expand values one 
at a time to be read by software, was developed in a resource-efficient manner by 
utilizing control bits connected from slv_regO. Since software sets the control bits, a 
slice-consuming VHDL process to generate the control bits as a signal did not have to be 
used, and the control signals need only be read by the core.
One control bit, krd is used only to signal that the key expand module is in “key 
expand readout” mode. If it is set, slv_regs9-12 are set from the key expand value, not 
from text_out. A second control bit, kstep, is used to proceed to the next key expand 
value on the next clock when it is high, or to hold the current key expand value when it is
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low. A third control bit, kstepend, was found necessary to prevent the state variable, 
rcntjiext from free-running (repeatedly causing its own update) in the “rcon” (round 
constant) module. 'It was necessary in the end to add a small process to time the exact 
transition of kstep and kstepend to the clock pulse before rcon is generated for its use in 
the key expand module. Then, as long as krd is “1”, setting kstep to “1”, then setting 
kstepend to “1” via software, would cause the subsequent key expand value to be 
available for the software to read from slv_regs9-12. Simultaneously clearing kstep and 
kstepend is necessary to prepare for the generation of the next variable. To begin the 
whole process, load (via autoload) must be done after setting krd. The first key expand 
value is the key itself, and is read before using kstep. When all eleven key expand values 
have been read, krd must be cleared in order to use the encryptor in its regular transform 
mode.
A random-access protocol was added to the decryptor to store the key expand 
values. Four bits of slv_regO in the decryptor were assigned for selection of eleven 
internal storage vectors, kcnt, internally, and a VHDL case statement was used to select 
the storage vector to receive the contents of slvjregsl-4  (the key input slave registers) 
when kid (“keyload”, from slv regO) is “1”. When kid is “0”, dent is used to address the 
particular key expand value when the decryptor is operating in its regular transform 
mode; as noted before, dent is actually counted upwards from zero in the decryptor; note 
that this means that the final key expand value (in encryption order) is located in address 
zero of the internal decryptor storage and thus the entire set of the eleven key expand 
values is stored in the decryptor in reverse order.
Also when kid is “0”, a kbrden (“key buffer read enable”) signal from slv_reg0 is 
used to select key readback, which was used as a confidence test when the decryptor was 
under development. An asynchronous assignment was used to determine the random- 
access address, readjcb, used to obtain the selected key expand value when kid is “0”, 
since dent is used when kbrden is “0”, for the regular transform mode, and kcnt, 
determined from the random-access address set in slvjregO, is used when kbrden is “1”:
read_kb <= ((not(kbrden & kbrden & kbrden & kbrden)) and dent) 
or ((kbrden & kbrden & kbrden & kbrden) and kcnt);
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Note that ”&” is a concatenation operator, making a four-bit vector from kbrden for 
selection of either dent or kcnt. If kbrden is set in slv_regO, the corresponding key expand 
value, according to the number set in the kcnt bits set in slv_regO, can be read from 
slv_regs9-12 under software control.
3.1.7.2.3. Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC) Mode
In a block cipher such as AES, the same block encrypted with the same key 
always gives the same ciphertext. This mode of encryption is known as “Electronic Code 
Book” mode, and is obviously cryptographically weaker than if the plaintext could be 
“salted” in some continually-varying way -  in cryptography, “salting” the message means 
to add unrelated content before encryption in order to attempt frustration of cryptanalysis.
In Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC) mode, the plaintext is XORed with the output of 
the previous encrypted block before being fed to the encryptor core for encryption. In 
decryption, each decrypted block is XORed with the previous block of ciphertext to 
reveal the plaintext. This is possible due to the property of the XOR operation that it is its 
own inverse. When the first block in an encryption or decryption sequence is processed, 
an “IV”, or “Initial Vector” is used in place of the ciphertext of the previous block.
This was added as a non-optional feature -  in the encryptor a one-time done pulse 
was added during which time the ciphertext is transferred to the IV  vector, which was 
reused for this purpose as well as for the actual IV, for simplicity. In the decryptor, two 
such pulses were required; in the first, the output is XORed with the IV  to form the 
plaintext; in the second, the IV  is updated from the current ciphertext.
To enter the IV, an ivload bit was defined in slvjregO for both the encryptor and 
the decryptor. When “ 1”, the contents of slv_regs5-8 are copied to the internal IV  vector. 
An ivrdback bit was defined in slv_regO for the decryptor. When set, the current value of 
the IV is copied to slv_regs9-12 for read-back. This feature was not added to the 
encryptor, due to space concerns.
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.3.1.7.2.4. Timing Diagnostic Output for Test
In each of the encryptor and the decryptor, a “test process” was added in which a 
signal, called loadtodone is set high when ld_r is detected and cleared when done is 
detected. This signal was defined as an output in the formal parameter list of the module 
and passed up to the outer wrapper where it in turn was defined as an output in its formal 
parameter list. This change was the only change necessary to the outer wrapper. In the 
EDK, this signal from the encryptor was connected to pin AF24 of the FPGA, which is 
connected on the ML403 board to J6 pin 64, and this signal from the decryptor was 
connected to pin AA24 of the FPGA, which is connected to J6 pin 2. As the top side of 
the ML403 board is viewed so that the large, gold-coloured “Virtex V4” and “Xilinx” 
labels are the correct way up for reading, J6 is the large header on the far right of the 
board. It is a double-column header; the third column of pins placed to the left of J6 to 
make it appear like a three-column header is actually J3. There is another three-column 
header to the left of J6 and J3, with some PCB (Printed-Circuit Board) space visible 
between it and J6 and J3. Pin 2 of J6 is at the upper right of the header and pin 64 is at the 
bottom right; both are comer pins, making attachment by an oscilloscope probe as easy as 
possible. The comparatively large, threaded brass cable connectors nearby on the PCB 
make a useful ground connection for the ground alligator clip of the oscilloscope probe. 
The “net” connections to the FPGA pins from the design can be found in “system.ucf ’ in 
the \data\ directory of the EDK project and are shown here:
Net aes_enc_0_loadtodoneout_pin LOC=AF24;
Net aes_dec_0_loadtodoneout_pin LOC=AA24;
In an earlier version of the AES core, an output signal set from the “load” 
slv_regO bit was routed to one of the pins noted before, as well as loadtodone, when only 
one core at a time was being tested in the FPGA, and before the autoload modification 
was done. This allowed the time taken to set and clear the load bit via software to be 
measured using an oscilloscope.
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Figure 17 shows the locations of the control bits in slv regO in the encryptor and 
decryptor:
Encryptor - stv_regO
I Ke Kr Ks L D
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00
D - Done, L Load (Go) (no longer used), I - IV load
Key expand mode: Kr - Key read (Key expand mode), Ks Key step, Ke - Key step end (Key expand values are read from sl»_regs9-12)
Decryptor - slv_regO
K3 K2 HI K0 fr I Kb K1 L D
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 13 17 16 15 14 13 12 I f 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00
D - Done, L - Load (Go) (no longer used), I - IV load, Ir - IV readback
Key storage and read back: K t - Key load, Kb - Key readback, K3-K0 - Key schedule index (reverse of encryption order)
LE - Little Endian. BE • Big Endian
Figure 17. Control bit locations in slv_regO for both AES user peripherals
Bit 02 (BE -  Big-Endian) in the decryptor was for “Key Expand Done”, but that 
is not used since the key expand values are supplied to the decryptor.
3.1,7,2.5. A “Stepper” Version of the Decryptor
Blocks of logic were added to the decryptor to enable their corresponding clock 
phases in the core when the software would pulse a bit in slv_reg0. A counter was used to 
count through the clock phases, incrementing once each time the bit in slvjregO went 
high, and an enable for each phase was timed to be “1” when the rising edge of that phase 
was to occur. These enables were added as a condition to each process that uses a clock 
phase. The output of each resulting step of the three steps per round was placed in 
slv_regs9-12, resulting in a readout of the current state for each step of each round. This 
was written as a debugging check, and remains of theoretical interest. The method used, 
of implementing a separate process to enable each clock phase with its own pulse, was 
costly in terms of FPGA fabric and led to the realization of the simpler method used in 
the key expand generation feature.
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A simple CLI (Command-Line Interface) program was written to write the key 
and the plaintext to the decryptor peripheral’s slave registers, pulse the load bit, then 
repeatedly pulse the step bit in slv_regO, and read slv_regs9-12, and send their hex- 
ASCII-encoded values for display via RS232 when the user presses a printable character 
key on the computer keyboard -  see the section after, “CLI and Simpler Programs” for 
more description of this general programming technique.
A bug was found in which the initial key expand value used was not correct due 
to the repeated ld_r during the “load” pulse causing the array index used to access the 
array of key expand values being incremented; the index was not being initialized along 
with the value of dent when the latter was initialized to zero. Due to arbitrary key expand 
values being left from previous rounds of operation, the “stepper” would eventually 
produce a series of correct output values. This knowledge was used to correct the 
decryptor’s operation by initializing the key expand values always from the first element 
of the key expand array rather than relying on the initialized array index; in the 
subsequent round, ld_r occurred, and the index was always being set to the second value. 
This fix was added to the “stepper”, as well, which should correct its operation, but the 
“stepper” was not subsequently tested.
3.1.8. Test and Demonstration Software
3.1.8.1. CLI and Simpler Programs
Numerous small CLI programs were written to be loaded into the ML403 board to 
test the AES cores, beginning with one to successfully write and read back the slave 
registers. The standard program, “Hyperterminal”, included with all versions of 
Windows, was used on the PC to view the RS232 output from the board and send user 
keystroke data. Xilinx provided easy-to-use function calls to use the UART and the 
RS232 port, such as inbyte() and outbyte() -  the parentheses following the identifier is 
syntax that indicates a C function, and, in actual implementation, may or may not contain 
a list of parameters being passed to the function. In addition, Xilinx provided a written 
“TestApp_Memory” C program that tested memory and reported via RS232, making a
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useful test of system “liveness”. Next, one was written to write the key and plaintext and 
to turn the “load” bit on and off, loop to wait for the “done” bit, and then read slv_regs9- 
12; later, this was also written to test the decryptor. These confirmed basic operation of 
the user peripheral, once the same cryptographic output appeared that was seen in 
simulation.
Functions were written to encode and decode numeric values and strings, because 
raw binary data should not be sent over an RS232 link, for the reason that some numbers 
are RS232 control codes that can stop the link from apparently functioning. Any numbers 
sent over an RS232 link that are not intended as control codes should be encoded as 
printable ASCII. The encode function, called “hex-ASCII encoding” in this work, 
interprets numeric data as hexadecimal and creates the printable characters representing 
the hexadecimal digits. The decode function takes a string of characters that represent 
hexadecimal digits and converts it into the numeric data that was represented. Note that 
an ASCII character requires eight bits and a binary hexadecimal digit requires only four 
bits, meaning that this type of encoding doubles the storage space required (when the data 
is not immediately decoded upon reception). When the program in the board sends 
numeric data for display, it encodes the digits, and when it receives numeric data typed 
by the user from the keyboard, it decodes the characters received, to determine the 
numeric value of the data.
Versions for each of the encryptor and the decryptor were written to loop, setting 
and clearing the “load” bit, when that was used, looping to wait for the “done” bit, and 
then repeating. This was used to determine the maximum possible processing speed 
available using this overall design, and did not even include any RS232 output, being 
intended for measurement of the diagnostic output signals using an oscilloscope. Later, 
these programs were revised to use autoload and to include a full write of the input and a 
full read of the output.
A full CLI test program was written to exercise all features included with the 
cores; this program evolved as features were added, originating as a version to test only
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the encryptor. Its basic design is an endless loop with no exit criterion, containing a wait 
for a character to be received via RS232, following which a C “switch” statement (which 
is the C-language equivalent of the VHDL “case” statement) was used to act on valid 
command characters received. An infinite outer loop is the basic computer operating 
system in its simplest form. In it, the list of tasks to be done is placed, to be processed in 
a round-robin fashion -  i.e., repeatedly. Notably, this test program echoes the key expand 
values one at a time via RS232 when the key is loaded, as they are copied to the 
decryptor core. The inbyte() function waits for input if none is available, making it useful 
for halting processing to allow the user to view the output generated. Typically, a string 
such as “Press any key to continue” is first sent for display, following which the wait-for- 
input function call is invoked. The character typed by the user is generally not otherwise 
used in this specific situation.
Since Cipher-Block Chaining mode was added to the AES cores, the IV is loaded 
to both by this test software, and the encrypted block can be seen to vary, following 
which it is always decrypted to the correct plaintext, upon repeated test encryptions.
Commands available in this program are: “i - enter the IV; v - view decryptor's 
IV; k - enter the key (and do key exp); p - enter the plaintext; e - encrypt and decrypt; x - 
Display the decryptor's key expand values”. The command characters are made case- 
insensitive in the switch statement by using pairs of case statements for each block. This1, 
saves the memory required to add in an extra library; moreover the library containing the 
standard C “toupper” function was not found in the GNU libraries provided by Xilinx.
This basic design was used for the ML403 board code that works with the 
demonstration GUI: the demonstration GUI sends the individual command characters.
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3.1.8.2. The AES Demonstration GUI, “AESfile”
The demonstration GUI sends the individual command characters to the board 
and then has a programmed dialog with the board until the specific dialog for that 
command character finishes.
In this demonstration, a text file with a given name, “plaintextin.txt” is sent block- 
by-block to the board and encrypted. Each encrypted block is hex-ASCII encoded by the 
board and sent back to the PC for storage in a text file, “ciphertextouttxt”. The GUI- 
board system also does decryption by reading a file called “ciphertextouttxt” and sending 
the block of hex-ASCII-encoded bytes back to the board, which sends back the block of 
sixteen characters (128 bits); the GUI saves these in a file called “plaintextouttxt”. Note 
that the block of hex-ASCII-encoded bytes requires 32 ASCII characters, one to represent 
each hexadecimal digit in 128 bits. The ASCII values of the block of sixteen plaintext 
characters are treated as numeric data by the board for encryption purposes. For 
decryption purposes, the 32 hex-ASCII-encoded characters received are first decoded, by 
the board, to sixteen bytes of numeric data.
3.1.8.2.1, The ML403 Board Code
When ‘k’ is received as a command, the board then expects the hex-ASCII- 
encoded key from the GUI, which it decodes, writes to the encryptor, does key expand 
and writes the key expand values to the decryptor.
When ‘i’ is received as a command, the board then expects the hex-ASCII- 
encoded IV from the GUI, which it decodes and writes to the encryptor and the 
decryptor.
When ‘e’ is received as a command, the board encrypts the IV using an IV of 
zero, sends it to the GUI, updates the encryptor with the IV, and then loops: receiving 
blocks from the GUI, encrypting them and sending them back. It stops when the ASCII
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character “ETX” (End-of-Text) is received and includes it as the last character to encrypt, 
padding any remnant o f the last block with zeroes.
When ‘d’ is received as a command, the board first receives the encrypted IV 
from the GUI (hex-ASCII-encoded), decodes it, and decrypts it using the key and an IV 
of zero. Then it updates the decryptor’s IV with the decrypted IV. Then it loops, 
receiving hex-ASCII-encoded blocks of ciphertext from the GUI, decoding them, 
decrypting them, and sending them back. When the ETX is found, the loop exits.
3.1.8.2.2. The PC Demonstration GUI, “AESfile”
A package written for MSVC++V6, to do serial 10, was located [KLE2003], and 
incorporated into a MSVC++V6 project. Its function calls (“methods” in C++), provided 
the ability to communicate with the ML403 board via RS232.
The GUI, named “AESfile,” provides two “edit boxes” for entry of the key and 
IV, and two “static text boxes” next to these for display of the resulting numeric key and 
IV, since, if characters are typed into the “edit boxes”, their ASCII values are used as the 
numeric cryptographic data. Radio buttons are provided to allow interpretation of the 
user’s entry in the edit boxes as either hex. digits or ASCII characters.
Two buttons are provided, one to encrypt and the other to decrypt. A large static 
text box is provided in which activity echoing is shown, such as the data being encrypted 
or decrypted. A function was designed and implemented to add characters to the activity 
display and delete the oldest characters when the text box becomes full, giving the 
appearance of “scrolling”. When a button is clicked, the files are read and the board is 
commanded to encrypt or decrypt, via the procedure described before. The IV is 
encrypted and added to “ciphertextouttxt” so that only the correct key is needed to 
decrypt an encrypted file. Encrypting the IV was realized to be somewhat of a 
cryptographically faulty idea, as described before (see section 1.2.4.2. “Encapsulating
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Security Payload Protocol”). Figure 18 shows a “screenshot” of this demonstration in 
action.
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Figure 18. A "screenshot" of the “AESfile” demonstration
Test methodology for this, to determine the encryption speed, consisted of timing 
the file encryption and decryption processes as they progressed, using a digital watch that 
counts seconds. Due to expected delays caused by the RS232 transmission and the text 
display to the activity window, a more accurate timing method did not seem justified.
It seemed that other programs installed on the PC would hold access to the serial 
port and prevent communication from working. One such seemed to be the Tektronix PC 
Communications software, whose use is described after for obtaining images from the 
oscilloscope. Another seemed to be MSVC++V6; it was necessary to repeatedly begin
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and stop debugging in its IDE (Integrated Development Environment) in order to obtain 
access to the serial port -  which, at least, was faster than rebooting the PC. 
“Hyperterminal” could be used to determine if  access to the serial port could be obtained, 
as it would report a dialog box if it could not obtain access to the serial port; however, j 
that indication was not reliable when the Tektronix software was seemingly preventing 
access. “Hyperterminal” must itself be “disconnected” using its menu option or exited if 
it is required to use another PC program that accesses the serial port.
3.2. Design of a Combination LFSR-CASR Pseudo-Random Number Generator
3.2.1. Selection of the Base Design
The availability of random number generators was somewhat limited; on the 
“Open Cores” website [OPENCORES], there were only two selections available. The 
Verilog/SystemC LFSR-CASR (Cellular Automata Shift Register) RNG was chosen for 
its claimed good statistical properties [VILL2005]. The other, a library of RNGs, was 
indicated as not being synthesizable [DRA2004].
3.2.2. Description of the Tkacik-Villar LFSR-CASR PRNG
This PRNG was made available in SystemC and Verilog, and based on the design 
by Thomas E. Tkacik [TKA2002].
The LFSR contains bits numbered from 0 to 42; each clock, each of bits 0,19 and 
40 are replaced by their XOR with bit 42, then the contents of the LFSR is rotated one bit 
to the higher direction: bit 0 becomes bit 1, and so on to bit 42 becoming bit 0. The 
resulting output has a cycle length of (243)-l and a bias of 2'43.
The CASR contains bits numbered from 0 to 36; each clock, each bit is replaced 
by the XOR of its two neighbour bits, with bit 36 and bit 0 being considered neighbours, 
and bit 27 is specially included as a third XOR input for its subsequent value. This is a 
“cellular automata” reminiscent of “Life”, and introduces non-linearity. “Life” is played 
or run on a two-dimensional matrix of square cells of (ideally) infinite extent. Every tick
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of its “clock”, each cell is declared as “live” if it previously had exactly three “living” 
neighbours out of its eight, unchanged if it had exactly two “living” neighbours, and 
“dead” for any other status. It produces many interesting non-linear combinations of 
cells, and it in particular, as well as cellular automata, are a separate field of study. The 
37-bit CASR has a cycle length of (237)-l and a bias of 2"37.
Each clock cycle, the low-order 32 bits are XORed together to form the output. 
The LFSR-CASR combination has a cycle length of 280-243-237+l and a bias of 2'80 
[TKA2002]. The final XOR and the use of only the lower 32 bits of each state conceals 
the states from cryptanalysis.
The combination produces a good randomized output ([TKA2002] pg. 7), and 
does well on the “Diehard” tests ([TKA2002] pg. 8) -  see section 2.7., “Random Number 
Generators”, before.
3.2.3. Test Methodology and Use in this Work
In this work, this PRNG was first translated from Verilog to C++ -  which was a 
significant coding change, and its output was verified for correctness against simulation 
of the original Verilog. Then the C++ program was made to output, in hexadecimal, up to 
100,000 32-bit numbers, and up to 100,000 128-bit numbers by grouping the 32-bit 
numbers in fours. DOS Sort was used to sort the numbers into numerical order, and a 
second C++ program was written to count the numbers that fell within groups of values 
of the same first two and three digits, giving 256 and 4096 groups of numbers, 
respectively. The count of the quantity of numbers that fell into each group were plotted 
against the location of the groups in the number-lines of magnitude 232 and 2128.
The C++ code was then modified into C code, in a minor change, for inclusion in 
the IPsec implementation.
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3.3. Design of an IPsec Implementation, “IPsecImp”, Using the Five-Layer Security 
Framework
3.3.1. C vs. C ++for Embedded Systems
Since the IPsec implementation will have to go into an embedded system, amount 
of memory used is critical. Although the ML403 board has 1MB of SRAM, it is desirable 
for test and demonstration purposes to fit the entire software package into the available 
BRAM on the FPGA/CPU chip itself, for one-step downloading from a bit file. The 
implementation created along with the AES peripherals provided 32kB of BRAM. C++ 
code with a class and a constructor and small method of only approximately two lines, as 
generated by the GNU C++ compiler that came with the Xilinx EDK, required about 40k. 
In comparison, 64k times 16 would be the entire SRAM of 1MB. Clearly C++ is too 
costly in terms of memory usage for the ML403 board. Equivalent code compiled with 
the GNU C compiler required about one-seventh the memory, and the IPsec portion 
implemented used slightly less than 32kB (0x8000 bytes).
3.3.2. Top-Level Design of a Peer
An IPsec implementation, designed for demonstration and testing, was developed. 
The important functionality is located in the ML403 board, and called “IPsecImp” with a 
GUI to operate it, via an RS232 serial connection, located on a Windows PC, called 
“IPsecGUI”. The GUI commands the OSI layer functionality to start, sends it its 
operating settings as chosen by the user, and displays results.
Figures 19,20 and 21 give an ambitious top-level design for an IPsec peer, 
showing all five layers of the security framework. Following that, Figures 22 and 23 
show the portion that was implemented.
Layering helps the design a good deal, by reducing it to an exercise in 
“connecting the dots” -  but the design of the management layer still is not entirely 
rigorous. SLAs (Service Level Agreements) are used to determine the policy settings for 
the SMIB. The layers used are numbered as follows: 1., Policy, 2., Management, 3., 
Services, 4., Mechanisms, and 5., Primitives.
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It was planned to use public-domain code for all standard mechanisms and 
primitives -  which was done for the two primitives implemented, AES and the PRNG.
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The portion implemented was a subset of the design shown in Figures 19,20 and 
21, as shown in Figures 22 and 23. See also Appendix A, for pseudo-code.
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The basic design is the same as used previously, in which an infinite main loop is 
used, within which a command character is awaited from the GUI via RS232, and acted 
on using a switch statement, with the difference that a “non-blocking” check for a 
received character is used in order to allow the outer loop to run freely. That allows other 
processing to be inserted before the command character check. In this design, two 32-bit 
counters were added to continually count, in order to be used as a random seed value for 
the PRNG. Since the PRNG used (see before) has internal states of more than 32 bits, 
only a portion of the higher-order 32-bit counter is used. That one is counted down (in a 
cycle) from OxFFFFFFFF (hex.) and the lower-order one is counted up, from 
0x00000000. Other processing is the functions of the OSI layers, including the IPsec 
sublayer, within an “i f ’ block that is activated by a Boolean variable, PacketProcessing, 
that is turned on when a command character is received, sent by the controlling GUI 
when it is ready to send it a packet to process. The function calls for the three 
implemented OSI layers are listed within that “i f ’ block, and they are repeatedly called, 
every iteration of the outer loop, until there is no more processing to do, in which case the
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PacketProcessing variable is turned off. This top-level loop is considered the 
management layer; Figure 24 illustrates this design. See section 3.5., “Design of a CLI 
Version, ‘IPsecLoop,’ to Facilitate Testing,” for a slightly differing version. Pseudo-code 
for most functions implemented can be found in Appendix A.
Toggle packet processing
receive the SMIB vi&RS232
send the SMIB via RS232
•end the SADB via RS232
receive the SADB via RS232
send-Hello1' characters via HS232
toggle toad key in core every 
transform
seedthe RNGwiththe 64-bit count 
and send the count via K5232
Figure 24. "IPsecImp" top-level loop flowchart
The command characters are the following: ‘r’: the PRNG is seeded from the
I
free-running counter values. The unpredictable time at which a human operator would 
cause the GUI to send this command introduces the true random element. The seed value 
is also sent to the GUI. ‘h’: the characters of the string “Hello” are sent to the GUI, as an 
indication of board “liveness”, ‘z’: the SADB is sent from the board to the GUI. ‘s’: the 
SADB is received from the GUI by the board, ‘m’: the SMIB is sent from the board to
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the GUI. ‘i’: the SMIB is received from the GUI by the board, ‘k’: a variable, 
KeylsAlwaysTreatedAsNew is toggled that determines whether the key should always be 
loaded to the core for every IPsec packet transform or if it should only be loaded when it 
changes. Internally, there is a NeedNewIV Boolean variable that is set when the IV from 
the SADB (and otherwise when required, see after) is zero, ‘p’: PacketProcessing is 
toggled. It is only turned on if there is a protocol and mode set in the SADB. This code 
can also be operated via Hyperterminal for debugging purposes. For the purpose of 
discarding data sent when the board is not ready for it, none of these command characters 
are characters that represent hexadecimal digits.
Before this outer loop is entered, the SMIB is initialized to the services, 
mechanisms and primitives made available by the embedded software and FPGA 
configuration. A cleared SADB is also created.
The C language syntax provides the ability to define variables for the compiler’s 
pre-processor to read; these are called “#define” (“pound-define”), and can be checked 
using “#ifdef’. In this design, the C function prototypes and their external declarations 
were put in the same file, and a “#ifdef ’ was used to check the alternative to be used, 
using conditional compilation. A header file that included the main header file was used 
to be included in files that used another file’s functionality, that “#define”ed the variable 
to be checked. The native header file was included in its own source code file, so that the 
variable would not be defined and the native file would have its function prototypes 
selected. This technique can be used to implement a limited form of the object-oriented 
concept of private methods and data; generally a header file’s #defines are made 
available to other files that need to use that file’s functionality in this technique. Another 
use of “#define” and “#ifdef ’ is to “#define” a variable at the top of a header file if  it is 
not already defined, and to include the contents of the header file as well, in that 
conditional compilation. This prevents errors if header files included in the header file 
include the same header file at some level of inclusion; the header file will not include its 
content if its variable is already defined.
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3.3.3. SMIB (Security Management Information Data Base)
The SMIB is organized using C language “structs” (data structures), one 
representing each layer. The SMIB itself is a “struct”, containing the lower-level 
“structs”. Some ideas for general content of an SMIB were found in [KEN1994] (see also 
section 1.2.2., “Security Policy Database and SMIB”, before). The policy “struct” 
contains an integer giving the number of policies, and a pointer to the defined policy 
“struct”, allowing more than one policy to be pointed to, by allocating the memory 
required. Although the SMIB contains a value for the number of policies, only one policy 
at a time is used in the board at this time. The management layer “struct” contains four 
bytes for the local IP address, an integer for the number of clients, a Boolean variable 
indicating whether the client addresses should be interpreted as pairs, for range purposes, 
and a pointer to an array of four-byte client addresses, so that any number of client 
addresses can be referenced. The Services layer “struct” contains a “struct” for each of 
AH and ESP, each of which contains a Boolean variable to indicate whether the service is 
available, and an integer to indicate the mechanism number. In future work, the AH and 
ESP structs can be replaced with pointers to them so that more than one can be stored. 
This would allow selection of different services. In the same way, the mechanism number 
would allow selection of different mechanisms. The mechanism layer is designed in a 
similar way, as is the primitives layer, which could allow a great deal of flexibility in 
choosing combinations of algorithms. The numbers in the primitive layer “structs” refer 
to primitive algorithm numbers which can be chosen for each type of primitive.
3.3.3.1. The Policy Layer
The policy “struct” has two conceptual groups of variables: selectors and SA 
negotiation goals. The selectors determine whether a packet is to be processed, in flexible 
ways; each has a Boolean variable associated with it to determine if it should be used, or 
interpreted to match any packet. The six selectors implemented are understood to be 
combined together in an “AND” sense, since each selector represents an additional 
criterion to check. An overall Boolean is used to set whether the result of the overall 
selection should be taken in the opposite sense.
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In the “negotiation goals” group of variables, the protocols and modes desired 
should be considered to be non-negotiable. A “negotiate” Boolean is provided to select 
whether it is acceptable to negotiate different service numbers of those available. Two 
sets of negotiation goals are provided, inner and outer, so that IPsec protocols can be 
nested in pairs.
3.3.4. SADB (Security Association Data Base)
See the SADB plan in the pseudo-code in Appendix A for the complete list of 
contents of the SADB.
Note that the Service number field in the SADB is the location where the number 
chosen in negotiation from one of the available services is stored.
The “IV Constant” field in the SADB is used to clear NeedNewIV (equivalent to 
setting it to “FALSE”, in C -  any non-zero value in a C variable is interpreted as 
“TRUE”), unless the IV is zero, in which case NeedNewIV is set on a one-time basis.
This helps to counteract the natural user disinclination to originate cryptographic 
material. NeedNewIV is passed down the layers via function calls to the mechanisms 
layer, where it induces the getting of a new IV using the RNG in the sending case, when 
encryption is used.
As it was realized that an S A is associated only with a communication in one 
direction, considerable simplification resulted from reducing the number of keys and I Vs 
from eight to two, since incoming and outgoing cryptographic material did not need to be 
stored in the SA, and neither did that material need to be stored on behalf of the other 
entity.
3.3.5. OSI Layers Implemented
The IP (Internet Protocol) layer, IPsec layer and Link layer are represented in this 
work. The Link layer is a dummy layer that calls the dispatcher to get the IPsec packet
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and send it back to the IP layer. The IP layer is largely a dummy layer that receives the 
packet from the GUI via reliable data transfer, in “IPsecImp”, or copies the established 
test packet in memory, in “IPsecLoop” (see after). When a layer receives a pointer to 
allocated memory via the dispatcher, and uses it, it is responsible for deallocating that 
memory. When the IP layer receives the IP packet back via the dispatcher from the IPsec 
layer, it echoes it and then deallocates its memory.
The IPsec layer is based on the service calls. It checks the dispatcher for the 
presence of a packet. There are two outer if blocks, one for the transmit, sending, 
outgoing, or IP to IPsec case (in which case the IP packet is converted to an IPsec packet) 
and one for the receive, incoming, or Link to IPsec case (in which case the IPsec packet 
is converted to an IP packet). In the transmit block, the SADB for outgoing packets is 
checked for the protocol to use and the appropriate service call is made. In the receive 
block, the protocol field of the datagram is checked and then the SPI is checked for a 
match against that set in the SADB for incoming packets, before the service call is made. 
The pointer to the “incoming” SADB is set, in the management layer, to the “outgoing” 
SADB so that they will be identical for the purposes of this research. Any error codes 
generated from lower levels are passed to the Management layer for appropriate action, 
such as stopping packet processing and displaying error messages. Before each service 
call, the reliable data transfer routine is used to send a short synchronization message, 
literally the characters “Synch”, to the GUI, to alert the GUI to start its timer to measure 
the duration of the service call. Following the service call, regular RS232 output is used 
to alert the GUI that processing has ended. Following the “receiving” AH service call, a 
message indicating whether the authentication succeeded is sent via RS232; reliable data 
transfer was used to prevent the GUI from missing it. Figure 25 illustrates the design of 
the IPsec layer.
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Figure 25. The IPsec layer flowchart
3.3.6. Board-GUI Reliable Data Transfer
In development of the AES file encryption demonstration, “AESfile”, a 
considerable number of extraneous characters were observed being received by the GUI. 
Their source is unknown, whether that was a characteristic of the serial package used 
[KLE2003]. In an attempt to deal with that in the “IPsecGUI”, first it was attempted to 
require all characters, even printing characters themselves, to be hex-ASCII encoded and 
allow reception of only characters representing hex. digits, discarding any others. 
However, extraneous characters could still conceivably be hex. digits (0-9, a-f, or, A-F), 
and debugging using Hyperterminal was made tedious since even the text strings sent 
were encoded and readable only with much difficulty. What was really needed was 
reliable data transfer.
The requirements for this feature were the sending of a checksum, its verification, 
as well as three-way handshaking. Not only should the sending code receive an “ACK” 
or “NAK”, but the receiving code should have it echoed back to know that its response 
has been received. Finally, the sending code should receive an acknowledgement that the
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receiver knows that the sender has received its response. Another requirement was that 
communication should not “deadlock”, for example, with the receiver waiting for a 
character and the transmitter not sending any more.
The above requirements were satisfied by the following. First, the “receive” code 
sends “STX” when it begins to wait for a transmission. The sender begins sending when 
it receives an “STX”. When the receiver receives something, it stops sending “STX”. The 
“send” code sends its message, followed by a hex-ASCII-encoded checksum, and then 
sends “ETX” characters if  it does not receive a response, until it receives a response. The 
message is hex-ASCII-encoded if it consists of numeric data, and the checksum is 
calculated from the unencoded data. The receiver uses the numeric ASCII value for 
“ETX”, 0x03, if dropouts occur and it needs some “ETX”es to make up the required 
length of the message, which is supplied to the “receive” or “send” code by its respective 
calling function. In that case, the message verification fails (which was tested as being 
quite reliable). When the receiver has done the message verification, it then sends “ACK” 
or “NAK”, until it receives back either one, and then stops sending. The “send” code is 
aware that the “receive” code has received back its echo when the receiver stops sending. 
If “NAK” was sent by the receiver, both routines begin again. In practice, these routines 
had to be carefully adjusted with delay loops so that the board, with its 100 MHz clock, 
could successfully communicate with the PC used, with its 2.39 GHz clock, and with the 
laptop, with its 701 MHz clock (Pentium III CPU). Figures 26 and 27 illustrate the design 
of the send and receive code.
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These routines were only used to transfer numeric data; the “send” function 
included an input indicating whether the string pointed to should be sent via reliable data 
transfer, so that the same function could be reused to send unencoded characters without 
expecting any response, in order to avoid code duplication. The ML403 board code and 
the GUI code were written so that it was known at a given program location whether 
reliable data transfer was to be used. Each entity, “IPsecImp” in the board and 
“IPsecGUI” in the PC, has both a send and a receive function. If data of varying length 
was to be sent, the length was first sent as numeric data using a variable of known length 
in order to send a known number of bytes.
3.3.7. The Services Layer
Both an AH and ESP service were written. A pointer to the SMIB and to the 
SADB are passed to these routines, which use the service number in the SADB to trace 
the primitives to use, via the SMIB, from the service number, via the mechanism number,
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to the primitive algorithm number. This is necessary because it is these routines that 
allocate the memory for the transformed packet and therefore must access information 
from the Primitives layer in order to determine precise data sizes needed. This is an 
example of strict layering making implementation difficult (see section 1.5., “Motivation 
for General Layering”). Since the goal is a successful implementation, the end should not 
be sacrificed to the means; doing that might constitute fanaticism, which sometimes 
occurs in the form of increasing effort while losing sight of objectives.
■c,
These routines also read and build IP and IPsec packets. IPv4 is supported in this 
work ([BAC1997], “IP Packet Structure,”
http://www.freesoft.Org/CIE/Course/Section3/7.htm). [RFC0791]. Note that in the RFCs 
and in other standards documents, the term of choice to replace “byte,” is “octet,” since 
the term “byte” is sometimes used loosely, to refer to other than eight bits; in RS232 
transmission, the presence of start, stop and parity bits often means that a “byte” is nine, 
ten or eleven bits. Note also, that in this design, the AES IV is included, unencrypted, in 
every packet that contains data encrypted using AES, at the beginning of the section, 
immediately before it.
3.3.7.1. The ESP Service
In the ESP service, for sending, the size of the space required for the IPsec 
datagram (a specific term for a packet at the IP level [KUR2000]) is calculated and the 
space for the datagram is allocated from the system heap, using the standard C function, 
malloc() [KER1988]. In addition, space for at least the data to be encrypted is allocated, 
since padding has to be added to conform to a natural number of encryption block sizes, 
and to hold the padding size information itself. This latter space has at least the packet 
payload copied to it and is configured with the padding and the padding size, in order to 
send this space to the mechanism for encryption. Any unused padding area is set to 
zeroes, for confidentiality, in order to prevent any leak of data left in the memory area 
used, which should not be sent along with the packet. The Encryption mechanism routine 
is called and is passed a pointer to the destination address for the ciphertext, the source
87
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
address of the plaintext, and the data length. In addition, the mechanism is sent the 
mechanism number to use, determined from the SMIB, and the key and the IV from the 
SADB. It is also sent the SPI from the SADB for the purposes of only updating the key in 
the encryption core when necessary.
Upon reception, the IP datagram can only be allocated after the mechanism is 
called, because the padding size is not known until then. Instead, space is allocated for 
the size of the IPsec datagram payload, less only the size of the IV, as a destination for 
the decrypted data from the mechanism. The IP datagram payload only is then transferred 
to the IP datagram built.
Before exiting, the temporary payload area is freed, leaving only the datagrams-in 
and -out, of the service call. Figure 28 illustrates the design of the ESP service.
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Figure 28. The ESP service flowchart
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3.3.7.2. The AH Service
In the AH service, the datagram must always be hashed, in order to create the 
authentication data when sending, or for comparison with the decrypted authentication 
data when receiving. Therefore space for the generated hash must always be allocated. If 
receiving, space for the hash, as decrypted from the authentication data, must also be 
allocated. In addition, a copy of the IPsec datagram should always be created, in order to 
build a copy to send to the HMAC mechanism for hashing and signing (encrypting, if 
sending). This copy requires mutable fields (those fields that are changed when the 
packet is transmitted across links) to be zeroed. This copy can become the IPsec 
datagram when sending; doing this increases processing speed. When receiving, this 
datagram is created in this design, but it would be possible to increase processing speed 
by modifying the IPsec datagram that was passed in to the service, since it is always 
deleted by the IPsec sublayer following the service call. The IP datagram is directly 
created from the IPsec datagram if receiving since doing so amounts to only removing the 
AH header, and, if in Tunnel mode, the extra IP header.
An IPsec datagram is thus always passed to the HMAC mechanism for hashing, if 
sending or receiving. The pointer to the encrypted authentication data is set to its location 
in the original IPsec datagram if receiving, and set to separate allocated storage if 
sending, because the datagram to be hashed must not be written to while it is being read; 
this is passed to the mechanism. Pointers to the generated hash storage and the decrypted 
hash storage are also sent to the mechanism. As in the ESP mechanism call, the 
mechanism is sent the mechanism number to use determined from the SMIB, and the key 
and the IV from the SADB. It is also sent the SPI from the SADB for the purposes of 
only updating the key in the encryption core when necessary.
After the call to the mechanism, if sending, the authentication data is copied to the 
AH area in the IPsec datagram. If receiving, the generated hash is compared to the 
decrypted hash and a Boolean variable indicating whether the verification succeeded is 
passed out of the AH service call. All storage is freed except for the datagrams in and out, 
of the service call. Figure 29 illustrates the design of the AH service.
89
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
AIS42S:
Get m e. hash, mi
Hash sia* :33Case o f Hash
Extra AH fcte # i»  1$ hyts*
Point to  location of 
signed hash
Oat size o f and mam. fat
Figure 29. The AH service flowchart
3.3.8. The Mechanisms Layer
3.3.8.1. The Encryption Mechanism
The encryption mechanism contains the code to initialize the SPI-based key 
tracker, and the RNG. If the mechanism is passed the command to initialize these, it does 
so, seeding the PRNG with all “ l ”s. It exits immediately if it does initialization.
The mechanism mainly consists of an outer switch statement that is used to select 
the desired processing for the desired set of primitives found for the particular 
mechanism number that was passed in. AES-128 is the only primitive so far implemented 
for encryption. In that case the SPI-based key tracker is used to help determine whether 
the key needs to be updated in the core. In addition, if the KeylsNew variable passed in
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from the upper layers is true (where it is determined from KeylsAlwaysTreatedAsNew, 
and other factors, if that is false), the core is updated with the key. When the key is 
updated in the core, the SPI-based key tracker is also updated with the SPI used. If 
sending, if the NewIVNeeded variable passed in from the upper layers is true, the selected 
RNG is used to obtain a new IV. Since the IV storage area was passed to the mechanism 
via a pointer (i.e., as a memory address), this updates the IV in the SADB. The IV is also 
copied to the beginning of the destination transform area whose pointer was passed in to 
the mechanism. If receiving, the IV is retrieved from the beginning of the transform area. 
The IV is written to the core via the primitives, and the primitive is called to encrypt or 
decrypt the data starting from the address of the origin transform data and to place the 
transformed data in the destination transform area. The starting addresses have to be 
adjusted to follow the IV in the destination transform area if encrypting, and in the origin 
transform area if decrypting. An error code is accepted from the primitive and passed out 
of this mechanism when it completes. Figure 30 illustrates the design of the encryption 
mechanism.
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Figure 30. The encryption mechanism flowchart
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3.3.8.1. The HMAC Mechanism
The HMAC mechanism contains an empty “i f ’ block for initialization in case any 
HMAC-specific initialization needs to be done.
The HMAC mechanism contains a switch statement to select and use the Hash 
function specified in the SMIB. The generated hash is passed out of the mechanism using 
the pointer that was passed in. A second switch statement selects the encryption method, 
whose functionality is the same as that explained for the encryption mechanism. In future 
work, considerable object code could be saved by making that encryption block into a 
function. The decrypted or encrypted hash is passed out using the passed-in pointer. 
Figure 31 illustrates the design of the HMAC mechanism; note the similarity in the case 
of the encryption algorithm to that in the Encryption mechanism.
AE3-128:
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Figure 31. The HMAC mechanism flowchart
3.3.9. The Primitives Layer
3.3.9.1. The Hash Primitive
The hash primitive is a dummy hash, intended to be filled with the SHA-2 hash 
routine in future work. Thus 256 bits, or eight 32-bit words, are passed back from this
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function, each containing, alternately, 0x5A5A5A5A and 0xA5A5A5A5. See the figure 
in section 3.3.9.3., “The RNG Primitive,” for a diagram.
3.3.9.2. The Encryption Primitive
Three functions are provided, to update the IV in both the AES encryption and 
decryption cores in one, to update the key in the cores, only doing the key expand process 
and copy to the decryptor core when specifically commanded, and to encrypt or decrypt a 
block of memory from an origin starting address to a destination starting address, for a 
length of memory given in bytes. The length is passed in twice to this latter function, for 
error checking and the length is also checked to confirm that is a natural-number multiple 
of the 128-bit block size of sixteen bytes. An error code is returned if this check fails. 
Figure 32 and 33 illustrate the design of this primitive.
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3.3.9.3. The RNG Primitive
Four functions are provided. One function acts as the storage for the state of the 
LFSR-CASR PRNG. Static variables are used in this function to contain the two 64-bit 
state variables in the form of four 32-bit words. As explained before, not all of the high- 
order 32-bit words for each of the LFSR and CASR are used. The function will store or 
retrieve these values depending upon the command passed in. Another function resets the 
four 32-bit words passed in. Another seeds the four 32-bit words that are passed in. The 
most important function generates the pseudo-random number generator from the current 
state (the four 32-bit words) passed in, and returns a 32-bit pseudo-random number. 
Generation updates the state variables, as described before (see section 3.2., “Design of a 
Combination LFSR-CASR Pseudo-Random Number Generator”). Whenever the state 
variables are required for passing into the generation function, they must be retrieved 
from the storage function first (except of course if they are updated repeatedly before the
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local state values are lost such as by exiting the current function) and whenever they are 
updated by one of the reset, seed, or generation functions, they must be stored using the 
storage function. Figure 34 illustrates the design of the functions written to make use of 
the PRNG primitive (as well as an illustration of the dummy hash routine).
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Figure 34. The hash and pseudo-random number generator flowcharts
3.3.10. Versions
Four different versions of the actual layers to be tested for performance, Service, 
Mechanism and Primitive, were created, mostly involving changes to the Service 
functions, due to their complexity. Some changes were made to the mechanisms, but 
none to the primitives. A design change was made in ver. 7 to conform better to the 
layering idea, and to use the SMIB. Some additions were made to the SMIB. The version 
numbers are from the IPsecLoop CLI version of the project, but the same actual files and 
therefore the identical code is used for the Services down to the Primitives layers in both 
versions. This replaceability (or fungibility, to use the correct, but obscure word) due to 
modularity is a huge benefit derived from layering.
ver. 4\ This was the initial version tested.
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ver. 6: The ESP service was modified to remove “for” loops that cleared the entire 
datagram, which would cause delays proportional to the packet size.
ver. 7: Clearing of the padding area in ESP was restored that was removed in ver. 
6, to prevent security leaks, and additional reduction of processing time in ESP and AH 
was done, involving only clearing unused areas of the datagram rather than pre-clearing 
the entire datagram before filling it; the significant fix in ESP was done in ver. 6. The 
design was corrected to use the SMIB to look up the primitive numbers as is implicit in 
the layering scheme; algorithm numbers from the SADB had been passed-down -  the 
SADB was changed to have the service number (intended to be obtained from the SA 
negotiation) set in the SADB. Future work may cause additional processing delays when 
multiple services, mechanisms and primitives cause full SMIB looking-up to be done, 
however, it probably will not be significant compared to processing times incurred by 
packet payloads.
ver. 8: A transform pulse was added to follow the service call immediately, for 
accurate timing (see section 3.5., “Design of a CLI Version, ‘IPsecLoop,’ to Facilitate 
Testing,” after). The ESP service was modified to create only the payload portion to hold 
the payload image to be transformed, and to remove some redundant header-setting code. 
The AH service was revised to simply use the IPsec datagram created for hashing as the 
datagram out when sending, instead of copying it to a new one. The encrypted 
authentication data produced when sending was placed into a temporary holding area for 
transfer to the IPsec datagram after the mechanism call. Some redundant header-setting 
code was removed. Both the HMAC and the Enc. mechanisms were revised to only get 
the key from the void pointer in the SADB when it is needed. Initialization was only 
necessary in one mechanism, which saves a little code space. Some common code across 
an if-else that was left when the SADB was simplified to one key and one IV was 
amalgamated. The mechanisms were revised to not retrieve the IV from the SADB's 
pointer if  NewIVNeeded. The local key and IV variables were removed from the 
mechanisms. The mechanism-level key status tracker (L4AES128Mode) was revised to 
track the key in use via the SPI to uniquely identify the SADB and is now called
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L4AES128SPI. The RNG was added as a field in the mechanisms layer in the SMIB. 
MaxIPsecPacketSize was added to the policy struct in the SMIB.
3.4. Design of a Test and Demonstration GUI, “IPsecGUI”
The GUI, named “IPsecGUI”, and also written in MSVC++V6, supports all the 
features that were coded into the board: “hello”, “key is new”, random no. seed, SMIB 
and SADB receive and send. As in “AESfile”, there is an activity window to display 
scrolling messages to the user. Text appearing in this activity window is also saved to a 
file, “ActivityLog.txt” for self-record-keeping. The SMIB and SADB settings can be read 
in and saved via file I/O. A test packet can be read in via file I/O and its total size is 
validated and corrected, if necessary. A test packet size increment can be set and used to 
increment the test packet size. Help information is shown in a “modeless” window that 
can be left open while working, for reference. The “Packet Send” button initiates the 
PacketProcessing of the OSI layers in the board, and the called functions in the GUI 
measure the processing speeds of the service calls in the board.
Figures 35 and 36 show the operation of the KeylsAlwaysTreatedAsNew, i.e., 
“Load key in core every transform,” the seeding of the RNG, and the help window.
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Figure 35. Operation of "KeylsAIwaysTreatedAsNew" and the seeding of the RNG in “IPsecGUI”
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Figure 36. The “IPsecGUI” help window
When the GUI launches, it first gives the ‘h’ command to check whether the 
board is responding. If “Hello” is not received back, an error message is displayed to the 
user. If the board is responding, reliable data transfer is used to get the SMIB and the 
SADB from the board. In this way, update of context to the PC is automatic. If the user 
chooses to access the SADB dialog, the SADB is also acquired from the board, including 
the key and IV pointed to, since the board changes the IV -  and changing the key is 
forseen, in future work, when key exchange is added.
Multiple policies are supported by the GUI. A GUI field is provided for the user 
to enter the number of policies, and another is provided for the user to select the 
particular policy to view. When the former field is changed, the space allocated is 
changed to hold the required number of policies, in an array of policy structures. When
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the latter field is changed, the policy fields are updated with the data of the policy number 
selected. When a data field is changed, the entry in its policy structure is updated. If 
“OK” is clicked in the SMIB window, those policy structures are incorporated as the 
official SMIB array of policy structures, and the former array of policy structures is 
discarded. If the SMIB window is exited without clicking “OK”, such as by clicking 
“Cancel”, that is not done, leaving the official array of policy structures previously 
entered, unchanged. In addition, if “OK” is clicked, the SMIB in the board is updated via 
reliable data transfer and the policy that was selected to view in the SMIB dialog window 
is sent to the board. The same technique is used to implement the entry of multiple clients 
in the management layer of the SMIB.
Figure 37 shows the SMIB window, or dialog box.
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Figure 37. The “IPsecGUI” SMIB dialog 
101
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Similarly, when the user exits the SADB, it is updated to the board via reliable 
data transfer if “OK” was clicked.
*
Figure 38 shows the SADB dialog box, with the first non-zero IV produced by the 
PRNG from a seed of all “ l ”s (or “F”s, in hex.).
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Figure 38. The “IPsecGUI” SADB dialog
There is a checkbox provided for setting the IV  Constant field in the SADB, 
“Hold first non-zero IV.” See the explanation before, in section 3.3., “Design of an IPsec 
Implementation, ‘IPsecImp’ [etc.],” for the use of this field.
In sending these structures as a block, it should be noted that the GNU C code in 
the board uses big-endian data orientation, whereas the MSVC++V6 code running on the 
PC uses little-endian. The GUI is responsible for correcting the data orientation after
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receiving from the board and before sending back to the board, by switching the order of 
the bytes within each variable affected; a series of functions were written to do this.
When the “Packet Send” button is clicked, the GUI verifies whether the SMIB 
exists and has been set, and whether the SADB exists, including the key and IV, and has 
been set. The existence of the test packet is checked, and its header is checked for the 
minimum size. Using the same code that the board uses to obtain the IPsec packet size, 
the GUI checks to make sure that the resulting IPsec packet would not be larger than 
64kB-l bytes, or OxFFFF (65,535) bytes, and also that it would not be larger than the 
maximum packet size set in the policy. If everything is verified satisfactorily, the ‘p’ 
command is issued to the board to start packet processing. Reliable data transfer is used 
to send the test packet to the board when the IP layer requires it. The synchronization 
message, “Synch”, is received, using reliable data transfer, in order to synchronize with 
the beginning of the service call. The time count variables are cleared, and a timer that 
counts milliseconds is turned on. Following this, execution occurs in the timer message- 
handling routine. Figure 39 illustrates the design of this function.
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Figure 39. "IPsecGUI" packet processing setup flowchart
In the timer message-handling routine, the quickest possible check is made for 
any character received via RS232. The time count variables are updated, and the routine 
exits if  no character was received. This is done since timer messages are ignored if  the 
MSVC++V6 program is busy, and missing timer messages would result in a low time 
count. If a character was received, the timer is stopped, and reliable data transfer is used 
to get the IPsec packet. The synchronization message is received again, and the same 
process is used to time the “incoming”, or “receiving”, service call, in which the IPsec 
packet is converted back to an IP packet. During this process, minimal echoing is shown 
in the activity window, in order not to cause difficulties in synchronizing the GUI with 
the board, which could cause problems such as communication lockups. Packet Sending 
Progress Indicators shown are: “.. .o. .i”, which have the following meanings:
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first dot: test packet size received successfully by the board.
second dot', test packet rcvd and timing synch, message sent successfully by the
board.
space and dot'. IPsec packet size received back.
'o': IPsec packet received back (outgoing processing complete). 
dot', synch, message sent successfully by the board. 
space and dot'. AH header success message (or "Not AH" if not doing AH) 
received and derived IP packet size received back.
‘i derived IP packet successfully received back (incoming processing complete).
Figure 40 illustrates the design of this function.
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Figure 40. "IPsecGUI" packet processing timer processing flowchart
Figure 41 shows a “screenshot” of an example of the IPsecGUI’s operation.
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Figure 41. A "screenshot" of the operation of "IPsecGUI"
See also the pseudo-code for the “IPsecGUI” packet processing functions, in 
Appendix A.
3.4.1. Test Methodology
Testing the time required for the service calls to complete was done using the 
IPsecGUI packet processing functions described before. The times were echoed to the 
activity window, and thus to the activity log file. A standard 40-byte (0x28) test packet 
with a six-3 2-bit-word (twenty-four bytes) header was used, and incremented in units of 
0x100 and 0x200 bytes up to 0x4028 (approximately 16k) bytes. This range was used in 
testing all four protocol-mode combinations: AH protocol, Transport and Tunnel modes, 
and ESP protocol, Transport and Tunnel modes. The packet used was as follows (hex., 
with spaces added for readability):
06000028 00000000 5A81BEEF 12131415 26272829 DEADBE00 01020304 
15161718 292a2b2c 3d3e3f42
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A packet of the smallest size possible was tested just to verify correct operation -  
note the one-byte payload and the five-long-word header:
05000015 00000000 5A81BEEF 12131415 26272829 A5
Also, a packet with the largest possible header, of fifteen, OxF, “long words” (32- 
bit words), and a one-byte payload, was also tested, just to verify correct operation:
0F00003D 00000000 5A81BEEF 12131415 26272829 DEADBE00 10000001 
10000001  10000001  10000001  10000001  10000001  10000001  10000001  10000001 
A5
The typical size of a packet is about 500 bytes, 576 bytes to be exact ([RFC0791] 
pg.12), and “Datagrams are rarely larger than 1,500 bytes” ([KUR2000], 3rd ed., pg. 326). 
In an example from the literature, IPsec was tested only up to a packet size of about 8k 
(0x2000) bytes [KER1997]. The minimum packet size includes a one-byte payload 
([RFC0791] pg 34). In testing in this work, operation with an IP packet of the minimum 
size and up to ah IPsec packet of the maximum size of OxFFFF bytes was tested. 
However, “Such long datagrams are impractical for most hosts and networks” 
([RFC0791] pg.12). The resulting millisecond counts were graphed.
Testing was done to verify that the AES encryption was appearing correctly. ESP 
Transport mode was used to encrypt a packet payload consisting, in part, of the block 
“01020304 15161718 292A2B2C 3D3E3F42,” using the first IV produced by the RNG 
from a seed of all “F”s (hex.), which is F7EFFFFD E3CFFFF9 C19FFFF2 943FFFE4. 
The key value was arbitrarily chosen as the same as the plaintext. To follow the process 
of Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC mode), these were XORed using Windows Calculator to 
obtain F6EDFCF9 F6D9E8E1 E8B5D4DE A901C0A6. To predict the ciphertext that 
should appear, the Styer Javascript example [STY2006] was used, which predicted 
“F1E73B95 E690F3BA 45CF3F0B DDD92594.” An ESP Transport test was done using 
the 40-byte test packet, which contained that block as a payload, first leaving the IV in 
the SADB set to zero, and a freshly-initialized board that had the RNG seed set to all 
“F”s (hex.). Additionally, the comprehensive CLI demonstration program done to 
demonstrate the operation of the AES core described in section 3.1.8.1., “CLI and 
Simpler Programs,” was also used to verify the output of these “higher-level” programs.
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In addition, the “IPsecGUI” (as well as “IPsecLoop”) was used many times to 
encrypt and decrypt packets using all four protocol-mode combinations, and the resulting 
IPsec and received-back IP packets were verified for correctness.
3.5. Design of a CLI Version, “IPsecLoop,” to Facilitate Testing
Since it was unknown how accurate the method of testing described before using 
“IPsecGUI” would be, oscilloscope timing measurements were planned, with the idea 
that the service calls would be iterated. There was no point in developing a GUI to 
operate such a program, therefore “IPsecLoop” has no GUI, and is a CLI program, 
operated via Hyperterminal. Also, it only differs in the top-level loop and OSI layers; all 
of L3 (Service) to L5 (Primitive) layers are identical -  the same C files are used as in 
“IPsecImp”.
Referring to the pseudo-code (see Appendix A), “IPsecLoop” differs from 
“IPsecImp” in having a pre-set SADB set in initialization, before the main command 
loop. Also, the test packet is built-in by allocating memory for it and setting its contents 
during program initialization. In the command loop, ‘r’ to seed the PRNG, ‘z’ and ‘s’ to 
send and receive the SADB, and ‘m’ and ‘i’ to send and receive the SMIB, are not 
needed and are removed. Instead, the following commands were added: ‘o’, to toggle 
testing between outgoing (sending) and incoming (receiving), ‘t ’, to change the protocol 
and mode to be tested, ‘i’, to change the increment by which to increase the test packet 
size, ‘s’, to increment the test packet size or revert to the original size, and ‘n’, to toggle 
NeedNewIV. Commands retained are ‘h’, for “Hello” from the board, ‘k’ to toggle 
KeylsAlwaysTreatedAsNew, and ‘p’, to start packet processing, i.e., launch the test.
In the IPsec sublayer function, an infinite loop was placed around each of the 
services, which activates if its protocol and processing direction are set. A message is 
echoed to the user to indicate that outgoing, or incoming, processing is occurring. 
Slv_reg8 of the AES core of the opposite transform from that employed by the service
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call for that direction is written in order to cause autoload and create the diagnostic pulse 
previously described, in order to mark the timing of the loop and make it readable by an 
oscilloscope. Since the service call contains many lines of calculation and memory 
allocation, and there are two more layers below it, it was expected that the duration of the 
transform pulse would be about three orders of magnitude shorter than the duration of the 
service call, leading to a precise reading. Moreover, a reading to the nearest 220 ns due to 
the transform pulse is about three and a half orders of magnitude more precise than the 
IPsecGUI measurement, which is to the nearest millisecond.
Included in the service call loop are (as noted in Appendix A): 
a dummy transform to read via oscilloscope to mark the loop (the opposite one to 
the one used in the service call) 
the service call
a dummy transform to read via oscilloscope to mark the end of the service call 
(added in ver. 8 of “IPsecLoop”) 
test for error
set KeylsNew from top-level user selection, KeylsAlwaysTreatedAsNew 
check for a keystroke via RS232 and exit the loop if so
check for the setting of the "Outgoing" vs. incoming test selection to exit the loop 
after only one execution if testing the other direction.
delete the transformed packet if looping so as not to use up the memory
Since the extra instructions required for continuous looping would cause some 
delay, ver. 8 of “IPsecLoop” was revised to add an extra dummy transform immediately 
after the service call, for accurate timing.
3.5.1. Test Methodology
The test methodology to use “IPsecLoop” is fairly straightforward. Oscilloscope 
probes are connected to pins 2 and 64 of J6 so that the decryption core “loadtodone” 
signal (pin 2), is connected to channel 1 (the upper trace in Figure 42) and the encryption 
core “loadtodone” signal (pin 64) is connected to channel 2 (the lower trace in Figure 42). 
Hyperterminal is used to operate the program running in the ML403 board, ‘p’ is pressed
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to begin the first test. The reading is read from the oscilloscope, in units of screen 
divisions, in order to work carefully from the raw data. The “units per division” setting is 
carefully noted. A key is pressed to exit the loop. The processed packet is echoed, 
following that (if incoming processing is being tested, the IPsec packet is echoed before 
the program pauses during the incoming processing). The ‘o’ command is used to toggle 
the test to the opposite direction. The ‘i’ command is used to select the packet increment 
amount and the ‘s’ command is used to increment the packet size. The packet size, 
starting from the standard 40 (0x28)-byte packet (see section 3.4.1., “Test Methodology” 
-  “IPsecGUI”) is incremented until a range of packet sizes from 0x28 to 0x4028 bytes for 
that protocol and mode are tested, then the process is repeated for the other three 
protocol-mode combinations.
To show the method used (without the additional marker pulse following the 
service call, which would be close to the second marker pulse for the beginning of the 
next loop), Figure 42 shows an oscilloscope measurement of AH Transport outgoing 
processing time with the 40 (0x28 hex.)-byte packet, using IPsecLoop ver. 6. The 
oscilloscope used was the Tektronix TDS1002 Two-Channel Digital Storage 
Oscilloscope [TEKTDS]. Tektronix TDSPCS1 “Open Choice” PC Communications 
Software, Version 1.10, was installed on the PC and a 9-pin RS232 full “cross-cable” or 
“null modem” (the RS232 handshaking lines were also crossed) cable was used to 
connect an RS232 serial port on the PC to the RS232 port on the oscilloscope.
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Figure 42. Oscilloscope measurement of AH Transport outgoing processing time with a 40-byte
packet
The ‘k’ and ‘i’ commands only need to be toggled on once or twice, preferably 
when the packet size being tested is the smallest, so that the additional processing time to 
load the key into tfie core or get the IV from the PRNG can be most easily determined 
from the total processing time read from the oscilloscope. Since the IV is in the data in 
the incoming (receiving) processing, setting NeedNewIV does not cause a new IV to be 
acquired for that computation, of course. The time taken to load the key and/or the IV 
was not included in the series of measurements of packet processing time.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
4.1. The AES Accelerator
4.1.1. Simulation Results
Referring to the large “screenshots” in Appendix B, section B.I., Figures 61, 62, 
63 and 64 in section B. 1.1.1. show simulation of an encryption transform. Using the key 
shown, of value 01020304 15161718 292A2B2C 3D3E3F42 (hex.), and tex tjn , of 
41747461 636B2061 74206461 776E2020 (hex.) -  which is the ASCII for “Attack at 
dawn ” (note the two spaces at the end that make up the sixteen bytes of a 128-bit block), 
a ciphertext, or textout, of 03211ECA A144E6D0 7FF9F6D9 1801D80C (hex.) was 
produced, and was verified (see section 3.1.6.1., “Simulation Test Methodology”). The 
“load pulse” process formerly used can be seen. w0-w3 are the key expand values, 
beginning with the unchanged value of the key itself. The sa variables are the results of 
the XOR of the state (beginning with textjn), the sa su b  variables are the results of the 
sub-byte operation, and the sa jn c  variables are the results of the mix columns step.
In section B.l.1.2., verification with autoload can be seen in Figure 65. Note that 
start load starts when slv_reg8 is written.
In section B. 1.1.3., two encryptions using CBC mode can be seen in Figure 66. 
During the time of the donepulse, the ciphertext in slv_regs9-12 is copied into ivO-3. The 
results of XOR with the plaintext can be seen where tex tjn  changes. The differing 
ciphertext can be seen, as produced by the chained plaintext.
The “screenshot” in section B.l .2., “Decryption” (Figure 67) shows the inverse 
transform from the chained ciphertext in slv_regs5-8. The previous ciphertext can be 
seen, just prior, in slv_regs5-8, being used to load ivO-3 during ivload. When slv_reg8 is 
written, the transform commences (which was designed not to happen when ivload is 
“1”), and the familiar ASCII for “Attack at dawn ” can be seen in slvjregs9-12,
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occurring during donepulse, when the decrypted output is XORed with the IV to form the 
plaintext. During done2pulse, the previous ciphertext is seen being transferred to the IV. 
In slv_regsl-4, the last (in encryption order) key expand value loaded to the decryptor 
can be seen, being the first used for decryption in wO-3. (slv_regsl-4 correspond to w3- 
0). The last key expand value used in wO-3 can be seen to be the key itself, opposite from 
encryption order. Slv_regO bit 6 can be somewhat discerned as being the source of ivload 
(0x40 when the only bit set in slv_reg0).
4.1.2. FPGA Usage
Table 5 shows the FPGA device utilization summary when both the encryptor and 
the decryptor core, with all of the features described before, were included.
Number of BUFGs 7 out of 32 21%
Number of DCM_ADVs 2 out of 4 50%
Number of ILOGICs 33 out of 320 10%
Number of External IOBs 68 out of 320 21%
Number of LOCed IOBs 68 out of 68 100%
Number of JTAGPPCs 1 out of 1 100%
Number of OLOGICs 63 out of 320 19%
Number of PPC4 05_ADVs 1 out of 1 100%
Number of RAMB16s 36 out of 36 100%
Number of Slices 5470 out of 5472 99%
Number of SLICEMs 666 out of 2736 24%
Number of Slices containing only related logic: 4,635 out of
5.470 84%
Number of Slices containing unrelated logic: 835 out of
5.470 15%
Table 5. XC4VFX12 device utilization summary (most recent build -  Mar. 12,2007)
The most recent build was only required due to the change to “Daylight Saving 
Time” (DST), which was held early in 2007, when the Windows XP PC Operating 
System (OS) changed the EDK/ISE project file times retroactively to those of the 
changed “time zone”. Previous builds were done on Dec 10 and Nov 18,2006.
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As can be seen, usage has moved into using slices for unrelated logic, 99% of the 
slices being used. Place and route required 54 minutes; that time begins to grow rapidly 
as the FPGA is filled and slices have to be used for unrelated logic.
4.1.3. AES Performance Results
4.1.3.1. AES Core Performance using Small Software Test Programs
Please refer to the methodology that can be found in sections 3.1.7.2.4., “Timing 
Diagnostic Output for Test,” and 3.1.8.1., “CLI and Simpler Programs”.
When the original method of pulsing “load” to begin the transform was used, the 
load pulse in the encryptor was observed to take 510 ns and “loadtodone” was observed 
to take 730 ns. 730 - 510 = 220 ns, which is eleven 20 ns clock pulses as expected. 
Clearly, turning a bit on and off via software over the bus is slow.
Table 6 shows some of the most relevant observations that were made. The 
calculated SW transform rate was calculated by multiplying 128 by the SW loop rate (or 
by dividing it by the period).
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i i w c t Pulse j Encryptor 2 .28 j  442 j  66.637168 510 730 220
21-Nuv Autoload 
Full write
and read
j Decryptor 1 76 559. 71 910112 NA 200 . 2 ®
11-Dec back 
Full write 
and read
Encryptor
|
I
5 .3 | 18s j  24.150943
j
NA NA ' i y « M
back _ 
Full write 
and read
; Decryptor
I
5.76; 174! 22 222222 NA NA .2 0 0
back 
Full write
and read
| Both
I
10,18 . 98 ,2 j  .12,573674 
8.941 1 1 1 .J  14.317673
..............NA . NA NA
back (D) {Both NA NA NA
Pulse load: tested  with OP to a pin while the load pulse w as high while also OP to a pin until dona
is high. ' . i . _ 1 . : .................  i .    ; i
Autoload: tes t by only outputting to a pin firom time of internal load (Id j) until done asserted  
note-Aytaioadused. in all subsequent te s ts  . I. . . . :
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IN A: Not Applicable
Table 6. Observed AES performance in-core and as used by software
“Full write and read back” means that the time taken to write all four input and 
read all four output slave registers via software was included in the test loop. The test of 
both means that the output of the encryptor was fed into the input of the decryptor by 
reading and writing the slave registers via software.
Note that if the time taken to turn the load bit on and then off is 510 ns, then the 
time for one write is 255 ns. If the time taken to read a slave register is the same, that 
means that it is hardly worth using a software loop to check for the done bit in slv_regO, 
since the transform takes only 200-220 ns.
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By initializing the step counter in the decryptor and using a different timing plan, 
the clock cycles required were reduced from eleven to ten.
220 ns to encrypt 128 bits implies 128/220 = 582 Mbps, and 200 ns to decrypt 
implies 128/200 = 640 Mbps as an intrinsic core transform rate; however, some method, 
such as DMA, will be needed to transfer data to and from the core as fast as it can be 
processed. Xilinx offers a technology called FSL (Fast Simplex Link) that can import 
data from user IP cores to its soft-core processors, but this method is not available when a 
hard-core processor, as in this work, is used.
Processing via software intervention is slow. Even if  the time required to write the 
input slave registers, wait for the transform to finish and read the output slave registers 
could be reduced by removing the wait loop on the grounds that the transform happens so 
quickly compared to software operation that a wait loop is not needed, that would only 
save about 600 ns from one of the single transform times noted in Table 6 (removing it 
when it was used twice when both transforms were done, saved 1.24 ps, as can be seen 
from Table 6). If the encryption time, for example, were thus reduced to 4.7 ps, that 
would still imply a processing rate of only 27 Mbps, 21 times slower than the core’s 
capacity of 582 Mbps.
r
Table 7 compares the intrinsic core transform rates of this work with those of 
others’ found in the literature.
AES core rates achieved, by implementation (Mbps)
This
work
[MCL2002] [DAN2000] [KIM2004] [BEL2002] [LUJ2005]
Encryption 582 310 353 390 887 1197
Decryption 640
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This work (Fall 2006): Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGA, XC4VFX12, speed grade 10 
(slowest)
[DAN2000]: all on an FPGA (make, model unspecified)
[BEL2002]: Xilinx Virtex 1000 FPGA 
[MCL2002]: XCV1000E 
[KIM2004]: FPGA not specified 
[LUJ2005]: Xilinx Virtex-II Pro 100 XC2VP100
Table 7. AES core rates achieved in this work and in the literature
Since the FPGA used in this work is the lowest speed grade [XILRIV], it may be 
possible to double its processing rates by running the core at the full 100 MHz clock 
speed (see section 3.1.7.1., “Core Design and other Modifications”).
4.1.3.2. AES Performance with the “AESfile” GUI
Please refer to the test methodology described in section 3.1.8.2.2., “The PC 
Demonstration G U I,‘AESfile’.”
“AESfile” encrypts a 36kB text file in 24s and decrypts it (75 kB of ciphertext) in 
36s. 36kB/24s =1.5 kBps = 1.5 x 8 = 12 kbps (57600 bps serial connection). 75k/36 = 
25k/12 = 2.1 kBps = 2.1 x 8 = 17 kbps. The serial communication speed, display delays 
in the PC application, as well as the software calls in the board for each 128-bit block, all 
contribute to this slowdown. The simple calculation of the encryption and decryption 
rates here may not be precisely meaningful, because in both processes, there is a 
transmission of 16 bytes of plaintext and 32 bytes of hex-ASCII-encoded ciphertext for 
each block transformed, meaning that both processing times should be the same. The 
longer time taken for decryption is explained by the extra display echoing included in the 
decryption process (see the figure in section 3.1.8.2.2., “The PC Demonstration GUI, 
‘AESfile’”).
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Here is an example of the ciphertext output from “AESfile” (notes added on the 
right, afterward). A key and IV of zero were used to encrypt the plaintext: "Attack at 
dawn Attack at dawn Two spaces were added to each phrase to make each phrase a 
block of 16 bytes; the quotes were not included in the plaintext.
66E94BD4EF8A2C3B884CFA59CA342B2E - IV encrypted in ECB
06362F5ED752BD8A1A2D8AFF2D887988 - "Attack at dawn "
504 9804CC352A02E3B6E2BB6EB55E548 - "Attack at dawn "
8A8BC72E24DCFE7DFF6F8 9065BE13599 - 0x03 (ETX) padded with 0's.
This output format looks regular and pleasing to the eye, somewhat reminiscent of 
the “PGP” style of output [PGPI], and is suitable in the same way, for convenient 
copying and pasting for emailing, since it is ASCII text.
4.2. The LFSR-CASR PRNG
Please refer to section 3.2.3., “Test Methodology and Use in this Work”, for a 
description of how the graphs that follow were produced (the section just preceding that 
one refers to tests already done on this PRNG as documented in a corporate paper). The 
four graphs that follow (Figures 43,44,45 and 46) show that the distribution of the 
pseudo-random numbers produced by the LFSR-CASR PRNG is reasonably uniform, at 
least for the quantities of numbers produced.
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Distribution of ten thou. 32-bitnumbers in 256 ranges
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Figure 43. Distribution of ten thou. 32-bit numbers from the LFSR-CASR PRNG in 256 ranges
Dist. of a hun. thou, 32-bit nos. in 4096 ranges
Number value (hex) in range (x16A5)
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Figure 44. Distribution of a hun. thou. 32-bit numbers from the LFSR-CASR PRNG in 4096 ranges
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Dist of ten thou. 128-bit nos. in 256 ranges
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Figure 45. Distribution of ten thou. 128-bit numbers from the LFSR-CASR PRNG in 256 ranges
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Dist. of a hun. thou. 128-bit nos. in 4096 ranges
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Figure 46. Distribution of a hun. thou. 128-bit numbers from the LFSR-CASR PRNG in 4096 ranges
4.3. Performance Results from “IPsecImp”, “IPsecGUI” and “IPsecLoop”
Please refer to sections 3.3.10., “Versions”, 3.4.1., “Test Methodology” 
(“IPsecGUI”), and 3.5.1., “Test Methodology” (“IPsecLoop”).
In a related note, final memory usage in the XC4VFX12 chip, out of the designed 
(using BSB) 0 to 0x7FFF BRAM memory space, was 0x7ab6 for “IPsecLoop” and 
0x6fea for “IPsecImp”. IPsecLoop required more space due to the built-in SADB and test 
packet, including its copying, changing the test packet size, and the commands to toggle 
the test direction, change the protocol and mode, setting the test packet size increment, 
and toggling “NeedNewIV”, in spite of removal of the send and receive code for the 
SADB and SMIB and the removal of the reliable data transfer code.
4.3.1. Demo, of Processing the Largest Possible Packet
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Figure 47 shows successful packet processing using the largest IPsec packet 
possible in ESP, Tunnel mode. An IP packet size of FFBE created by increasing the 
payload size of the standard 40 (0x28)-byte test packet was the maximum possible using 
this protocol and mode, since it resulted in an IPsec packet size of OxFFFF.
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Figure 47. Packet processing using the largest IPsec packet possible in ESP, Tunnel mode
4.3.2. Demo, of Correct AES Encryption in “IPsecGUI”
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Figures 48 and 49 show correct AES encryption in “IPsecGUI” demonstration, 
and the SADB settings used. Note the predicted block of ciphertext in the IPsec packet 
(copied below the GUI window shown in Figure 48). Note also that the IP packet was 
correctly received back.
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tew) r1 (mt)
!nc Feel oi f t : l  Pa.-i ei
W es. heir)
iJetoML4D3?
r  toad key in com every ti
Using reliable data transfer to send Ihe SADB to the ML403 board...
Sending lha 128-bil kr-yto the ML403 boatd...
Gendins Ihe 1 » b il IV to the ML403 board...
'Sent Ihe SADB to the ML4D3 bead, end mode any local updates, successful.
,The protocol set is ESP. The mods set is Transport
’Getting test packet (tom liks "restPackettot" on PC...
Packet length: 0028
The packet 06CCW)29000CI000IBAatBEEFi2j314l52e2?2£B3DEADBE0tKn020X1413161710292a2b2c3d3ea«
Got the packet successful 
Packet send and receive lest 
.Cheeking the SADB:
The SADB settings seem to he adequate: continuh'is)..
;T eating packet sand end receive on the board, through IPsec...
n213l41SSG272823DEADBE0DD1O2O30415tS17182S2A2B2C3D3E3F42
IPsec packet
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Figure 48. "IPsecGUI" "screenshot" showing correct encryption
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Figure 49. SADB settings used in the previous figure
4.3.3. “IPsecLoop” Results
In Figure 42, in section 3.5.1., “Test Methodology” (“IPsecLoop”), two 
encryption pulses are visible, due to the two (128-bit) blocks of hash being signed 
(encrypted), since the SHA-2 hash (supplied by the function that returns a dummy hash) 
is a 256-bit hash.
In testing with version 8, it was found that the extra loop-managing overhead after 
each service call takes 8.4ps, which is not a significant amount of error, but was included 
in measurements prior to ver. 8 (see section 3.5., “Design of a CLI Version, ‘IPsecLoop,’ 
to Facilitate Testing”).
Using “IPsecLoop”, the time required to run the LFSR-CASR PRNG in software 
for four 32-bit numbers to get the 128-bit IV was determined to be 1.3ms. The time 
required to load the key into the encryptor was determined to be 15ps, and 20ps when 
version 8 was tested (see section 3.3.10., “Versions”). The time required to load the key 
into the encryptor, do key expand in the encryptor and load the key expand values into 
the decryptor was determined to be 13Ops, and 120ps when version 8 was tested. It is not
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quite clear why the time required to load the key expand values into the decryptor should 
decrease when the time required to load the key into the encryptor increased, which may 
have occurred due to the slightly more complex code used to track the key loaded into the 
core according to the SPI being used.
The figures in sections 4.3.3.1. to 4.3.3.4., inclusive, show the packet processing 
times graphed, for the range of packet sizes, protocol-mode combinations, and software 
versions tested (see the test methodology sections: 3.4.1., “IPsecGUI”, and 3.5.1., 
“IPsecLoop”; see also the tabulated data in Appendix B, section B.2.). All lines graphed 
are closely linear, beginning at the origin.
4.3.3.1. Version 4, with “IPsecLoop” and “IPsecGUI” Comparison
In the graph shown in Figure 50, since it is expected that the line symbols will be 
difficult to discern without the benefit of colour, it should be explained that the upper line 
is “Incoming” and the middle line is “Outgoing”. The lowest four lines are the 
“IPsecGUI” results, “GUI in L,” “GUI in P,” “GUI out L,” and “GUI out P,” in order 
from top to bottom, at least on the right-hand end, at a packet size of 16,424 (0x4028) 
bytes; their total spread there is only about 8 ms.
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AH Transport packet processing times (ver 4)
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Figure 50. AH Transport packet processing times (ver 4), comparing measurements made using 
“IPsecLoop” to those made using “IPsecGUI”
Note the low count given by the GUI (“L” stands for the Laptop and “P” stands 
for the PC). There must have been some activity going on in the “IPsecGUI” code which 
caused it to miss most of its millisecond time-count event messages. It is concluded that it 
is a better idea to use good, commercially-available test equipment, than to attempt to 
build one’s own.
The processing times are close to being linear, meaning a fixed per-byte 
processing rate; the header size of twenty-four bytes which imposes a fixed processing 
overhead, does not impose an overhead sufficient to appear in these graphs. Differences 
in processing times in these graphs that are proportional to the packet size must be 
explained by processing done to each unit of payload.
The incoming (receiving) processing may have taken longer in the results shown 
in Figure 50, due to two additional comparison operations used in the “for”-loop that
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copies the datagram without the authentication data in order to hash it with that field 
cleared. In the outgoing (sending) code (the “i f ’ of the “if-else”), the authentication data 
section was skipped by using a separate “for”-loop from the one that copied the packet 
header portion.
4.3.3.2. Version 6 Compared to Ver. 4
ESP Transport packet processing times
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Figure 51. ESP Transport packet processing times -  ver. 6 vs. ver. 4
In the graph shown in Figure 51, the lines are “Out v4,” “Inc v4,” Inc v6,” and 
“Out v6,” from top to bottom. “Inc v6” is only above “Out v6” by 3 ms at the right-hand 
end, and the two are centered on 60ms there.
Note that no change was made to the AH service in ver. 6, however the ESP 
service was modified to remove “for” loops that cleared the entire datagram, which 
would cause delays proportional to the packet size. Outgoing processing required more 
time in ver. 4 in ESP due to copying the entire datagram to be encrypted including the
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padding as well as to the datagram to be produced, which was not necessary; see also the 
analogous graph for ESP Tunnel mode, in Figure 52.
ESP Tunnel packet processing times
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Figure 52. ESP Tunnel packet processing times -  ver. 6 vs. ver. 4
In the graph shown in Figure 52, the lines are “Out v4,” “Inc v4,” Inc ver 6,” and 
“Out ver 6,” from top to bottom. “Inc ver 6” is only above “Out ver 6” by 2 ms at the 
right-hand end, and the two are centered on 60ms there.
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4.3.3.3. Version 7 Compared to Ver. 6 and 4
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Figure 53. AH Transport packet processing times -  ver. 7 vs. ver. 4
In the graph shown in Figure 53, the lines are “Inc v4,” “Inc v7,” “Out v4,” and 
“Out v7,” from top to bottom. “Inc v7” reaches 143 ms at the right-hand end, and “Out 
v7” reaches 90 ms.
Note that ver, 4 is compared to ver. 7 here, since no change was made to AH in 
ver. 6. As noted in section 3.3.10., “Versions,” AH was sped up by removing a “for” loop 
that was being used to pre-clear the entire datagram; instead, only portions of the 
outgoing or incoming datagram being prepared that needed to be, were cleared. This 
applied to both modes; see also the graph of AH Tunnel mode in Figure 54.
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AH Tunnel packet processing times
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Figure 54. AH Tunnel packet processing times -  ver. 7 vs. ver. 4
In the graph shown in Figure 54, the lines are “Inc v4,” “Inc v7,” “Out v4,” and 
“Out v7,” from top to bottom. “Inc v7” reaches 143 ms at the right-hand end, and “Out 
v7” reaches 93 ms.
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BSP Transport packet processing times
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Figure 55. ESP Transport packet processing times -  ver. 7 vs. ver. 6 and 4
In the graph shown in Figure 55, the lines are “Out v4,” “Inc v4,” “Inc v6,” “Inc 
v7,” “Out v6,” and “Out v 7 t h o s e  last four looked at, at the right end, since their total 
spread there is only about 2 ms.
Note that no processing time penalty was incurred in the ESP protocol in going 
from ver. 6 to ver. 7, showing that processing not done to each unit of the packet paylod 
is not significant; see also the graph of ESP Tunnel mode in Figure 56.
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BSP Tunnel packet processing times
140
120
100
i
I
■
4000 18000o 2000 120006000 8000
Packet size {bytes, base ten)
10000 18000
Figure 56. ESP Tunnel packet processing times -  ver. 7 vs. ver. 6 and 4
In the graph shown in Figure 56, the lines are “Out v4,” “Inc v4,” “Inc v6,” “Inc 
v7,” “Out v6,” and “Out v7,” although, at the right end, “Inc v6” is covered by “Inc v7” 
and “Out v6,” the lowest line there, is covered by “Out v7”; the total spread of the last 
four there is only about 2 ms.
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4.3.3.4. Version 8 Compared to Ver. 7
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Figure 57. AH Transport packet processing times -  ver. 8 vs. ver. 7
In the graph shown in Figure 57, “Inc v7” is very slightly above “Inc v8,” at the 
right end, by only about 1 ms, virtually superimposed, then “Out v7” follows, then “Out 
v8,” from top to bottom. “Out v8” reaches 48 ms at the right-hand end.
The reuse of the datagram prepared for hashing as the outgoing datagram, as 
noted in section 3.3.10., “Versions,” succeeded in almost halving the outgoing packet 
processing time in the AH protocol in ver. 8 as compared to ver. 7; see also the graph of 
AH Tunnel mode, in Figure 58. The incoming packet processing time in this protocol 
could be similarly reduced by clearing the mutable fields of the received IPsec datagram 
and sending it to the Mechanisms layer for hashing (also removing and saving the block 
of authentication data), which is advisable, since although the incoming IPsec packets are 
passed to the Service layer by pointer (i.e., memory address) and thus retain any
134
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
modifications made to them, they are simply discarded by the security layer above the 
Service layer, following the service call.
AH Tunnel packet processing times
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Figure 58. AH Tunnel packet processing times -  ver. 8 vs. ver. 7
In the graph shown in Figure 58, “Inc v7” is very slightly above “Inc v8,” at the 
right end, by only about 1 ms, slightly less than in the previous graph, virtually 
superimposed, then “Out v7” follows, then “Out v8,” from top to bottom. “Out v8” 
reaches 48 ms at the right-hand end.
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Figure 59. ESP Transport packet processing times -  ver. 8 vs. ver. 7
In the graph shown in Figure 59, “Inc v8” is the highest line, reaching 69 ms at 
the right-hand end, followed by “Inc v7,” which reaches 62 ms, and “Out v8” is slightly 
higher than “Out v7,” virtually superimposed.
Here again it can be seen that introducing efficiencies not tied to each unit of 
payload has no significant effect; modifying for the efficiency of not including the 
datagram header in the plaintext to be encrypted didn’t help at all in the outgoing case 
and introduced some extra processing in the incoming case. Since the index values of the 
payload data items alone were no longer the same as those of the entire datagram, an 
additional index variable was used in the code following the mechanism call, that copies 
the decrypted data to the IP datagram being built. Incrementing that extra index variable 
is probably responsible for the extra time taken, since it was the only additional 
processing added. The outgoing (sending) case was not affected, because it already used 
an additional loop variable to be incremented, due to the changed positioning of the
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packet payload in the IPsec packet due to the addition of the ESP header. The receiving 
case is a little simpler because the payload always goes right after the IP header (and the 
mechanism processing is not able to place it because the padding size is unknown before 
and during decryption in the ESP protocol). This is also the case in Tunnel mode, as 
shown in Figure 60.
ESP Tunnel packet processing times
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Figure 60. ESP Tunnel packet processing times -  ver. 8 vs. ver. 7
In the graph shown in Figure 60, “Inc v8” is the highest line, reaching 69.5 ms at 
the right-hand end, followed by “Inc v7,” which reaches 62 ms, and “Out v8” is slightly 
higher than “Out v7,” virtually superimposed.
4.3.4. Comparisons to Results from the Literature
Table 8 shows a comparison of the best processing times achieved in this work 
against an available report of processing times found in the literature [KER1997]. The 
paper reported on a 3DES implementation, which is notoriously slow, all done in 
software, which is not difficult to beat. The paper’s times are for combined ESP with
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ESP’s own authentication, and are the latencies. At the largest packet size compared, the 
sum of the largest AH and ESP processing reported in this work (which would be two 
different protocols, nested), become slightly larger than the 3DES-MD5 implementation. 
For example, at the 8kB packet size (approx. 2028 hex.), if the incoming AH Transport 
and ESP Transport mode from this work were to be used together, the latency would be 
103 ms vs. 100 ms reported from the 3DES-MD5 implementation, although the AH 
incoming processing time in this work can be halved, as explained before. However, at 
the small packet sizes, the worst combined times from this work become approximately 
five times less than those of the 3DES-MD5 implementation. This work could be added 
to, to add the ESP’s own authentication service, which would be more efficient.
IPsec packet processing tim es comparison
Packet Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming [KER1997]
Packet 
size (hex)
size
(decimal)
prac. time 
(ms) (AR)
proc. time 
(ms) (AR)
11II proc. time 
(ms) (AU)
prac. time 
(ms) (ER)
proc. time 
(ms) (ER)
prac. time 
(ms) (EU)
proc. time 
(ms) (EU)
3DES- 
MD5 (ms)
26 40 0.435 0.B4 0 51 0.975 0 38 0 315 0.44 0 255
126 296 1.19 3.1 3 2 1.3 1 3 1.4 1.2
226 552 1 94 5.3 ................2 5.4 2 2 2 2 2.3 .............2.2 40
326 BOB
426 1064 3.43 9.6 .............3.5 9 6 ZIIM. 4 1 4.2 ............ 4.1 42
526 1320
626 1576 4.9 14 4 95 ..............14 5 9 ................ 6 6 ................6
726 1832
B26 2068 6.4 19 6 45 19 7 8 6 7.8 ............ 7.9
926 2344
a2B 2600 7.9 23 7 95 23 9 6 9 9 9 7 9.6
c20 3112 9.25 ..............26 9.38 28 12 12 12 12
e2B 3624 10.9 32 ...........l a g ..............32 13 .............. 14 14 14
1028 4136 12.4 36 12.6 36 ..............15 16 15 16 65
1226 4648 13.B 41 ...........1 1 9
1426 5160 1 5 3 ..............45 154 ..............45 .............. 19 20 19 19
1628 B1B4 1 8 3 54 18.3 54 23 23 23 23
1c26 7208 21 3 ..............63 21 3 62 ..............26 27 27 27
202B 8232 24 3 ” 72 24 3 72 30 31 30 31 . ......... ..100
2428 9256 27.3 80 27 3 80 34 35 34 35
2828 10260 30.3 "..8B ..........30.3 90
. _
39
, . _
39
2c28 11304 33 3 98 33 3 99 ..............41 43 .............41 42
3026 12328 36.3 ”"100 36.3 106 45 46 45 46
3428 13352 39 115 39 3 115 48 50 49 50
3626 14376 42 1 2 5 42 3 125 52 54 53 54
3c2B 15400 45 133 45 131 56 56 56 58
4026 16424 ............  46 ........ 143
— *
143 60 62 60 62
[Packet sizes in bytes - B bits in the ML403 board)
This work: IPsecLoop ver. 7, March 21, 2007 AR: Auth. Trans.; AU: Auth Tunn.; ER E SP Trans.; EU: E SP  Tunn.
Using IPsecLoop ver. B results, April 9 , 20D7, for AH outgoing, bath modes: AR end AU
SW , 100MHz PPC4J05 with FPGA AES a cce l e r a t o r I  ” ^ ...
(A: Authentication Header; E: ESP E ncapsulating Security Payload; Trans.: Transport Modu; funn.: Tunnel Mode.) 
[KER1997]: Keromytis, 1997: latency - a SW , Linux, implementation on a 166MHz Pentium w. 100Mbps E thernet___
Table 8. Packet processing times compared to a result from the literature [KER1997].
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In Table 9, shown as a group of tables, the processing-time results from the 
previous table are expressed as rates, calculated by dividing the packet size processed by 
the time taken, averaging them for each category and expressing them in units of 
Megabits per second (Mbps). A comparison with three results found in the literature is 
made.
IPsec packet processing rates (Mbps)
Outgoing 
proc. rate 
(AR)
Incoming 
proc: rate 
(AR)
Outgoing 
proc. rate 
(AU)
Incoming 
proc. rate 
(AU)
Outgoing 
proc. rate 
(ER)
Incoming 
proc. rate 
(ER)
Outgoing 
proc. rate 
(EU)
2.5 0.88 2.5 0.87 2.1 2.0 2.1
(cont) 
Incoming 
proc. rate 
(EU)
2.1
These results are calculated averages across 40 to 16kB packet sizes (since the rate 
remained roughly constant due to linearity of the processing-time results)
Literature reports (Mbps)
[BEL2002]
AES
[DAN2000]
AES
[CHE2002]
3DES
50 353 53
[BEL2002]: SW, Linux, w AES acceleration on Xilinx Virtex 1000 FPGAs 
[DAN2000]: all on an FPGA (make, model unspecified)
[MCL2002]: Did not test packet processing rates 
[KIM2004]: Did not test packet processing rates
[CHE2002]: Free S/WAN using a DES accelerator on a custom platform, "Pilchard" 
[LUJ2005]: Did not test packet processing rates
Table 9. (group): Packet processing rates and comparison with the literature
The processing rates reported from this work are lower than those found in the 
literature due to reading core results from registers via the bus rather than using DMA, 
FSL, an all-FPGA implementation or some other such fast access method.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this work, an IPsec implementation, including five design layers, from top to 
bottom: Policy, Management, Service, Mechanism, and Primitive, an SMIB (Security 
Management Information Database), an SPDB (Security Policy Database), an SADB 
(Security Association Database), code to support testing and a GUI, was developed and 
tested. The portions designed and the results are discussed as follows.
5.1. The AES Implementation
A 128-bit AES implementation was done in VHDL in this work, working from a 
published Verilog core design that accurately implemented the published AES standard, 
using a Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGA, part number XC4VFX12, in the Xilinx ML403 
development board. The cipher and inverse cipher were implemented as separate 
modules, an encryptor and decryptor, using 99% of the FPGA fabric, and unrelated logic 
occupying 15% of the slices; even so, the key expand module was not added to the 
decryptor and a protocol is provided to obtain the key expand, or permutation, values 
from the decryptor and store them in the decryptor, a process that requires 120 ps, 
whereas loading the key to the encryptor required 20 ps. The speed grade of the FPGA 
was 10, the slowest, and the clock used in the modules was divided by two from the 100 
MHz board clock. The encryptor performs its transform in eleven clock cycles, i.e., 220 
ns; the decryptor in ten, i.e., 200 ns, due to a better timing plan, which could be adopted 
for the encryptor. These times imply processing rates of 582 Mbps and 640 Mbps, 
respectively. However, the access method to obtain the results is only via software via 
32-bit registers via the OPB, which reduces maximum processing rates to about 22 to 27 
Mbps in this implementation.
In addition to the ability to generate and read the key expand values from the 
encryptor and store them in the decryptor via software, the key expand values stored in 
the decryptor can be read via software. Both peripherals have CBC mode built in, so that 
the plaintext input to the encryptor is always XORed with the stored and automatically-
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updated “IV” register, and the internally decrypted block in the decryptor is always 
XORed with its similarly-designed “IV” register. The “IV” register can be loaded into 
each peripheral, and a readback method is provided in the decryptor. The peripherals 
each automatically perform their transform when their input data registers are written. A 
“programming model” is provided in this work showing the bit positions in the peripheral 
slave registers for the commands to accomplish these operations and giving the 
operational protocol required. Connections to pins on the ML403 board provide two 
signals, each of which is high when its corresponding peripheral is performing its 
transform, allowing oscilloscope measurements to be taken for research, development, 
and evaluation purposes.
A version of the decryptor was produced that can output the value of each step of 
each round, and did so in testing. A bug fix was added that was verified in the main 
version of the decryptor, to the source code of the “stepper” and is expected to induce the 
“stepper” version to begin always with the correct output.
Numerous small software programs were written in C and C++ to test and 
demonstrate the AES cores, culminating in a full CLI version that demonstrates all 
features of the cores in individual block processing, and a C++ GUI that runs on a PC and 
uses the ML403 board to encrypt and decrypt an ASCII text file on the PC. It was found 
that the IV should not be encrypted when CBC mode is used, since an attacker could use 
knowledge of that design to tell when the first block of plaintext happens to be all zeroes. 
The processing rate of the “AESfile” GUI using the ML403 board in this way was found 
to be in the 12-17 kbps range, given a 57,600 bps RS232 link and a good deal of time- 
consuming processing display echoing to the user in the GUI.
It is hoped that this section of this work will contribute a commercially-useful 
AES implementation, with the features necessary for it to be used in practice, and 
contribute knowledge of the capabilities of the relatively recently-developed Xilinx 
Virtex 4 FPGA, results from which have not yet been seen in journal and conference 
papers.
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5.2. The LFSR-CASR PRNG Implementation
A LFSR-CASR PRNG implementation was done in C++ and C in this work, 
working from a published Verilog design. Distributions of samples of its output were 
graphed in this work, showing that its output seems to have a good, uniform distribution. 
Using the IPsec implementation done in this work, it produces and stores a 128-bit 
random number in 1.3ms, as a concatenation of four of its output words (a rate of 128/1.3 
= 98 kbps). According to its original specifications, the basic design has a cycle length of 
280-243-237+l and a bias of 2"80. Its final XOR and the use of only the lower 32 bits of 
each of its state variables conceals the states from cryptanalysis. The original design 
came supplied with a report from the literature that showed that it did well in the 
“Diehard” series of statistical tests [TKA2002].
However, AES itself makes a better PRNG, having a cycle length of two to the 
exponent of its block size, and being carefully and successfully designed for extreme 
non-linearity. From a design comparison, it is estimated that AES contains up to two 
orders of magnitude more non-linearity than does this LFSR-CASR PRNG. Since it is 
already implemented in the FPGA, it can produce random numbers much more quickly,. 
at a rate of 27 Mbps in this work. Although an FPGA implementation of the LFSR-CASR 
PRNG would probably generate pseudo-random numbers faster than AES, it remains 
merely a good PRNG, while AES makes a great one [HEL2003].
5.3. The IPsec Implementation
Working from the five-layer framework for design of a security system 
established in previous work, a partial IPsec implementation was designed, written in C 
and tested. Content from each of the five layers was included. The AES and PRNG 
implementations discussed before were used as the primitives, and a dummy SHA-2 hash 
routine was included. Two mechanisms, an HMAC and an encryption mechanism, and 
two service routines, AH and ESP, were implemented. IPv4 was supported. The HMAC
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mechanism performs its signing by using the AES symmetric key to encrypt the hash -  a 
key exchange service was not implemented. The ciphertext in both the HMAC and the 
transformed ESP datagram begin with the IV itself, sent unencrypted along with the 
datagram. The mechanisms are designed to show the technique of selecting the primitives 
and to show the technique of selecting different mechanisms; new mechanisms added are 
intended to be added as additional cases to the existing mechanism files. The anti-replay 
service was not implemented. Attention was given to possible security leaks, such as by 
making sure that the padding area in the ESP plaintext is cleared. The SMIB is designed 
to be used to specify and select the mechanism from the service and the primitives from 
the mechanism. The idea of having an array of services, mechanisms and primitives is 
indicated. The SMIB is designed in its policy layer to support doubly-nested S As.
At the management layer, two versions were implemented, one which supports a 
remote GUI, running on a PC, and a CLI (Command-Line Interface) version more 
suitable for use in performing laboratory measurements. In the GUI version, the IP 
addresses of multiple clients can be entered and the Service, Mechanism and Primitive 
layers are configurable. The board itself supplies the basic configuration of its 
implemented capabilities. In the SADB, the IV can be set constant, or to be regenerated 
by the RNG for every packet sent. The PRNG can be seeded from a free-running counter. 
The GUI demonstrates packet transform and reverse transform: IP to IPsec and back.
At the policy layer, multiple policies were implemented, making the GUI running 
on the PC a policy server. Only the selected policy is downloaded to the board. It is 
intended that the service number as an index of the array of those available be negotiated 
in SA setup; the SADB is designed to hold that selection. The SADB and SMIB can be 
saved to files on the PC from the GUI, the SMIB in three different files, one for each of 
the policies, the clients’ IP addresses, and the base SMIB.
The implementation was verified to successfully process packets from the 
smallest to largest possible size of a five-32-bit-word header and one-byte payload, to a 
six-3 2-bit-word header and a total size of 65,535 bytes, respectively, in both the GUI and
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the CLI versions. A benefit of layering and modularity is that all files at the layers below 
the management were the same in both versions.
The typical packet processing rate achieved in this implementation was found to 
be 2.0 Mbps, measuring the rate at which the Service calls could be repeated, although 
outgoing (IP to IPsec) AH processing reached 2.5 Mbps and incoming AH processing 
sank to 0.87 Mbps. The packet processing times for all four protocol-mode combinations 
were always linear, meaning a roughly constant packet processing rate. Operations that 
do not need to be done over the packet payload do not significantly affect processing 
time. The time required, 120 ps, to load the key expand values into the decryptor, is not a 
serious delay, considering that it usually only has to be done once after the SA is set up 
with a particular key. It could cause more delay if the board serves more than one 
incoming S A. The time required to get a random number using the software 
implementation of the LFSR-CASR PRNG, 1.3 ms, is significant, especially given the 
processing times of the most common packet size of about 500 bytes, of about 2 ms. 
Processing rates reported in this work are lower than those reported in [BEL2002], 
[DAN2000] and [CHE2002] (see section 4.3.4., “Comparisons to Results from the 
Literature”), due to reading core results from registers via the bus rather than using some 
fast access method such as DMA, FSL (Fast Simplex Link) or an all-FPGA 
implementation. However, it is not difficult to beat a software implementation of 3DES.
Some different versions of the service calls and lower were produced in 
development, to carefully adhere to the design concept of using the SMIB to select the 
modules used in the lower layers from those in the upper layers, and to remove 
inefficiencies and speed up processing. Four different versions were involved in testing.
As briefly noted before in this section, a huge benefit resulted from the modularity 
of layering when a second version, “IPsecLoop”, was needed for testing: only the 
management layer file needed to be modified; eight code files and their “header” files for 
three lower layers could simply be reused. A drawback of layering was noticed in which 
data present at a lower layer had to be read at a higher layer, that is, the Primitive layer
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information on the size of data created at the Primitive layer had to be used at the 
Services layer in order to determine packet sizes; strict separation of layers had to be 
discarded in order to have a successful implementation. However, the design of the 
management layer is still not entirely rigorous.
5.4. Recommendations for Future Work
5.4.1. The AES Implementation
The timing plan of the encryptor could be revised to match that of the decryptor, 
“shaving” a clock cycle off of the time required.
A higher speed grade of the XC4VFX12 Virtex-4 could be used to determine if 
the core transform rate could be doubled. This could be attempted in simulation with 
available tools, without having to buy an actual chip; once post-PAR simulation 
succeeds, operation in the actual chip is virtually guaranteed. However, one must pay 
attention to test techniques; it is easy to set unrealistically-short input pulse times in the 
testbench, for example, when real-world input pulse durations may trigger unintended 
effects in the design and cause it to fail.
The debugged source code of the “stepper” version of the decryptor could be 
built, tested and verified.
The preceeding three ideas would be good initial exercises to perform to become 
familiar with the technology. An ambitious investigation would be to see if  the encryptor 
and decryptor could be implemented in the same module.
Programming the Flash EEPROM could be done so that the code in the board 
would be non-volatile, making demonstration easier, especially with larger code sizes 
that require the 1MB of SRAM, since the debugger to load the executable code separately 
may not be available when the board is programmed “in the field” or in demonstrations,
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using Xilinx “iMPACT”, due to the full Xilinx software package being cumbersomely 
large for installation on a laptop PC.
5.4.2. The LFSR-CASR PRNG Implementation
AES should be used as the PRNG in this work, saving the code space required for 
the software implementation of the LFSR-CASR PRNG that has a far shorter cycle 
length and is probably much less non-linear, and speeding up random-number generation 
by over two orders of magnitude using technology established in this work.
5.4.3. The IPsec Implementation
As with most work, the amount of work that can be done in the future vastly 
exceeds the amount of work completed.
The project could be redone without the layering in order to compare the 
effectiveness of the layering technique, but that would be tedious, since it is not expected 
to produce useful, modifiable code and is therefore not recommended. Instead, it is 
recommended to investigate the use of DMA to speed up processing; then the results 
obtained could be expected to be improved, and could be recompared with those from the 
literature. An all-FPGA implementation would be an ambitious undertaking, and would 
require the purchase of considerable amounts of new hardware. FSL could perhaps be 
attempted using the Xilinx “Microblaze” boards available in this department, if available 
in the version installed, which is 6.1. Otherwise that might require purchase of new 
hardware, design software and Xilinx IP cores.
As a conclusion from this work and a recommendation, it is a better idea to use 
good, commercially-available test equipment than to attempt building one’s own.
An easy and forseen improvement that can be made is to double the speed of the 
AH incoming processing using the method described (see section 4.3.3.4., “Version 8 
Compared to Ver. 7”). The ESP Service routine should be reverted from ver. 8 to ver. 7.
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As was done in this portion of this work, the IV should not be encrypted if 
included with ciphertext encrypted in CBC mode, since an attacker could use knowledge 
of such a feature to determine whether the first block of plaintext is all zeroes.
Additional primitives, mechanisms, and thus services could be added, 
implementing the arrays in the SMIB by making the contents of the constituent lower 
three layers into pointers to the contained structures. The reading of the SMIB to 
determine the services, mechanisms and primitives used would then have to be fully 
“fleshed out”. The “Enabled” fields that were designed into the SMIB Services, 
Mechanisms and Primitives layers, could be actually used. The SHA-2 hash routine, 
which contains only dummy code as a result of this work, could be implemented. The 
unimplemented IPsec services and portions thereof, such as anti-replay and ESP 
authentication (which would be more efficient than nesting ESP and AH S As -  see 
section 4.3.4., “Comparisons to Results from the Literature”), could be added. Support 
for IPv6 could be added. A challenging investigation would be to make the design of the 
management layer more rigorous.
Header checksumming support could be added, as well as support for other IP 
header and AH header fields. This work now supports the IP header total length field (in 
octets), the datagram total length field, the AH or ESP protocol field, the TTL (Time To 
Live) field, the AH header Payload length, the ESP padding length, and the AH and ESP 
headers’ SPI. All other fields were left for future work.
An RxIVConstant variable can be defined for the SADB and used if  the particular 
mechanism calls for the IV not to be included with the ciphertext. More criteria could be 
added as policy selectors. More ideas could be incorporated into the SMIB from 
[KEN1994].
A function should be used for the AES-128 encryption mechanism, since a similar 
block of code is used in both the HMAC and Encryption mechanisms. In general,
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functions should be used for any mechanism component that may be added in the future, 
that is used in a similar way in more than one mechanism.
More sophisticated error recovery techniques could be added, such as “freeing” 
all “malloc”ed pointers in the event of heap overflow.
Since the reliable data transfer routines sometimes “lock up” and seem, during the 
initial transfer of a session, particularly, to take many repetitions for a successful 
transmission, their operation should be debugged, using a protocol analyzer. Display 
echoing to the activity was used in debugging, which might continue to be useful; the 
echoing commands affect the timing, which is “touchy”, and are left “commented out”, in 
the source code.
As with all complex software, the software written in this work should be viewed 
with scepticism and should be continually tested, particularly in areas of operation that do 
not receive common use, or in areas of unintended operation permitted by the software 
that could cause the program to fail.
*
Key Exchange could be added, as well as support for bidirectional SAs; in this 
work, the incoming SA is set to use the same SA as the outgoing. To implement multiple 
SAs, the SADB declaration could be made a pointer to an array of pointers that each 
point to an SADB. Then space for SADBs can be “malloc”ed at will, as can the space for 
an array of pointers as the number of SADB instances change. To work with the GUI, an 
intermediate dialog could be added in the GUI that just gets the different SPIs from the 
board, allowing the user to select the SPI of the SADB that he wishes to view. It does not 
seem likely that support for the incoming SADB being identical to the outgoing would 
need to be retained.
In outgoing processing in the IPsec sublayer, the SA should be chosen from the 
future array of SAs based on the selectors in the datagram. In incoming processing, the 
SAs should all be searched for the SPI that matches that in the datagram.
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A challenge would be to make the implementation in this work communicate with 
a different existing implementation. A full OSI stack would have to be included. The 
physical OSI layer could be Ethernet and use the RJ11 connector on the ML403 board. 
The application layer can be the interface to the GUI on the PC or perhaps the LCD on 
the ML403 board, or any other of the many 10 devices and output ports on the ML403 
board.
If AH IPsec packets fail to authenticate, that should at least be made an auditable 
event, for the system administrator to check on, and should conceivably be passed up to 
the application layer to prevent further communication and inform the user of that.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
A. Pseudo-Code 
Note that “//” or “/*” indicates a comment 
A.I. IPsecImp
A.1.1. The SMIfi
A. 1.1.1. The Overview and Top Two Layers
structure SMIB { 
structure PolicyLayer {
NumberOfPolicies 
pointer to array of policy structures } 
structure ManagementLayer {
Local IP Address 
NumberOfClients
boolean AreAddressRanges // If so, there should be an even 
NumberOfClients
pointer to array of client IP addresses } 
structure ServicesLayer {} 
structure MechanismsLayer {} 
structure PrimitivesLayer {} }
A. 1.1.2. The Policies
structure Policy {
// First, the selectors, and whether they are used
boolean NextlltemUsed // If False, all destination addrs are selected.
DestinationAddress
boolean Next2ItemUsed
SourceAddress
boolean Next3ItemUsed
NextProtocol
boolean Next4ItemUsed
IPSecurityLabel // Level 1-16 (future work: more criteria)
boolean Next5ItemUsed
T ransportDestinationPort
boolean Next6ItemUsed
TransportSourcePort
151
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
/ / I f  none of the above are used, all packets are
selected
boolean Process // True if these packets are to be processed
// False if these are the packets NOT to be
processed.
// The negotiation goals
// The policy data is to be used by the key exchange module to negotiate
SAs.
32-bit int SPI1 Inner // SPI of the inner SA set up - 0 if  none
32-bit int SPI20uter // SPI of the outer SA set up - 0 if none
Protocollnner //
Modelnner //
ServNumlnner //
boolean Negotiatelnner 
choices if selected one not accepted
ProtocolOuter //
ModeOuter 
ServNumOuter 
boolean NegotiateOuter 
choices if selected one not accepted 
MaxIPsecPacketSize 
. . . }
A. 1.1.3. The Lower Three Layers (within the Overview)
structure SMIB { 
structure PolicyLayer {} 
structure ManagementLayer {} 
structure ServicesLayer { 
structure AH {
Enabled
HMAC mech. n o .} 
structure ESP {
Enabled
enc. mech. no. } } 
structure MechanismsLayer { 
structure Encryption {
Enabled
RNG prim. n o .} 
enc. prim. n o .} 
structure HMAC {
Enabled
RNG prim. n o .}
Hash. prim. no. 
enc. prim. n o .} } 
structure PrimitivesLayer {
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Protocol type of the inner SA to be set up 
The mode wanted: 1 for transport; 2 for tunnel 
Array index in the service structure
// if True, try different service
Protocol type of the outer SA to be set up
// Array index in the service structure 
// if True, try different service
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structure Encryption {
Enabled
enc. algorithm no.
chaining mode } // such as CBC
structure Hash {
Enabled
hash algorithm n o .} 
structure RNG {
Enabled
RNG algorithm no. } } }
In future work, each substructure of the Services to Primitives layers can be 
generalized to an array of the structures in order to select one at the higher layer. For 
now, each service, mechanism and primitive number is zero for each type because there 
is only one of each.
A. 1.2. The SADB
structure SADB {
FromlPAddress // Set to all 255s for all
ToIP Address
Protocol // 1=AH; 2=ESP
Mode // Same for AH and ESP l=Transport 2=Tunnel
32-bit int SPI // default 1
32-bit int SequenceNumber
32-bit int AntiReplayWindow
boolean SequenceNumberOverflow
3 2-bit int LifeTime // Number of bytes
L3ServiceNo // The SMIB service number negotiated
Pointer to (address of) the key
Pointer to the IV
boolean IVConstant; // - true if IV constant for this SA
boolean OppositeSAIdentical; // The SA for the other direction -
TRUE if so }
A. 1.3. Top-Level. Loop 
Initialization
-call the security Services layer with initialization command code.
-fill in lower three SMIB layers to reflect programmed capabilities.
-"key is always new" <— FALSE;
-packet processing <— FALSE;
Loop forever {
increment 64-bit counter for RNG seed (dec high 32 bits; inc low 32 bits) 
if (packet processing) { // process the OSI stack
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IP Layer // Note: each of these layers is called in sequence and each
checks the dispatcher for an incoming packet 
IPsec sublayer 
Link Layer} 
if (Command character received via RS232) { 
case of command character { 
h: board sends "Hello" characters via RS232 
r: board seeds the RNG with the 64-bit count and sends the count via
RS232
z: board sends its SADB out via RS232 
s: board receives its SADB via RS232 
m: board sends its SMIB out via RS232 
i: board receives its SMIB via RS232
k: toggle setting to initialize key in core every packet transform: "key is
always new"
p: toggle packet processing } } }
Note: blocks of data in the r,z,s,m and i commands are communicated using two 
reliable data transfer routines: a send routine and a receive routine. These commands are 
not used in the test version (IPsecLoop).
A. 1.4. Packet Processing, or OSI Layers 
A. 1.4.1. IP Layer
IP Layer: somewhat of a dummy layer { 
if (Start of Test) {
Start of Test <— FALSE
get the memory to receive the test packet via RS232 
receive the test packet via RS232 using reliable data transfer 
dispatch the packet to the next layer }
check the dispatcher for a received packet 
if  (Packet received) {
send the packet received, out via RS232 using reliable data transfer 
delete the memory containing the packet received back 
packet processing <— FALSE -  passed to top-level loop } }
A. 1.4.2. IPsec Layer
IPsec Layer { 
if (not already a packet being sent to the Link layer) { 
check the dispatcher for a packet from the IP layer }
j l
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if (packet received from the IP layer) { // Showing the packet sending code
KeylsNew <— KeylsNew or KeylsAlwaysTreatedAsNew or ((not 
LastTimeWasSending) and KeysDiffer)
depending upon the protocol in the SADB { 
use the reliable data transfer to synchronize with the GUI 
Level 3 AH or ESP Service(SADB, SMIB, SENDING, KeylsNew, 
NeedNewIV, IP packet in, IPsec packet out)
KeylsNew«- FALSE} 
echo the IPsec packet via RS232 using reliable data transfer - alerts the GUI 
dispatch the IPsec packet to the link layer 
delete the IP packet}
The receive code is analogous, with RECEIVING set in the service call, except 
that the protocol is read from the incoming packet and the SPI from the incoming packet 
is checked against the available incoming SADB(s). If the protocol is AH, a header 
verification message is sent via RS232.}
A. 1.4.3. Link Layer
Link Layer: a dummy layer { 
check the dispatcher for a packet from the IPsec layer 
if  there is a packet, put it back in the dispatcher to send it back }
A. 1.5. Reliable Data Transfer
These are for the IPsecImp demonstration only. Each of the board and the GUI 
have a send and a receive routine
A.I.5.1. Send Algorithm
Send algorithm (pointer to character buffer, length) {
Receive characters until STX from the recipient is received 
for each count of length, encode each of the two digits of the character 
byte as hexadecimal ASCII
and send the two digits
-increment the checksum from the original byte 
read and clear any hanging characters sent from the recipient, to clear any 
left-over STXes
send the four-byte checksum the same way.
if nothing received back from recipient, send ETX until something is 
while characters received back from recipient, echo back ACK or NAK 
-this ensures that the send code knows that the receiver got the 
handshake, when it stops sending
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-quit and continue if recipient sent STX for another block of data 
if the transmission was ACKed, quit, otherwise repeat the above to try
again }
A. 1.5.2. Receive Algorithm
Receive algorithm (pointer to character buffer, length) {
read any hanging characters and discard; stop if  ETX received 
if ETX not received, send STX until a character is received 
get two characters for every count of length
-each of the two is a hex digit; strip off the ASCII encoding and
make one byte
-increment the checksum using the determined byte 
get the four-byte checksum the same way
send ACK or NAK depending upon whether the checksums match 
get the handshake from the Sending entity
-if the handshake is not ACK or NAK, resend the ACK or NAK 
until the handshake is received.
read any hanging characters and discard
if the checksums matched, quit, otherwise repeat the above }
A. 1.6. The AH Service
L3AHServ (in; SADB, SMIB, Initialize, KeylsNew, Sending, NewIVNeeded, 
Datagramln, out: DatagramOut, Verifies) {
if (Initialize) L4MACMech(Initialize) and return, 
case SMIB—>Hash and encryption primitive { 
get the hash size needed
get the size of any extra space needed for signing (encryption) such as for 
including the IV }
get memory for the generated hash
if (not Sending) get memory for the decrypted hash, for verification 
get size of and memory for the transformed datagram, depending upon 
SADB—>mode: Transport or Tunnel
point to the location of the signed hash to write if  Sending or to read if 
receiving (pAuthData)
get size of and memory for a copy of the datagram to hash (pPayloadToL4) 
fill the copy of the datagram to hash, leaving off the mutable fields -  set to zero 
fill the transformed datagram out, skipping the location of the signed hash if
sending
L4MACMech(In: SMIB—>HMAC Mechanism number, SADB —> key and IV, 
SMIB, Initialize, KeylsNew, Sending, NewIVNeeded, pPayloadToL4, Out (In if 
receiving): pAuthData, Out: DecryptedHash, GeneratedHash) 
delete the space at pPayloadToL4
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if (not Sending) check the decrypted vs. generated hash and set Verifies 
accordingly
delete the decrypted and generated hash memory }
-Future work: use SADB service no —► SMIB—^ Service layer—^ Mechanism layer 
and —^ Primitives layer when arrays added
A. 1.7. The ESP Service
L3ESPServ (in: SADB, SMIB, Initialize, KeylsNew, Sending, NewIVNeeded, 
Datagramln, out: DatagramOut) {
if (Initialize) L4EncMech(Initialize) and return, 
case SMIB—► encryption primitive { 
get the encryption block size 
specify whether an IV is included } 
if (Sending) calculate the padding size required to make the payload a natural 
number multiple of the block size
calculate the transformed DatagramOut size, depending on SADB —» mode: 
Transport or Tunnel
get the memory for an unencrypted/decrypted copy of the datagram, 
DatagramOutUnEnc, with all the padding; also if receiving, the padding has to be 
decrypted before the padding size can be retrieved.
if  (Sending) get the memory for the DatagramOut
if (Sending) set pTransformedData in DatagramOut, else set pTransformedData 
in DatagramOutUnEnc
if (Sending) set pPayloadToL4 to the payload location in DatagramOutUnEnc, 
else set it to the payload location in Datagramln
Set the header data in DatagramOutUnEnc
if (Sending) set the data to be transformed in DatagramOutUnEnc and copy the 
header data to DatagramOut
L4EncMech(In: SMIB —»Enc Mechanism number, SADB —> key and IV, 
SMIB, Initialize, KeylsNew, Sending, NewIVNeeded, pPayloadToL4, Out: 
pTransformedData)
if (not Sending) get the memory and copy DatagramOutUnEnc to DatagramOut 
without the padding
delete DatagramOutUnEnc}
Future work: use SADB service no —> SMIB—^ Service layer—>Mechanism layer 
and —^ Primitives layer when arrays added)
A. 1.8. The HMAC Mechanism
L4MACMech(In: SMIB—»HMAC Mechanism number, SADB —*• key and IV, 
SMIB, Initialize, KeylsNew, Sending, NewIVNeeded, pPayloadToL4, Out (In if 
receiving): AuthHdrStorage, Out: DecryptedHash, GeneratedHash) { 
if (Initialize) L4AES128Mode(NONE) return 
case SMIB—►SMIB_Prims_layer.SMIB_Hash_Prims.Algorithm {
SHA2: set the hash size
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L5SHA2 (pPayloadToL4, Out: GeneratedHash)} 
case SMIB—»SMIB_Prims_layer.SMIBJEnc_Prims. Algorithm {
AES 128: get the key, if (Sending) get the IV
determine whether the key needs to be set in the core from KeylsNew 
and L4AES128Mode
if so, set the core use to MAC using L4AES128Mode() and call 
L5AESI28UpdateKey
if (NewIVNeeded and Sending) {
Get the RNG state, Use the RNG to create a random number for the 
IV, save the RNG state
Pass back the new IV using its pointer } 
if (Sending) {
put the IV into the output datagram at AuthHdrStorage 
L5AES128UpdateIVs() - put the IV into the AES core 
L5AES128EnDecrypt(ENCRYPT, GeneratedHash, HashSize, 
(AuthHdrStorage+sizeof(IV)), HashSize)} 
else {
get the IV from the input datagram at AuthHdrStorage 
L5AES128UpdateIVs() - put the IV into the AES core 
L5AES 128EnDecrypt(DECRYPT, (AuthHdrStorage+sizeof(IV)), 
HashSize, DecryptedHash, HashSize)} } }
A. 1.9. The Encryption Mechanism
L4EncMech(In: SMIB—^ Encryption Mechanism number, SADB —> key and IV, 
SMIB, Initialize, KeylsNew, Sending, NewIVNeeded, pPayloadToL4, Out: 
TransformStorage) {
if (Initialize) L4AES128Mode(NONE), reset and save the RNG state, return 
case SMIB—>SMIB_Prims_layer.SMIB_Enc_Prims.Algorithm {
AES 128: get the key, if (Sending) get the IV
determine whether the key needs to be set in the core from KeylsNew 
and L4AES128Mode
if so, set the core use to ENC using L4AES128Mode() and call 
L5AESI28UpdateKey
if (NewIVNeeded and Sending) {
Get the RNG state, Use the RNG to create a random number for the 
IV, save the RNG state
Pass back the new IV using its pointer } 
if (Sending) {
put the IV into the output datagram at TransformStorage 
L5AES128UpdateIVs() - put the IV into the AES core 
L5AES 128EnDecrypt(ENCRYPT, pPayloadToL4+sizeof(IV), Size, 
(TransformStorage+sizeof(IV)), S ize)} 
else {
get the IV from the input datagram at pPayloadToL4 
L5AES128UpdateIVs() - put the IV into the AES core
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L5AES128EnDecrypt(DECRYPT, pPayloadToL4+sizeof(IV), Size, 
TransformStorage, S ize)} } }
A.1.10.L4 (Mechanism) SPI Tracking Storage
L4AES128SPI(Setting, SomethingSet, —>SPI, —^ Decrypting) {
static IsSomethingSet // Whether anything is stored
static SPIState 
static DecryptingState
if  (Setting) {
IsSomethingSet = SomethingSet 
SPIState = —»SPI 
DecryptingState = —>Decrypting}
else {
-►SPI = SPIState 
—►Decrypting = DecryptingState} 
return(IsSomethingSet)}
A. 1.11 .The Hash Primitive 
Dummy Hash
L5SHA2(MsgIn, MsgLen, 32-bit OutO - 32-bit Out7) { set each of the eight 32-bit 
words to (hex) 5A5A5A5A }
A.1.12.The RNG Primitive
First, the state is stored using static variables within a function -  this function 
must be used to retrieve and then to save the state before and after the Generate function.
A. 1.12.1. Get or Set the State
L5RngCoreValues(int Set, 32-bit HOCASR, 32-bit LOCASR, 32-bit HOLFSR, 
32-bit LOLFSR) {
if  (Set) store HOCASR, LOCASR, HOLFSR, LOLFSR (the state) in local 
static variables
else retrieve the state }
A .I.12.2. Reset the State (to all “ l ”s)
L5RngReset(32-bit HOCASR, 32-bit LOCASR, 32-bit HOLFSR, 32-bit 
LOLFSR) {
set the state to all binary Is, i.e., hex FFFFFFFF for each }
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A .I.12.3. Seed the RNG
L5RngSeed(32-bit HOSeedln, 32-bit LOSeedln, 32-bit HOCASR, 32-bit 
LOCASR, 32-bit HOLFSR, 32-bit LOLFSR) {
HOCASR«- HOSeedln, LOCASR <- LOSeedln, HOLFSR «- 
HOSeedln, LOLFSR «- LOSeedln }
A. 1.12.4. Generate a Random Number
L5RngGenerate(32-bit HOCASR, 32-bit LOCASR, 32-bit HOLFSR, 32-bit 
LOLFSR) {
generate the random number as given previously and update the state 
return the 32-bit random number }
A .I.13.The AES-128 Primitive 
A .I.13.1. Key Load to the Core
L5AES128UpdateKey(32-bit KeyO, 32-bit Keyl, 32-bit Key2,32-bit Key3, 
Decryptor) {
write the encryptor core slave registers 1-4 with Key 0 to 3 
if  (Decryptor) {
use the algorithm detailed previously to load the key expand values from 
the encryptor core to the decryptor core }
The encryptor's IV was changed by loading the key expand values to the 
decryptor; just clear it even if not loading the decryptor. The calling 
routine will be responsible for setting it:
L5AES 128UpdateIVs(0, 0, 0, 0)}
A. 1.13.2. IV Load to the Core
L5AES 128UpdateIVs(32-bit IVO, 32-bit IV1, 32-bit IV2, 32-bit IV3) { 
set IVLoad in the encryptor core 
write the encryptor core slave registers 5-8 with IVO to 3 
clear IVLoad in the encryptor core 
set IVLoad in the decryptor core 
write the decryptor core slave registers 5-8 with IVO to 3 
clear IVLoad in the decryptor core }
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A .I.13.3. The Encrypt or Decrypt Function
L5AES128EnDecrypt(int Encrypt, 32-bit CurrentBlockln, BlocklnLength, 32-bit 
CurrentBlockOut, BlockOutLength) {
Validate user entry - BlocklnLength must be a multiple of sixteen bytes, 
and BlockOutLength must be at least the same size - return with error if  not the case, 
for each 128-bit (16-byte) block {
// Note big-endian data orientation. Note that SlaveReg8 has to be 
written last for the transform to proceed; use the first 32-bit words as higher-order data. 
In the core, SlaveReg5 is highest order.
if (Encrypt) {
write the encryptor core slave registers 5-8 with the four
32-bit words of the block in
Wait for the encryptor core to finish, although doing this 
seems somewhat ridiculous given how fast the core works (220 ns).
read the encryptor core slave registers 9-12 to the four 32-
bit words of the block o u t} 
else {
do the same except using the decryptor core slave registers
A.2. IPsecLoop
Differences from IPsecImp are shown. Note that IPsecLoop has no GUI, since it 
is a CLI program. Also, it only differs in the top-level loop and OSI layers; all of L3 
(Service) to L5 (Primitive) layers are identical.
A.2.1. Top-Level Loop
Differences from IPsecImp:
Initialization 
-set the SADB
-set a specific embedded test packet 
commands 
r, z, s, m, and i are not needed 
added:
o: toggle the loop testing between outgoing (encryption) and receiving back 
(decryption)
t: change the protocol and mode to be tested, in the SADB
i: change the increment by which to increase the test packet size
n: toggle "need new IV"; if  set, a new IV is acquired via the RNG every packet
transform
s: increment the packet size or revert to the starting size
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A.2.2. Packet Processing, or OSI Layers 
Differences from IPsecImp:
A.2.2.1. IP Layer
IP Layer:
Start of test:
copy the embedded test packet (so that the IPsecLayer won't delete the
original)
if packet received:
echo the packet via plain RS232
A.2.2.1. IPsecLayer
IPsec Layer:
The service calls are put into a loop containing:
a dummy AES transform (the opposite one to the one used in the service 
call) to read via oscilloscope to mark the loop 
the service call
a dummy transform to read via oscilloscope to mark the end of the service
call
test for error
set "KeylsNew" from top-level user selection 
check for a keystroke via RS232 and exit the loop if so 
check for the setting of the "Outgoing" vs. incoming test selection to exit the 
loop after only one execution if testing the other direction, 
delete the transformed packet if looping
A.3. IPsecGUI
The key packet processing functions are shown below.
A.3.1. Packet processing test setup
OnButtonSendPacket { 
initial validation of SMIB, SADB and their contents
test for existance and validity of the test packet - header size, minimum 1-byte 
payload size
verify that the size of the IPsec test packet produced will be no larger than 
(hex) FFFF
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send 'p' to start packet processing in the board
if no error message from the board, use reliable data transfer to send the test
packet
- display a progress dot after sending the packet size
use reliable data transfer to receive "Synch" from the board to synchronize to 
the board's actual service call
- display a progress dot 
PacketOutgoing <— true
PacketOutProcTime <— 0, PacketlnProcTime <— 0 
Set the GUI timer for timer messages at a 1ms rate }
A.3.2. Packet processing timer processing 
OnTimer {
increment the appropriate count depending upon PacketOutgoing 
check for character received; exit if nothing 
stop the timer
if error message from the board, display it and exit 
if (PacketOutgoing) { 
display the time taken for the outgoing processing for display purposes 
get the IPsec packet size via reliable data transfer; display a space and a progress dot 
get the IPsec packet using reliable data transfer; display an "o" for "outgoing 
processing complete"
use reliable data transfer to receive "Synch" from the board to synchronize to the 
board's actual service call 
display a progress dot
Set the GUI timer for timer messages at a 1ms rate } 
else {
use reliable data transfer to receive the status message of the AH verification (or 
dummy characters if ESP)
display the time taken for the incoming processing for display purposes 
get the IP packet size via reliable data transfer; display a space and a progress dot 
get the IP packet using reliable data transfer; display an "i" for "incoming processing 
complete"
display the IP and the IPsec packet
echo the protocol and mode for record-keeping
echo the outgoing and incoming processing times for record-keeping
echo the AH verification message for record-keeping } }
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APPENDIX B
B. Experimental Data
B.l. Simulation Results
B.1.1. Encryption
B. 1.1.1. Encryption -  with All Intermediate Step Results
At the time these “screenshots” were taken, the “load pulse” method was used to 
initiate “Id r” and the transform.
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Figure 61. Encryption simulation "screenshot" -  upper left quadrant of view
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Figure 62. Encryption simulation "screenshot" -  lower left quadrant of view
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Figure 63. Encryption simulation "screenshot" -  upper right quadrant of view
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Figure 64. Encryption simulation "screenshot" -  lower right quadrant of view
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Figure 65. Encryption simulation “screenshot,” showing autoload
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Figure 66. Encryption simulation “screenshot,” showing CBC mode
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B.1.2. Decryption
Figure 67. Decryption simulation "screenshot,” showing IV load and save
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B.2. Tabulated Data from “IPsecLoop” Oscilloscope Testing
B.2.1. Version 4, with “IPsecLoop” and “IPsecGUI” Comparison
B.2.1.1. AH Transport
AH Transport Mode packet processing times using IPsecLoop, - data  of Mar 1-2, 
2007
(entered here Mar 13-15) - Jam es  W iebe 
(Packet sizes in bytes - 8 bits in the ML403 board)
"GUI processing times" refer to use  of the IPsecGUI; (1) laptop runs Mar 13-14, 2007 
(2) on PC Mar 17, 2007
(hex)
GUI
GUI inc.
Outgoing Incoming GUI out. out. proc.
proc. proc. proc. GUI inc. proc. time
size Packet size time time time (ms) proc. time time (ms)
(decimal) (ms) (ms) (1) (ms) (1) (ms) (2) (2)
28 40 0.72 0.97 2 2 1 1
128 296 3.9 3.6 2 2 1 1
228 v 552 5.7 6.3 2 1 1 1
328 808 7.6 2 1 1 1
428 1064 9.3 11.5 2 1 1 1
528 1320 11.3 1 2
628 1576 13 17 1 1 1 2
728 1832 15 2 1
828 2088 17 22 1 1 1 2
928 2344 18.8 2 2
a28 2600 28 1 1 1 3
c28 3112 24 33 1 2 1 3
e28 3624 28 38 1 2 2 2
1028 4136 31.5 44 2 3 3 3
1228 4648 35.5 3 3
1428 5160 39 54 2 4 3 4
1828 6184 46 64 3 5 3 5
1c28 7208 54 75 4 6 4 6
2028 8232 61 85 5 7 5 6
2428 9256 68 95 5 8 5 7
2828 10280 76 108 6 9 6 8
2c28 11304 83 118 7 10 5 8
3028 12328 90 128 7 11 6 8
3428 ' 13352 98 140 7 12 7 9
3828 14376 108 150 9 14 7 10
3c28 15400 113 160 9 15 8 11
4028 16424 120 170 10 15 8 12
10. AH Transport tabulated data -  ver. 4, with “IPsecLoop” and “IPsecGUI” comparison
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B.2.1.2. AH Tunnel
AH Tunnel Mode packet processing times using IPsecLoop, - data  of Mar 3, 2007
(entered here Mar 15) - Jam es  W iebe
(Packet sizes in bytes - 8 bits in the ML403 board)
"GUI processing times" refer to use  of the IPsecGUI; (1) laptop runs Mar 13-14, 2007 
(2) on PC Mar 17, 2007
(hex)
GUI
GUI inc.
Outgoing Incoming GUI out. out. proc.
proc. proc. proc GUI inc. proc. time
size Packet size time time time (ms) proc. time time (ms)
(decimal) (ms) (ms) (1) (ms) (1) (ms) (2) (2)
28 40 0.9 1.2 2 2 1 1
128 296 2.8 3.8 2 2 1 1
228 552 4.6 6.4 2 2 1 1
328 808 2 2 1 1
428 1064 8.3 12 2 1 1 1
528 1320 1 1
628 1576 12 17 1 1 1 2
728 1832 1 1
828 2088 17 22 1 1 2 2
928 2344 2 2
a28 2600 20 28 1 1 2 2
c28 3112 23 33 1 2 3
e28 3624 27 38 1 1 2 3
1028 4136 31 43 2 4 3 3
1228 4648 1 4
1428 5160 38 54 2 4 3 4
1828 6184 45 64 3 5 3 4
1c28 7208 53 75 4 8 3 5
2028 8232 60 85 4 6 4 6
2428 9256 68 95 5 8 5 7
2828 10280 75 105 6 9 5 7
2c28 11304 82 116 7 10 6 8
3028 12328 90 128 7 11 7 9
3428 13352 98 138 7 13 7 10
3828 14376 105 150 9 13 7 10
3c28 15400 111 160 9 14 8 10
4028 16424 120 170 10 15 7 11
Table 11. AH Tunnel tabulated data -  ver. 4, with “IPsecLoop” and “IPsecGUI” comparison
B.2.1.3. ESP Transport
ESP Transport Mode packet processing tim es using IPsecLoop, - data of Mar 3, 
2007
(entered here Mar 15) - Jam es  W iebe
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(Packet sizes in bytes - 8 bits in the ML403 board)
"GUI processing times" refer to use  of the IPsecGUI; (1) laptop runs Mar 13-14, 
2007
(2) on PC Mar 17, 2007
GUI
out.
Outgoing Incoming proc. GUI inc. GUI out. GUI inc.
Packet Packet proc. proc. time proc. proc. proc.
size size time time (ms) time time time
(hex) (decimal) (ms) (ms) (1) (ms) (1) (ms) (2) (ms) (2)
28 40 0.6 0.41 2 2 1 1
128 296 2.7 1.8 2 2 1 1
228 552 4.7 3.2 2 2 1 1
328 808 4.6 1 1
428 1064 8.8 6 1 2 1 1
528 1320 1 1
628 1576 13 8.8 1 1 1 1
728 1832 2 1
828 2088 17 12 1 1 2 1
928 2344 2 2
a28 2600 21 14 1 1 2 1
c28 3112 25 17 1 1 2 2
e28 3624 30 20 1 1 3 2
1028 4136 34 23 2 1 2 2
1228 4648 3 2
1428 5160 42 28 2 1 3 2
1828 6184 50 34 3 2 4 2
1c28 7208 58 40 4 3 4 3
2028 8232 66 45 5 3 5 3
2428 9256 74 50 4 4
2828 10280 83 56 7 4 6 4
2c28 11304 90 62 7 4 7 4
3028 12328 100 68 7 5 6 5
3428 13352 108 73 8 6 7 6
3828 14376 115 78 10 1 7 6
3c28 15400 125 85 11 7 8 6
4028 16424 133 91 11 6 9 6
Table 12. ESP Transport tabulated data -  ver. 4, with “IPsecLoop” and “IPsecGUI” comparison
B.2.1.4. ESP Tunnel
ESP Tunnel Mode packet processing tim es using IPsecLoop, - data of Mar 3, 2007
(entered here Mar 15) - Jam es  W iebe
(Packet sizes in bytes - 8 bits in the ML403 board)
"GUI processing times" refer to use  of the IPsecGUI; (1) laptop runs Mar 13-14, 2007 
(2) on PC Mar 17, 2007
Packet Packet Outgoing Incoming GUI out. GUI inc. GUI GUI inc.
size size proc. proc. proc. proc. time out. proc.
(hex) (decimal) time time time (ms) (ms) (1) proc. time
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(ms) (ms) (1) time (ms) (2) 
(ms) (2)
28 40 0.755 0.34
128 296 2.8 1.7
228 552 4.8 3.1
328 808 7.9 4.5
428 1064 8.9 5.9
528 1320
628 1576 13 8.7
728 1832
828 2088 17 12
928 2344
a28 2600 21 14
C28 3112 26 17
e28 3624 30 20
1028 4136 35 23
1228 4648
1428 5160 42 28
1828 6184 50 34
1c28 7208 58 40
2028 8232 66 45
2428 9256 75 51
2828 10280 83 56
2c28 11304 93 62
3028 12328 100 67
3428 13352 108 73
3828 14376 115 78
3c28 15400 125 85
4028 16424 133 90
Table 13. ESP Tunnel tabulated data -  ver. 4,
2 2 1 1
2 2 1 1
2 2 1 1
1 1 
2 2 1 1
1 1 
1 2 2 1
2 1 
1 1 . 1  1
2 1 
1 1 2  2
1 1 2  1
1 1 3  2
1 1 3  2
3
3 1 3
3 2 4
3 2 4
5 2 5
5 3 5
6 3 6
7 4 6
8 5 7
9 5 8
10 6 8
10 7 7
11 7 9
1th “IPsecLoop” and “IPsecGUI” comparison
B.2.2. Version 6 Compared to Ver. 4
B.2.2.1. ESP Transport
ESP Transport Mode packet processing times using IPsecLoop, - 
data of Mar 20,
2007 - IPsecLoop Ver 006
(entered here Mar 26) - Jam es W iebe
(1) - Data of Mar 3, for comparison
(Packet sizes in bytes - 8 bits in the ML403 board)
Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming
Packet Packet proc. proc. proc. proc.
size size time time time time
(hex) (decimal) (ms) (1) (ms) (1) (ms) (ms)
28 40 0.6 0.41 0.39 0.37
128 296 2.7 1.8 1.3 1.4
228 552 4.7 3.2 2.3 2.3
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328 808 4.6
428 1064 8.8 6 4.2 4.2
528 1320
628 1576 13 8.8 6 6.2
728 1832
828 2088 17 12 7.9 8.1
928 2344
a28 2600 21 14 9.8 10
c28 3112 25 17 12 12
e28 3624 30 20 14 14
1028 4136 34 23 16 16
1228 4648
1428 5160 42 28 19 20
1828 6184 50 34 23 24
1c28 7208 58 40 28 28
2028 8232 66 45 30 31
2428 9256 74 50 35 35
2828 10280 83 56 38 39
2c28 11304 90 62 42 44
3028 12328 100 68 46 47
3428 13352 108 73 49 51
3828 14376 115 78 53 55
3c28 15400 125 85 57 59
4028 16424 133 91 60 63
Table 14. ESP Transport tabulated data -  ver. 6 compared to ver. 4
B.2.2.2. ESP Tunnel
ESP Tunnel Mode packet processing times using IPsecLoop, - 
data of Mar 20,
2007 - IPsecLoop Ver 006
(entered here Mar 26) - Jam es W iebe
(1) - Data of Mar 3, for comparison
(Packet sizes in bytes - 8 bits in the ML403 board)
Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming
Packet Packet proc. proc. proc. proc.
size size time time time time
(hex) (decimal) (ms) (1) (ms) (1) (ms) (ms)
28 40 0.755 0.34 0.48 0.31
128 296 2.8 1.7 1.4 1.3
228 552 4.8 3.1 2.3 2.3
328 808 7.9 4.5
428 1064 8.9 5.9 4.2 4.2
528 1320
628 1576 13 8.7 6.1 6.1
728 1832
828 2088 17 12 8 8.1
928 2344
a28 2600 21 14 9.9 9.9
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c28 3112 26 17 12 12
e28 3624 30 20 14 14
1028 4136 35 23 16 16
1228 4648
1428 5160 42 28 19 20
1828 6184 50 34 23 23
1c28 7208 58 40 27 27
2028 8232 66 45 30 32
2428 9256 75 51 34 35
2828 10280 83 56 38 39
2c28 11304 93 62 42 43
3028 12328 100 67 46 47
3428 13352 108 73 49 51
3828 14376 115 78 54 55
3c28 15400 125 85 56 58
4028 16424 133 90 60 62
Table 15. ESP Tunnel tabulated data -  ver. 6 compared to ver. 4
B.2.3. Version 7 Compared to Ver. 6 and 4
B.2.3.1. AHf Transport
AH Transport Mode packet processing tim es using IPsecLoop, - 
data of Mar 21,
2007 - IPsecLoop Ver 007
(entered here Mar 26) - Jam es W iebe
(1) - Data of Mar 1-2, for comparison
(Packet sizes in bytes - 8 bits in the ML403 board)
Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming
Packet Packet proc. proc. proc. proc.
size size time time time time
(hex) (decimal) (ms) (1) (ms) (1) (ms) (ms)
28 40 0.72 0.97 0.56 0.84
128 296 3.9 3.6 2 3.1
228 552 5.7 6.3 3.4 5.3
328 808 7.6
428 1064 9.3 11.5 6.2 9.6
528 1320 11.3
628 1576 13 17 9 14
728 1832 15
828 2088 17 22 12 19
928 2344 18.8
a28 2600 28 15 23
c28 3112 24 33 18 28
e28 3624 28 38 21 32
1028 4136 31.5 44 23 36
1228 4648 35.5 26 41
1428 5160 39 54 29 45
1828 6184 46 64 35 54
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1c28 7208 54 75 40 63
2028 8232 61 85 46 72
2428 9256 68 95 52 80
2828 10280 76 108 58 88
2c28 11304 83 118 63 98
3028 12328 90 128 68 108
3428 13352 98 140 73 115
3828 14376 108 150 80 125
3c28 15400 113 160 85 133
4028 16424 120 170 90 143
Table 16. AH Transport tabulated data -  ver. 7 compared to ver. 4
B.2.3.2. AH Tunnel
AH Tunnel Mode packet processing tim es using IPsecLoop, - data 
of Mar 21,
2007 - IPsecLoop Ver 007
(entered here Mar 26) - Jam es  W iebe
(1) - Data of Mar 1-2, for comparison
(Packet sizes in bytes - 8 bits in the ML403 board)
Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming
Packet Packet proc. proc. proc. proc.
size size time time time time
(hex) (decimal) (ms) (1) (ms) (1) (ms) (ms)
28 40 0.9 1.2 0.69 0.975
128 296 2.8 3.8 2.1 3.2
228 552 4.6 6.4 3.6 5.4
328 808
428 1064 8.3 12 6.4 9.8
528 1320
628 1576 12 17 9.3 14
728 1832
828 2088 17 22 12 19
928 2344
a28 2600 20 28 15 23
c28 3112 23 33 18 28
e28 3624 27 38 21 32
1028 4136 31 43 23 36
1228 4648
1428 5160 38 54 29 45
1828 6184 45 64 35 54
1c28 7208 53 75 41 62
2028 8232 60 85 46 72
2428 9256 68 95 52 80
2828 10280 75 105 58 90
2c28 11304 82 116 63 99
3028 12328 90 128 70 106
3428 13352 98 138 75 115
3828 14376 105 150 80 125
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3c28 15400 111 160 85 131
4028 16424 120 170 93 143
Table 17. AH Tunnel tabulated data -  ver. 7 compared to ver. 4
B.2.3.3. ESP Transport
ESP Transport Mode packet processing times using IPsecLoop, - data  of Mar 21,
2007 - IPsecLoop Ver 007
(entered here Mar 26) - Jam es W iebe
(1) - Data of Mar 3 - ver 4
(2) - Data of Mar 20 - ver 6
(Packet sizes in bytes - 8 bits in the ML403 board)
Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming
Packet Packet proc. proc. proc. proc. proc. proc.
size size time time time time time time
(hex) (decimal) (ms) (1) (ms) (1) (ms) (2) (ms) (2) (ms) (ms)
28 40 0.6 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.315
128 296 2.7 1.8 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3
228 552 4.7 3.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2
328 808 4.6
428 1064 8.8 6 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1
528 1320
628 1576 13 8.8 6 6.2 5.9 6
728 1832
828 2088 17 12 7.9 8.1 7.8 8
928 2344
a28 2600 21 14 9.8 10 9.6 9.9
c28 3112 25 17 12 12 12 12
e28 3624 30 20 14 14 13 14
1028 4136 34 23 16 16 15 16
1228 4648
1428 5160 42 28 19 20 19 20
1828 6184 50 34 23 24 23 23
1c28 7208 58 40 28 28 26 27
2028 8232 66 45 30 31 30 31
2428 9256 74 50 35 35 34 35
2828 10280 83 56 38 39 38 39
2c28 11304 90 62 42 44 41 43
3028 12328 100 68 46 47 45 46
3428 13352 108 73 49 51 48 50
3828 14376 115 78 53 55 52 54
3c28 15400 125 85 57 59 56 58
4028 16424 133 91 60 63 60 62
Table 18. ESP Transport tabulated data -  ver. 7 compared to ver. 6 and 4
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B.2.3.4. ESP Tunnel
ESP Tunnel Mode packet processing times using IPsecLoop, - data of Mar 21,
2007 - IPsecLoop Ver 007
(entered here Mar 26) - Jam es  W iebe
(1) - Data of Mar 3 - ver 4
(2) - Data of Mar 20 - ver 6
(Packet sizes in bytes - 8 bits in the ML403 board)
Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming
Packet Packet proc. proc. proc. proc. proc. proc.
size size time time time time time time
(hex) (decimal) (ms) (1) (ms) (1) (ms) (2) (ms) (2) (ms) (ms)
28 40 0.755 0.34 0.48 0.31 0.44 0.255
128 296 2.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.2
228 552 4.8 3.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2
328 808 7.9 4.5
428 1064 8.9 5.9 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.1
528 1320
628 1576 13 8.7 6.1 6.1 6 6
728 1832
828 2088 17 12 8 8.1 7.8 7.9
928 2344
a28 2600 21 14 9.9 9.9 9.7 9.8
c28 3112 26 17 12 12 12 12
e28 3624 30 20 14 14 14 14
1028 4136 35 23 16 16 15 16
1228 4648
1428 5160 42 28 19 20 19 19
1828 6184 50 34 23 23 23 23
1c28 7208 58 40 27 27 27 27
2028 8232 66 45 30 32 30 31
2428 9256 75 51 34 35 34 35
2828 10280 83 56 38 39 38 39
2c28 11304 93 62 42 43 41 42
3028 12328 100 67 46 47 45 46
3428 13352 108 73 49 51 49 50
3828 14376 115 78 54 55 53 54
3c28 15400 125 85 56 58 56 58
4028 16424 133 90 60 62 60 62
Table 19. ESP Tunnel tabulated data -  ver. 7 compared to ver. 6 and 4
B.2.4. Version 8 Compared to Ver. 7
B.2.4.1. AH Transport
AH Transport Mode packet processing tim es using IPsecLoop, - 
data of Apr 9,
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2007 - IPsecLoop Ver 008
(entered here Apr 10) - Jam es W iebe
(1) - Data of IPsecLoop ver 007, Mar 21, for comparison
(Packet sizes in bytes - 8 bits in the ML403 board)
Outgoing Incoming Outgoing incoming
Packet Packet proc. proc. proc. proc.
size size time time time time
(hex) (decimal) (ms) (1) (ms) (1) (ms) (ms)
28 40 0.56 0.84 0.435 0.83
128 296 2 3.1 1.19 3.03
228 552 3.4 5.3 1.94 5.2
328 808
428 1064 6.2 9.6 3.43 9.6
528 1320
628 1576 9 14 4.9 14
728 1832
828 2088 12 19 6.4 18.4
928 2344
a28 2600 15 23 7.9 22.8
c28 3112 18 28 9.25 27.3
e28 3624 21 32 10.9 31.8
1028 4136 23 36 12.4 36
1228 4648 26 41 13.8 40.3
1428 5160 29 45 15.3 45
1828 6184 35 54 18.3 53
1c28 7208 40 63 21.3 62
2028 8232 46 72 24.3 71
2428 9256 52 80 27.3 79.5
2828 10280 58 88 30.3 88
2c28 11304 63 98 33.3 98
3028 12328 68 108 36.3 106
3428 13352 73 115 39 115
3828 14376 80 125 42 123
3c28 15400 85 133 45 133
4028 16424 90 143 48 141
Table 20. AH Transport tabulatedI data -  ver. 8 compared to ver. 7
B.2.4.2. AHTunnel
AH Tunnel Mode packet processing times using IPsecLoop, - data 
of Apr 9,
2007 - IPsecLoop Ver 008
(entered here Apr 10) - Jam es  W iebe
(1) - Data of Mar 21, IPsecLoop ver 007, for comparison
(Packet sizes in bytes - 8 bits in the ML403 board)
Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming
Packet Packet proc. proc. proc. proc.
size size time time time time
(hex) (decimal) (m s)(1) (m s)(1) (ms) (ms)
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28 40 0.69 0.975 0.51 0.975
128 296 2.1 3.2 1.25 3.2
228 552 3.6 5.4 2 5.4
328 808
428 1064 6.4 9.8 3.5 9.88
528 1320
628 1576 9.3 14 4.95 14.1
728 1832
828 2088 12 19 6.45 18.6
928 2344
a28 2600 15 23 7.95 23
c28 3112 18 28 9.38 27.3
e28 3624 21 32 10.9 32
1028 4136 23 36 12.8 36.5
1228 4648 13.9 41
1428 5160 29 45 15.4 45
1828 6184 35 54 18.3 54
1c28 7208 41 62 21.3 63
2028 8232 46 72 24.3 71.5
2428 9256 52 80 27.3 81.5
2828 10280 58 90 30.3 89
2c28 11304 63 99 33.3 98
3028 12328 70 106 36.3 108
3428 13352 75 115 39.3 116
3828 14376 80 125 42.3 125
3c28 15400 85 131 45 133
4028 16424 93 143 48 142
Table 21. AH Tunnel tabulated data -  ver. 8 compared to ver. 7
B.2.4.3. ESP Transport
ESP Transport Mode packet processing times using IPsecLoop, - 
data of Apr 9,
2007 - IPsecLoop Ver 008
(entered here Apr 10) - Jam es W iebe
(1) - Data of Mar 21 - ver 7
(Packet sizes in bytes - 8 bits in the ML403 board)
Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming
Packet Packet proc. proc. proc. proc.
size size time time time time
(hex) (decimal) (ms) (1) (ms) (1) (ms) (ms)
28 40 0.38 0.315 0.27 0.24
128 296 1.3 1.3 1.23 1.33
228 552 2.2 2.2 2.16 2.4
328 808
428 1064 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.55
528 1320
628 1576 5.9 6 5.9 6.7
728 1832
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828 2088 7.8 8 7.8 8.9
928 2344
a28 2600 9.6 9.9 9.63 11
c28 3112 12 12 11.5 13.1
e28 3624 13 14 13.4 15.4
1028 4136 15 16 15.3 17.5
1228 4648 17.3 19.8
1428 5160 19 20 19.1 21.9
1828 6184 23 23 22.8 26.3
1c28 7208 26 27 26.5 30.3
2028 8232 30 31 30.3 34.8
2428 9256 34 35 34 39.3
2828 10280 38 39 37.8 43.3
2c28 11304 41 43 41.5 47.5
3028 12328 45 46 45 52
3428 13352 48 50 49 56.5
3828 14376 52 54 53 61
3c28 15400 56 58 56.5 65
4028 16424 60 62 60 69
Table 22. ESP Transport tabulated data -  ver. 8 compared to ver. 7
B.2.4.4. ESP Tunnel
ESP Tunnel Mode packet processing times using IPsecLoop, - 
data of Apr 9,
2007 - IPsecLoop Ver 008
(entered here Apr 10) - Jam es W iebe
(1) - Data of Mar 21 - ver 7
(Packet sizes in bytes - 8 bits in the ML403 board)
Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming
Packet Packet proc. proc. proc. proc.
size size time time time time
(hex) (decimal) (ms) (1) (ms) (1) (ms) (ms)
28 40 0.44 0.255 0.34 0.26
128 296 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.35
228 552 2.3 2.2 2.23 2.43
328 808
428 1064 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.6
528 1320
628 1576 6 6 6 6.75
728 1832
828 2088 7.8 7.9 7.9 8.9
928 2344
a28 2600 9.7 9.8 9.8 11.1
c28 3112 12 12 11.6 13
e28 3624 14 14 13.5 15.4
1028 4136 15 16 15.4 17.5
1228 4648 17.3 19.8
1428 5160 19 19 19.1 21.9
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1828 6184 23 23 22.8 26.3
1c28 7208 27 27 26.5 30.5
2028 8232 30 31 30.5 34.8
2428 9256 34 35 34.3 39.3
2828 10280 38 39 37.8 43.5
2c28 11304 41 42 41.5 47.5
3028 12328 45 46 45 52
3428 13352 49 50 49.5 56
3828 14376 53 54 54 60.5
3c28 15400 56 58 57 65.5
4028 16424 60 62 60.5 69.5
Table 23. ESP Tunnel tabulated data -  ver. 8 compared to ver. 7
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